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Abstract
This thesis draws on evidence from interactions between China 
and India over the past few years to make an empirical case for the 
existence and impact of asymmetrical perceptions of threat 
between the two countries. The major issues of China-India 
relations, including the nuclear issue, the boundary problem, the 
Tibet issue, regional competition and cooperation, and China-India 
relations in the global context, are examined.
The first aim of the thesis is to highlight the asymmetry of the 
threat perceptions between China and India and has explained the 
interactions of Sino-Indian relations. India tends to be deeply 
apprehensive of threats from China, while China appears 
comparatively unconcerned about threats from India.
The second contention in this study is that Sino-Indian relations are 
constrained by the asymmetry between their threat perceptions. 
The asymmetry in perceptions of threat will result in a dilemma for 
India. India will try to reduce the sense of insecurity by adopting 
some countermeasures, such as developing nuclear weapons, 
allying with other countries, and undermining China’s influence. 
However, India is also very cautious and avoids angering China.
On the contrary, China will be in favour of the status quo, and feel 
no urgent need to sort out the boundary disputes. The Chinese side
has ignored the asymmetry and is in no mood to share India’s 
expectations and concerns.
Thus, this thesis argues that this asymmetry has made it difficult 
for China and India to forge shared knowledge and to set a 
common agenda around which their expectations could converge. 
India will be on a perennial quest for changes in Sino-Indian 
relations, such as a final resolution of the border issue and securing 
more credible nuclear deterrent against China. The asymmetry in 
threat perceptions is seen as a destabilising factor in China-India 
relations.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
1.1 Research Question
On May 11, 1998, the Government of India shocked the world by conducting three 
rounds of nuclear tests in the Pokhran desert in its north-western Rajasthan state. The 
new National Democratic Alliance (NDA) government, led by the Bharatiya Janata 
Party (BJP), had been elected to office barely a month earlier. Two days after the 
nuclear tests, the New York Times published a letter from Indian Prime Minister Atal 
Bihari Vajpayee to US President Bill Clinton. Aiming to explain the rationale of the 
nuclear tests, Vajpayee said:
We have an overt nuclear weapon state on our borders, a state which committed 
armed aggression against India in 1962. Although our relations with that 
country have improved in the last decade or so, an atmosphere o f  distrust 
persists mainly due to the unresolved border problem. To add to the distrust that 
country has materially helped another neighbour o f ours to become a covert 
nuclear weapons state. At the hands o f  this bitter neighbour we have suffered 
three aggressions in the last 50 years}
Since the late 1980s, China and India have sought to reduce the tensions along the 
frontier and expanded trade and cultural exchanges. However, following Vajpayee’s 
statement, China not only demanded that India should roll back its nuclear weapon 
programme, but also boycotted the decade-long bilateral dialogue for solving the 
border dispute.
1 For the text o f Vajpayee’s letter, see New York Times, May 13, 1998, A12.
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The nuclear tests episode once again exposed the fragility of Sino-Indian relations. 
India was the first non-communist state to establish diplomatic relations with the 
People’s Republic of China. The slogan “Hindi, Chini, bhai bhai” (Indians and 
Chinese are brothers) was trumpeted by Beijing and New Delhi in the mid-1950s. 
However, Sino-Indian relations soon deteriorated after 1959 when the Dalai Lama 
fled to India and the Sino-Indian border dispute surfaced, culminating in a brief but 
significant war along the disputed frontier. The border dispute remains unresolved, 
albeit diplomatic relations at ambassador level were restored in 1976.
The normalisation of relations gained new momentum when Indian Prime Minister 
Rajiv Gandhi visited Beijing in 1988, the first visit by an Indian head of government 
since Jawaharlal Nehru’s visit in 1954, and was reciprocated by Chinese Premier 
Zhou Enlai’s visit to India in 1960. Since then, high level exchanges visits had 
increased and the cooperation in various fields had been expanded, but after the 
Pokhran II nuclear tests (Pokhran I test was conducted in 1974), Sino-Indian relations 
went into a deep chill once again. Recurrent tensions seem to be a significant feature 
of Sino-Indian relations. The central question that will guide this study is: Why are 
China and India not able to develop long-term stable and friendly relations?
Most studies about Sino-Indian relations emphasize the boundary dispute or the 
border war (see Table 1), but the conclusions of various writers are irreconcilable with 
those of others. Some blame China’s ambition to expand its territory as the cause of 
the deterioration China-India relations. Others blame India for misconduct or failure 
in foreign-policymaking.
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Table 1: Key Literature on Sino-Indian Relations
Year Author Title Place Publisher Main Argument
1957 K.M. Panikkar India and China: A Study o f  
Cultural Relations
Bombay Asia Publishing 
House
An indication o f the main lines o f Sino- 
Indian cultural relations in the past
1960 Girlal Jain Panchsheela and After London Asia Publishing 
House
India must undertake an agonizing 
reappraisal of its policy in respect o f China, 
which must inevitably involve a re­
examination o f the entire basis and structure 
o f foreign policy.
1961 P.C. Chakravarti India-China Relations Calcutta Firma K. L. 
Mukhopadhyar
Communist China pursued the traditional 
Chinese policy o f expansionism. Every 
strong imperial regime in China attempted 
to expand its borders.
1963 V.K. Krishna 
Menon
India and the Chinese 
Invasion
Bombay Contemporary
Publishers
China not only betrayed the Indians, but also 
the cause of world peace, the progress o f the 
peoples of Asia and humankind.
1964 Alastair Lamb The China-India Border: The 
Origins o f  the Disputed 
Boundaries
London Oxford
University
Press
China has legitimate claims to a few small 
tracts of territory south o f the McMahon 
Line and to the northern part o f Aksaichin.
1964 W.F. Van Eekelen Indian Foreign Policy and 
the Border Dispute with 
China
Hague Martinus
Nijhoff
Nehru misjudged Chinese intentions and 
consented to an agreement that offered 
respectability to China while receiving in 
return only the vague precepts of 
Panchsheel.
1967 Sudhakar Bhat India and China New
Delhi
Popular Book 
Service
Sino-Soviet ideological dispute is the basic 
reason behind China’s confrontation with 
India.
1967 John Rowland A History o f  Sino-Indian 
Relations: Hostile Co- 
Existence
London D.Van 
Nostrand 
Company, Ltd.
Communist China has mocked India’s 
political philosophy of peace and non- 
alignment, undermined India’s national 
security, not only directly along its northern 
border, but indirectly by encouraging 
tensions with Pakistan, and by inciting 
subversion and separatists within the Indian 
federation.
1968 Gondker 
Narayana Rao
The India-China Border: A 
Reappraisal
Bombay Asia Publishing 
House
The Sino-Indian dispute is as much a part of 
China's ideological and power game as it is 
a product of its territorial lust.
1970 Neville Maxwell India's China War London Jonathan Cape 
Ltd.
India's forward policy provoked the Chinese 
to launch a pre-emptive attack and India's 
decision not to negotiate with China over the 
issue made the conflict almost 
nonnegotiable diplomatically.
1973 Mohan Ram Politics o f  Sino-Indian 
Confrontation
Delhi Vikas
Publishing
House
India was drawn into the vortex of big 
power politics to contain China. India lost 
its leverage vis-a-vis the big powers and its 
confrontation with China increased its 
dependence on them.
1979 Nancy Jetly India-China Relations, 1947- 
1977: A Study o f  
Parliament's Role in the 
Making o f  Foreign Policy
Atlantic 
Highlands 
, N.J
Humanities
Press
Parliamentary opinion can be only one of 
the factors, and not always the most 
important, influencing decision-making in 
Indian foreign policy.
1984 Yaacov
Vertzberger
Misperceptions in Foreign 
Policymaking: the Sino- 
Indian Conflict, 1959-1962
Boulder,
Colo.
Westview Press Nehru's complicated personality, his beliefs 
and attitudes were the dominant factors 
underlying his inaccurate processing of
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information. Nehru's faults, combined with 
other factors, played a causal role in a chain 
o f errors that led to the Sino-Indian war.
1985 D.K. Baneijee China-India Border Dispute 
Contents
New
Delhi
Intellectual
Publishing
House
India must always keep China’s expansionist 
ambitions in mind. China is not defending 
an old frontier, but looking for a new one 
that would meet its existing and anticipated 
security needs.
1986 Chih H. Lu The Sino-Indian Border 
D ispute: A Legal Study
New York Greenwood The Chinese assertion that the entire Sino- 
Indian border had not been demarcated by 
any treaty or agreement is fractionally true 
and the Indian contention that all three 
sectors o f the Sino-Indian boundary had 
been defined is groundless.
1987 Junzhuan Shen Zhonggongyu Yindu guanxi 
zhengchanghu de guocheng 
yu zhangai (The Process and 
Obstacles in the 
Normalisation o f  Sino-Indian 
Relations.)
Taipei International
Relations
Institute,
National
Chengchi
University
Both China and India were keen to resolve 
the boundary problems through negotiation. 
China's rapprochement with the Soviet 
Union would be helpful to the improvement 
of Sino-Indian relations.
1987 Jay Taylor The Dragon and the Wild 
Goose : China and India
London Greenwood Both India and China want to avoid war and 
concentrate on development. Yet the volatile 
agents of nationalism and history produce a 
mysterious chemistry.
1988 Bhim Sandhu Unresolved Conflict: China 
and India
London Sangam Books 
Ltd.
The prime reason for the inability of China 
and India to negotiate their disputes 
peacefully and amicably was the adamant 
attitude o f each toward the other.
1989 J. Lall Aksaichin and the Sino- 
Indian Conflict
Ahmeda-
bad
Allied 
Publishers 
Private Ltd.
Aksaichin was neither Chinese nor Indian. 
Both sides should jointly investigate the 
traditional boundary then accept it.
1990 Steven A. 
Hoffman
India and the China Crisis Berkeley California
University
Press
The study o f India's role in India-China 
conflict helps us to become mindful o f how 
easily normal behaviour by a nation's 
decision-makers can lead to tragedy.
1994 Liu Xuecheng The Sino-Indian Border 
Dispute and Sino-Indian 
Relations
Lanham,
Maryland
University 
Press o f 
America, Inc.
The Sino-Indian relationship was intricately 
interwoven with Indo-Pakistani enmity and 
American-Soviet-Chinese triangular rivalry
2000 Kanti Bajpai and 
Amitabh Mattoo 
eds.,
The Peacock and the 
Dragon: India: China 
Relations in the 21st Century
New
Delhi
Har-Anand 
Publications 
Pvt Ltd.
The volume includes the essays by many of 
India’s researchers, and coconsciously aims 
at generating a public debate by 
provisioning a variety o f perspective.
2000 G P. Deshpande 
and Alka Acharya
Crossing A Bridge O f 
Dreams : 50 Years O f India 
China
New
Delhi
Tulika This volume is a collection of papers 
presented at a national seminar held in New 
Delhi, to commemorate fifty years of 
Independent India and the People’s Republic 
o f China.
2001 John W. Garver Protracted Contest: Sino- 
Indian Rivalry in the 
Twentieth Century
Seattle University of
Washington
Press
China outmanoeuvred India in South Asia 
by forging ties with Pakistan, Myanmar, and 
the Himalayan states. The contest between 
China and India will be resolved only if 
India accepts Chinese hegemony in South 
Asia or if  China pulls back to leave the 
subcontinent for India to dominate
2003 Waheguru Pal 
Singh Sidhu and 
Jing-dong Yuan
China and India: 
Cooperation or Conflict?
New
Delhi
India Research 
Press
India and China tend to adopt a more 
pragmatic approach in managing differences 
and broadening the agenda of common
9
interests. There is reason for optimism, but 
challenges remain ahead. The future of 
Sino-Indian relations will be affected by 
how the two countries can effectively 
manage their differences and explore areas 
o f common interest.
2004 Harry Harding 
and Francine R. 
Frankel
The India-China Relationship 
: Rivalry and Engagement
New
Delhi
Oxford
University
Press
This volume brings together scholars to 
address three common questions: a historical 
overview, the varied dimensions o f the 
India-China relationship, and the evolution 
o f the strategic triangle-China, India and the 
US.
2005 B. R. Deepak India And China 1904-2004: 
A Century O f Peace And 
Conflict
New
Delhi
Manak 
Publications 
Pvt. Ltd
Irritants such as border problem, the Sino- 
Pak nexus, the Tibet issue and the Chinese 
attitude of looking at India as a South Asian 
hegemonic power would continue to haunt 
the Sino-Indian relations in the 21st century. 
However, the willingness o f  both the 
countries to strengthen material and cultural 
ties will certainly enhance the mutual 
understanding and might pave the way for 
the final resolution of both border and other 
issues.
2005 Mahavir Singh Panchsheel: Retrospect and 
Prospect
Delhi Shipra
Publications
Collection o f papers presented at an 
international conferences organised by 
Maulana Abul Kalam Azad Institute of 
Asian Studies, Kolkata
2005 Jairam Ramesh Making Sense o f  Chindia: 
Reflections on China and 
India
New
Delhi
India Research 
Press
There will be competition and sometimes 
some confrontation between China and 
India, but that does not make China and 
India natural enemies.
Most of these studies are based on historical accounts or are from the perspective of 
“mainstream” international relations theory, namely neorealism and neoliberalism. 
The underlying premise is that, just like other states, China and India are driven to 
secure the support of other powers to maximise their interests in a condition of 
anarchy. Treating national interests as exogenously determined, the realists often 
ignore the possibility of cooperation between states, and fail to explain or predict the 
re-engagement between Beijing and New Delhi in the post-Cold War era. Many 
studies have assumed that any improvement of relations between the two sides would 
involve a settlement of the boundary problem. Belying such arguments, China and
2 For example, see, Alastair Lamb, The China-India Border: The Origins o f  the Disputed Boundaries 
(London: Oxford University Press, 1964), p.2; Gondker Narayana Rao, The India-China Border: A 
Reappraisal (Bombay: Asia Publishing House, 1968), p.2.
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India have agreed to expand contacts and cooperation in many fields with a high 
frequency of govemment-to-govemment exchanges and a significant increase in 
bilateral trade, even if there is still no foreseeable final solution to the border dispute.
The end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union opened up considerable 
space for alternative theoretical perspectives as the “mainstream” theory failed to
'y
comprehend adequately the systematic transformation. Among the critical theories, 
constructivism holds that normative or ideational variables are just as important as 
material ones and sees national interests as endogenous to interactions between states. 
Shared ideas, beliefs and values also have structural characteristics, and they exert a 
powerful influence on a state’s actions.
In order to address the above-mentioned research question and offer some fresh 
insight into this topic, this research will take account of the constructivist 
understanding of international relations in order to develop an alternative approach to 
that of the existing literature. Thus, the constraints to the development of Sino-Indian 
relations will be studied in terms of mutual perceptions and expectations, particularly 
the perception of threat. Considering that Sino-Indian studies in English suffer from a 
sparseness in the Chinese perspective compared to the Indian one, an attempt will be 
made to make greater use of Chinese-language sources in order to fill this information
gap-
1.2 The China Threat with Indian Characteristics
With the fall of the Soviet Union, China’s security environment became more
3 Christian Reus-Smit, “Constructivism,” in Scott Burchill et al., Theories o f International Relations, 
2nd (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2001), p.216.
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favourable. However, China’s security concerns soon increased as it was targeted as a 
challenge to the new post-Cold War status quo. China’s dramatic economic growth 
and its modernizing military power have not only attracted attention on the world 
stage, they have also invited suspicion and are sometimes perceived as posing a threat.
Given that China has had nuisance value, exacerbated regional conflicts and refuses to 
comply with some international norms, it is feared that a strong China may pursue an 
expansionist policy to recapture the land and rights to which it lays claim. In the 
words of Zheng Yongnian, there is a concern that a rising China may seek “revenge” 
for the actions of western imperialists.4 That is, many in the West tend to see a rising 
China as the main potential threat to international peace and stability in the post- 
Soviet era.
As well as listing China as a major source of uncertainty in the post-Soviet era, some 
commentators in the West have gone further and bluntly called for a containment 
policy. The Chinese feel disappointed when they are targeted as a “threat”, and feel 
that the real aim of the “China threat” theory is to thwart China’s bid for its rightful 
place in the world. Furthermore, the “China threat” discourse is seen as a strategy 
targeted at sowing discord between China and the other Asian-Pacific countries, 
especially at harming China’s relations with its neighbours.5 The Chinese maintain 
that the “China threat” theory has overshadowed China’s relations with its 
neighbours.6
China is aware that many countries fret about the security implications of a rising
4 Yongnian Zheng, Zhongguo minzu zhuyi de fuxing: minzu guojia he chu qu? (The revival o f Chinese
nationalism: where will the nation-state go?) (Hong Kong: Sanlian shudian, 1998), p.5.
5 Ren Xin, “‘China threat’ Theory Untenable,” Beijing Review, February 5-11, 1996, pp.10-11.
6 Wang Zhongren, “‘China threat’ Theory Groundless,” Beijing Review, July 14-20 1997, pp. 7-8.
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China. Thus, it has been busy informing international society that it wants peace 
abroad so that it can concentrate on economic development at home. Chinese leaders 
have reiterated that China needs a surrounding environment conducive to stability and 
development.7 On the military front, Beijing has argued that it pursues a defensive 
policy aimed at resisting outside invasion, safeguarding national territorial, air and 
marine integrity and maintaining national unity and security; that its military 
expenditure remains at a relatively low level and China has no overseas military 
bases.8 In keeping with the “peaceful development” argument, China has also claimed 
that its rise is a “peaceful” one.9
The Chinese side is aware that India has long been suspicious of China’s strength. 
That was why the late Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping repeatedly told the Indians that 
neither China nor India posed a threat to each other. For example, in a meeting with 
an Indian parliamentary leader, Subramaniam Swamy, Deng Xiaoping tried to allay 
India’s suspicious about China. He dismissed the possibility of another Sino-Indian 
border war, saying that the Chinese army could not cross Tibet to attack India because 
of the lack of oxygen at that altitude. He also claimed that “we do not have many 
troops and we also do not see any threat from your side to China.”10
In the early 1990s, the defence establishments in Beijing and New Delhi finally 
resumed the exchanges on defence and security matters. In order to maintain peace 
and tranquillity along the disputed border, the two countries concluded two 
agreements on confidence-building measures (CBMs) in 1992 and 1997. However,
7 The Hindu (Chennai), November 27,2000, p. 14.
8 Ren Xin, ‘“China threat’ Theory Untenable,” pp. 10-11.
9 Jiang Xiyuan and Xia Liping, Zhongguo hepingjueqi (Peaceful rise o f China)(Beijing: Zhongguo
shehui kexue chubanshe, 2004)
10 The Times (London), April 9, 1981, p.4.
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there are many Indians who are still attached to the idea of a permanent enmity 
against China. Although China has argued that it will not harm the existing peaceful 
international environment even at the risk of its own development program, and 
emphasises that China and India do not pose any threat to each other, Indian defence 
planners remain very cautious about China’s strength and intentions. The efforts to 
develop a friendship between the two countries are also hindered by the accumulated 
and long-standing distrust that remains embedded in the minds of the Indian strategic 
community. In Indian eyes, the Chinese betrayed India’s friendship and committed an 
aggression to occupy India’s territory.
Thus, as this thesis seeks to illustrate, despite China’s assurances, India continues to 
perceive China as a serious threat. That is why India’s nuclear tests took place amidst 
rising anti-China rhetoric from a section of the Indian establishment. However, India’s 
perception of the “China threat” is quite different from the Western view. The “China 
threat” theory circulated in the West is that the rise of China will inevitably destabilize 
regional security and challenge the vital interests of the countries concerned. It is 
believed that a stronger China will be intent on challenging the present international 
order dominated by western and developed countries and will thus confront the 
countries concerned.n However, the Indians do not consider a belligerent China as a 
merely imagined scenario, as Western strategic analysts do, but argue that China has 
frequently been a hostile and disagreeable neighbour, as India has already suffered 
from China’s expansionism and containment. In contrast to the West’s concerns about 
the intention of a future China, India’s “China threat” syndrome probably has its roots 
in the history of the 1950s-1960s, much earlier than the West’s “China threat” theory
11 See, for example, Richard Bernstein and Ross H. Munro, “China I: The coming conflict with 
America,” Foreign Affairs, vol.76, no.2, Mar/Apr 1997, pp. 18-32.
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of the 1990s.
It is no secret that, after the 1962 border war, Indian strategic thinkers treated China as 
a potential rival and not as a partner. Just as an Indian analyst has observed, the annual 
reports of the Indian Ministry of Defence have long been guardedly articulating the 
view that China is India’s most potent threat. The humiliating defeat of the 1962 
border war, China’s takeover of Tibet, and China’s strategic links with India’s smaller 
neighbours have all been rich sources of the “China threat” perception.
Beijing, for its part, has not expended much energy in its relations with India because 
of its perception of India’s marginal role and influence in international affairs. To 
Chinese officials, India has not yet reached the position that merits much attention 
from the Chinese side. The main foci of Chinese interests and security concerns lie 
elsewhere, despite India being China’s second largest neighbour.
1.3 Threat Perception as an Analytical Approach
Regarding perception studies, Robert Jervis has identified perception as a variable in 
analyzing international politics and foreign policies. He explored the process of 
perception and identified common forms of misperception, which are perceptions of 
centralization, overestimating one’s importance as influence and target, the influence
1 Tof desire and fears on perception, and cognitive dissonance. His pioneer study has 
thus provided a foundation in this area.
This thesis tries to narrow the focus on the perception of threat to understand China-
12 Manoj Joshi, “George in the China Shop,” India Today (internet edition), May 18, 1998.
13 Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton, New Jersey: 
Princeton University Press, 1976).
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India interactions. The threat perception refers to perceived intent and perceived 
capability of an opponent. In this thesis, threat perception is defined as an expectation 
of harm to assets or values of the state.14 The loss or damage caused by a perceived 
threat might be in the areas of military, economic, strategic, national sovereignty and 
national prestige.
There are three major sources of threat perception. The first one is historical enmity. 
States tend to rely on past experiences and interactions to forecast how other states 
will behave. As David Singer states, historical memories easily help to transform 
vague suspicion into concrete hostility.15 Moreover, the existence of historical enmity 
will often amplify present perceptions of threat.16 The second source of threat 
perception is the sense of separate identity. Since a state’s identity informs its interests 
and preference, states which do not hold a shared identity are uncertain as to each 
other’s intentions and plots. On the contrary, a sense of shared identity can reduce the
|  n
perception of threat. A power gap between the competing states is the third major 
source of the threat perception. A substantial gap in power between the competing 
states will increase the sense of insecurity for the state with less power.
In addition to illustrate the perceptions of threat between India and China, this thesis 
tries to understand how China and India interact under their own threat perception. A
14 Zeev Maoz, National Choices and International Processes (Cambridge: Cambridge University, 1990), 
p. 13; David A. Baldwin, “Thinking about Threat,” The Journal o f  Conflict Resolution, vol. XV, no.l, 
Mar 1971, pp.71-78.
15 J. David Singer, “Threat Perception and the Armament- Tension Dilemma,” Journal o f  Conflict 
Resolution, vol.2, no.l, 1958, p. 93..
16 Barry Buzan, Ole Waever, ans Jaap De Wilde, Security: A New Framework fo r Analysis (Boulder, 
Colo.: Lynne Rienner Pub., 1998), p.59.
17 David L. Rousseau, Identifying Threats and Threatening Identities: The Social Construction o f  
Realism and Liberalism (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2006), pp.213-4.
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state will not mobilise available resources against a threat if it does not perceive the 
existence of threat. On the contrary, the threat perception will encourage a state to 
take countermeasures against its perceived threat. Several countermeasures for 
dealing with the threat are often discussed as the following.
The first is a balancing. Internal balancing is to increase one’s own strength and to 
reduce vulnerability; external balancing is used to ally with the states which share
1Rcommon concerns. However, an increase in capabilities, especially militarily, may 
intensify the security dilemma and is not conducive to a reduction in the perception of 
threat.
According to Stephen M. Walt’s “balance of threat” theory, which modified the 
popular balance of power theory, a state’s alliance behaviour is determined by the 
threat they perceive from other states. That is, a state aims for balance against 
perceived threats rather than against the most powerful states. 19 T. V. Paul has 
proposed the concept of “soft-balancing” as a variant of traditional “hard balancing”, 
which is based on countervailing alliances and arms build-ups. According to his idea, 
soft balancing involves tacit balancing short of formal alliances. The features of soft 
balancing are limited arms build-up, ad hoc cooperative exercises, or collaboration in
90regional or international institutions.
The second way to deal with threat perception is to bandwagon the perceived threat
18 Buzan, Waever,and Wilde, Security: A New Framework fo r Analysis, p.58.
19 Stephen Walt, The Origins o f  Alliances (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987), pp.21-26.
20 Stephen G. Brooks and William C. Wohlforth, “Hard Times for Soft Balancing”, International 
Security, vol. 30, no.l, Summer 2005, pp. 72-73; T. V. Paul, “Soft Balancing in the Age of U.S. 
Primacy,” International Security, vol. 30, no. 1, Summer 2005, pp. 46-71.
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(appeasement of or subordination to the main source of threat).21 Weak and small
states are more likely to “jump on the bandwagon” with the rising threat in order to
00protect their own security. The third option to reduce the threat perception is policy 
of constructive engagement, such as conducting CBMs (confidence-building
O'!
measures) to reduce both military capability and estimated military intent.
Threat perceptions vary in degrees. David Singer even tries to define threat perception 
in a quasi-mathematical form: Threat-Perception = Estimated Capability * Estimated 
Intent.24 Zeev Maoz also attempts to measure the magnitude of threat perception by 
listing the comparison indexes, which includes (a) the nature and scope of assets 
perceived to be affected, (b) their relative importance to the decision maker, (c) the 
perceived extent of loss to each other’s assets or values, (d) the likelihood of loss, and 
(e) the scope of currently possessed assets.25 This thesis is not conducting a 
quantitative analysis for threat perception, but has taken note that threat perceptions 
vary in intensity. That is, the perception of threat between two competing state are 
most likely asymmetrical.
After reviewing the above-mentioned studies, this thesis thus develops an analytical 
framework based on the asymmetrical perception of threat. The theoretical hypothesis 
developed by this thesis is that the asymmetry in threat perceptions will result in a 
symmetrising process to reduce the threat perception. The state with a higher
21 Buzan, Waeve, and Wilde, Security: A New Framework fo r  Analysis, p.58.
22 Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory o f  International Politics (New York.: McGraw Hill Publishing Company, 
1979), pp. 123-128.
23 For more analysis on how does CBMs work, see Michael Krepon ed .,A Handbook o f  Confidence- 
Building Measures fo r  Regional Security, 3rd.Edition (Washington D.C: The Henry L. Stimson 
Center, 1998)
24 Singer, “Threat Perception and the Armament- Tension Dilemma,” p. 93.
25 Maoz, National Choices and International Processes , p. 13.
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perception of threat will tend to change the status quo in order to reach a more 
favourable balance of threat. Countermeasures taken by the state may involve options 
o f balancing, bandwagoning or CBMs. On the contrary, the state with a lower 
perception of threat will prefer to maintain the status quo. However, this thesis will 
argue, to maintain status quo is not the best strategy as the asymmetrical threat 
perceptions will drive the opponent state to change the intensity of threat perception. 
This asymmetry can be summarised as follows: the higher the threat perception, the 
higher the probability that the state with intensified threat perception will take hard- 
balancing measures to reduce threat perception.
1.4 Asymmetrical Perceptions of Threat in China-lndia Relations
The Indians have not altered their position that China is the major threat to India. On 
the other hand, Beijing does not take India seriously. Although India is acknowledged 
to be a rising power, Beijing has not identified India as an immediate adversary. What 
may make Beijing.take notice is if India becomes an important part of an international 
strategy to contain China. So far, though, China’s perceived threat from India is far 
less than that from other countries, such as the US.
Paying more attention to the interactive culture between China and India, therefore, 
the first aim of the thesis is to point out the existence of an asymmetrical threat 
perception. Indeed, the threat perception between two states may often be 
asymmetrical. However, as John Garver’s study has shown, India tends to be deeply 
apprehensive about the threats from China, while China appears comparatively 
unconcerned about the threat from India. Such an asymmetry is both apparent and
26 John Garver, “Asymmetrical Indian and Chinese threat perceptions,” Journal o f  Strategic Studies, 
vol.25, no.4, December 2002, pp. 109-134.
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remarkable, especially considering that India and China share a similar type of 
international identity: both are big and populous developing countries and regional 
powers with considerable economic, military and political potential.
The second contention in this study is that Sino-Indian relations are constrained by the 
asymmetry of their threat perceptions. Stephen M. Walt’s “balance of threat” theory 
argues that states aim for balance against perceived threats rather than against the
*yn
most powerful states. A perceived threat could therefore affect a state’s behaviour 
and preference in dealings with its counterpart country. In general, China does not 
perceive India as a serious security threat, it considers the status quo to be favourable 
and wants to maintain the status quo between the two countries. On the contrary, India 
perceives China as a serious security and tries to reduce the sense of insecurity by 
adopting countermeasures, such as developing nuclear weapons, allying itself with 
other countries, or constructive CBMs.
Thirdly, this thesis will argue, the asymmetrical nature of the relationship has made it 
difficult for China and India to forge a relationship based on shared knowledge and to 
set a common agenda around which their expectations could converge. The Chinese 
side has ignored the asymmetry and is in no mood to share India’s expectations and 
concerns. Instead, it argues that India suffers from a “victim” syndrome.
Further, the thesis will demonstrate that the imbalance in the perception of threat will 
result in a dilemma for India. On the one hand, India will be on a perennial quest for 
changes in Sino-Indian relations, such as a final resolution of the border issue and 
securing the nuclear deterrent against China. On the other hand, it is also very
27 Walt, The Origins o f  Alliances, pp.21-26.
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cautious not to anger China, sometimes with self-imposed conditions because of the 
fear of its perceived threat from China.
1.5 Structure of the Thesis
This study aims to identify the asymmetrical perception of threats as the cause of the 
dynamics and the constraints in Sino-Indian relations with a focus on the post-1998 
period. In order to address the aforementioned objectives, this thesis will examine the 
major issues of China-India relations.
Chapter Two discusses the nuclear dimension in China-India relations. As India has 
secured a new identity as a nuclear weapons state, the nuclear issue has emerged as a 
late but significant issue between the two countries. India’s nuclear tests and its 
securing of nuclear weapons altered not only the hard power structure between China 
and India, but also the ideational structure. Chinese leaders have had to reassess the 
implications of nuclear India’s challenge to China’s security environment, and to take 
account of India’s enhanced international status derived from its possession of nuclear 
weapons. Beijing also has to deal with the “China threat” theory as perceived by 
Indian strategic planners and its use by them to justify India’s move against the 
international nuclear non-proliferation regime. Of particular concerns to Beijing are 
the ways in which its expectations about the trajectory of Sino-Indian relations were 
suddenly undermined by India.
The Tibet issue is still a sensitive and intractable issue for China’s diplomacy. Chapter 
Three provides a brief account of China’s “liberation” of Tibet, and points out India’s 
special role and Tibet’s significance for China. As will be suggested in this chapter, 
the Chinese are not satisfied with India’s approach to the Tibet issue, particularly its
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accommodation of the Dalai Lama and the govemment-in-exile. Although the Indian 
side has said in explicit terms that Tibet is a part of China and has stated that the Dalai 
Lama cannot carry out political activities in India, Beijing remains intensely 
suspicious of India’s Tibetan policy, and levels the criticism that India has been very 
reluctant to recognise Chinese sovereignty over Tibet. On the other hand, India has 
adopted a cautious approach in dealing with the Tibet issue, and faces a dilemma 
about playing the “Tibet card”.
Chapter Four will deal with the long-standing boundary question. China and India 
have paid a high price for the unresolved border dispute, which significantly 
undermined relations between the two countries throughout most of the Cold War 
period and even sparked a war. However, development under the mechanism of the 
border talks shows that the border dispute, even if far from being resolved, can be 
managed properly. The legacy of the border dispute, including the 1962 war and 
CBMs, will be identified. This chapter then further discusses the work that has been 
done on delineating the Line of Actual Control (LAC). The following section will 
focus on the recent efforts and problems regarding an earlier solution. The 
establishment of the Special Representative mechanism, the Sikkim Issue, and the 
Tawang controversy will also be discussed.
Chapter Five will focus on the geopolitical context of the China-India relationship. As 
regional powers, neither China nor India will ever give up their efforts to maximise 
their respective influence in the region. New Delhi keeps a wary eye on China’s ties 
with its South Asian neighbours, especially its arms transfers to Pakistan and military 
cooperation with Myanmar. While Beijing has quarrels with some of its marine 
neighbours over the South China Sea, New Delhi has embarked on a “Look East”
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policy to engage ASEAN states. This chapter, which deals with these aspects of geo­
politics, also analyses the sub-regional economic cooperation and anti-terrorism 
campaign to explore the possible cooperation related to the complex region.
Chapter Six assesses the development of China-India relations in the global context. 
The Indo-American alliance, the China-India-Russia strategic triangle, and the 
Chindia idea are scrutinized. This chapter refers to possible trends, cooperative or 
competitive, in China-India relations. The Indo-American alliance is seen as part of a 
global strategy against China, while the China-Russia-India strategic triangle and 
Chindia suggest a cooperative model for China and India to forge a new international 
order.
Chapter Seven summarises the findings of the thesis, and concludes that the 
asymmetry in China’s and India’s threat perceptions is an unstable factor for bilateral 
relations. Based on the asymmetrical threat perceptions, this thesis thus provides a 
new perspective for understanding China-India relations.
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Chapter 2: The Nuclear Dimension in China-India Relations
When China successfully exploded its first atomic bomb in October 1964, it opened 
up a new dimension in Sino-Indian relations -  the nuclear dimension. The Indian 
leaders had to consider in the light of the latest development whether India should 
continue to be a non-nuclear weapons state. New Delhi had tried to appeal to the US 
and the UK for some form of protection from China’s nuclear threat, but had failed to 
achieve any reassurance.1 In the light of these developments, the threat of China’s 
nuclear capability has continued to be an important driving force behind India’s 
nuclear weapons programme to the present day.
However, India remained in an ambiguous nuclear limbo, and had to choose between 
being a nuclear power and being a non-nuclear state. Although India detonated its 
own nuclear device under Indira Gandhi’s administration in May 1974, it maintained 
that the test was merely for peaceful purposes and it was reluctant to manufacture 
nuclear weapons.
India’s ambiguity towards developing nuclear weapons may have been seen as one 
strategic option for the Indian leaders, but it failed to come to terms with India’s 
perceived threat arising from China’s nuclear capability. By May 1998, India’s deep- 
seated suspicions were reinforced by the possibility of China’s nuclear coercion, 
China’s clandestine support for Pakistan’s nuclear weapons programme, and the 
enhanced international status China derived from nuclear weapons. Yet none of these 
concerns were taken into account by the Chinese side.
1 Arundhati Ghose, “Disarmament and India’s nuclear diplomacy: evolution of a reluctant nuclear 
weapon state”, in Atish Sinha and Madhup Mohta eds., Indian Foreign Policy: Challenges and 
Opportunities (New Delhi: Academic Foundation, 2007), p. 988.
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The failure to achieve a satisfactory solution to its security concerns clearly spurred 
India’s decision to move more surely down the road to nuclear weaponisation. In May 
1998, India finally discarded its traditional stance and proclaimed itself a nuclear 
weapons state after conducting five rounds of nuclear tests. Unlike the 1974 tests, its 
rationale for exploding nuclear devices brought a new and more significant nuclear 
dimension to Sino-Indian relations.
For Beijing, an India equipped with nuclear weapons presented a totally different 
challenge. India’s possession of nuclear weapons altered the hard power structure and 
played a decisive role in building up a new military balance between China and India. 
Moreover, India’s new identity as a nuclear power will reshape the ideational structure 
between India and China. Chinese leaders not only needed to reassess the implications 
of nuclear India’s challenge to its security environment, but also needed to take 
account of India’s enhanced international status derived from its possession of nuclear 
weapons. Meanwhile, Beijing also had to deal with the “China threat” theory used by 
Indian strategic planners and to justify India’s move against the international nuclear 
non-proliferation regime. Of particular concerns to Beijing is the ways in which its 
expectations about developing Sino-Indian relations were shattered and rejected by 
the Indian side. Facing the new situation, China felt obliged to re-evaluate and 
reconstruct its India policy.
This chapter will illustrate that India sees possession of nuclear weapons as a kind of 
status symbol of a great power and a deterrent against security threat. China also sees 
nuclear weapons in this way. The difference is that India has considered China as one 
of the major reasons to develop a nuclear deterrent as it identified China as the major
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security threat, while China’s nuclear weapons are not directed against India. Thus, 
this chapter argues that in relations to each other there is an asymmetrical perception 
of nuclear threat. Moreover, India looks to be catching up with China in terms of 
international status and influence by developing nuclear weapons. The China-India 
security dilemma is further driven by perceptions of great power status deriving from 
possessing nuclear power.
To understand the impact of nuclear weapons issues on Sino-Indian relations, this 
chapter will first retrace the role of nuclear deterrence as a factor in Sino-Indian 
relations before the 1998 tests to highlight how the nuclear issue has contributed to 
the formation of a perception of threat in India. The chapter then analyses India’s 
rationale for the 1998 tests, and China’s reactions to India’s nuclear tests. The 
following section will focus on how China evaluates India’s nuclear weapons 
programme and India’s status as a nuclear weapon state. This chapter concludes that 
India’s 1998 nuclear tests constitute a turning point for Sino-Indian relations in the 
post-Cold War era. Although India has not been able to symmetrise the perception of 
threat by possessing nuclear weapons, India’s possible nuclear challenge to China’s 
security environment and India’s enhanced international status deriving from its 
possession of nuclear weapons has allowed the creation of a more favourable 
framework for India to deal with China-India relations.
2.1 Nuclear Deterrence in China-India Relations before 1998
One main characteristic of Sino-Indian nuclear relations prior to India’s 1998 nuclear 
tests, according to John Garver’s observation, was the asymmetry in terms of the 
motives for nuclearisation and the perceived nuclear threat.
2 For this point, see John W. Garver, Protracted Contest: Sino-Indian Rivalry in the Twentieth Century
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Before 1998, for Beijing, the main concerns about a nuclear threat came first from the 
US and then the Soviet Union. Although the hostile relationship meant that China 
became a potential nuclear threat to India, Chinese leaders did not feel it necessary to 
launch a nuclear attack against India.3 That is, China’s nuclear deterrent was not 
directed towards India.
On the other hand, the Indian side has perceived a clear nuclear threat from China 
since 1964. Three sources of concerns, at least, have contributed to the construction of 
this perception. The first came from the scenario that China can use its nuclear 
capability to blackmail or coerce India. The second arose from China’s stance towards 
nuclear proliferation due to China’s assistance to Pakistan. The third source, less 
linked with nuclear issues, came from China’s political and diplomatic status as a 
nuclear power.4 Partly due to its possession of nuclear weapons, China edged out 
India and secured a higher international status. This undermined India’s prestige and 
leadership among the Asian and developing countries. These concerns related to 
China’s nuclear power motivated India to consider the nuclear option.
China’s Nuclear Strength and Posture
China successfully conducted its first nuclear test in October 1964, becoming the 
world’s fifth nuclear power. Since then, China’s nuclear forces have grown steadily,
(Seattle and London: University of Washington Press, 2001), pp.313-315.
3 Vincent Wen-Hsien Chen, “Guoji huanjing dui Zhonggong he wu zhengce fazhan de yingxiang”
(“The Impacr of the International Situation on the Evolution of China's Nuclear Force Policies”), 
Wentiyu Yanjiu (Issues and Studies), vol. 38, no.2, 1999, pp. 1-19.
4 Wu Kanghe and Song Dexing, “Lun Yindu he zhengce de lishi yanbian ji qi he wu hua de we hai
xing” (“On the historical development of India's nuclear policy and the danger of its nuclear 
weaponisation”), Shujie jingjiyu  zhengzhi (world economic and politics), no. 6, 1998, pp.25-29.
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with advanced nuclear warheads and delivery systems. In July 1966, the Second 
Artillery Corps was established as China’s strategic nuclear force. China has 
conducted 45 tests, and the last of them being held on July 29, 1996. As regards 
delivery systems, China launched a Dongfeng-2 (DF-2) medium-range ballistic 
missile (MRBM) in October 1966, and then developed a series of surface-to-surface 
missiles (SSMs), intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and submarine-launched 
ballistic missiles (SLBMs). Despite these advances, around the end of the Cold War, 
China’s nuclear force was seen as minimal in quantity and deficient in accuracy, 
credibility, and survivability. The focus of Chinese nuclear assets was on a middle to 
long-range strategic nuclear attack.
China, in 2006, officially published the details of its nuclear policy to the effect that it 
was pursuing a self-defensive strategy. The white paper on China’s national defence in 
2006 said that China’s nuclear strategy is designed to deter other countries from using 
or threatening to use nuclear weapons against China. Thus, China aims at building a 
lean but effective nuclear force and conducts a “limited development” of nuclear 
weapons.5 In general, China claims that it tries to maintain a nuclear doctrine of 
“minimum deterrence”, and thus securing only the capabilities necessary to maintain a 
credible nuclear deterrent.
In addition, China was the first country to commit to the policy of no-first-use of 
nuclear weapons. It also unconditionally undertook not to use or threaten to use 
nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon states or nuclear-weapon-free zones. 
Given Beijing’s commitment to the no-first-use principle, a non-nuclear India was, in 
theory, free from the threat of being attacked by China’s first nuclear strike and should
5 Information Office o f the State Council, People’s Republic of China, China’s National Defense in 
2006, December 29, 2006.
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not have seen itself as the main target on the radar screen of China’s nuclear weapons. 
In fact, China had decided to develop nuclear weapons as early as 1955, a time when 
China and India still shared a mood of optimism over the possibility of a friendly 
bilateral relationship. The perceived threat from the US was the main reason 
prompting China to develop its own nuclear weapons.
Although India was not the main cause for China’s nuclear weapons programme, 
Indian strategic analysts had to assess the scenario that India might suffer another 
humiliating defeat like the 1962 war in the case that China exploited its nuclear 
advantage vis-a-vis India.6 In response to China’s nuclear weapons, there was an 
increasing outcry within the Indian domestic polity for the immediate weaponisation
n
of the country’s nuclear capability. India’s concerns were further aggravated by a 
series of nuclear tests that China conducted between 1964 and 1974. In fact, 
throughout the Cold War era, the most visible nuclear threat pressure to Indians came 
from the US in early 1970s. Washington sent the nuclear-armed USS Enterprise to the 
Bay of Bengal during the Bangladesh war in 1971 as a signal warning India not to 
escalate the war. However, as far as the Indian side was concerned, even though China 
did not consider India as a reason for developing nuclear weapons, the perceived 
nuclear threat from China was too imminent to ignore for the Indians because of the 
worsening relationship following the 1962 war. That is, India’s perception is linked to 
the security dilemma, under which a state is keen to enhance its own power in order to 
defeat the perceived threat. Since India suspected China’s intentions, it sensed the
Q
need to enhance its military power in order to “prepare for the worst”.
6 Neil Joeck, Maintaining Nuclear stability in South Asia, Adelphi Paper (London: International
Institute for Strategic Studies, 1997), p.37.
7 Ghose, “Disarmament and India’s nuclear diplomacy: evolution o f a reluctant nuclear weapon state”,
pp. 985-986.
8 For more analysis regarding security dilemma in China-India relations, see Jonathan Holslag, “The
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Although India finally conducted its first nuclear test in 1974 (Pokhran I), it took a 
very different approach from that of China towards developing a nuclear weapons 
programme. As China went down the route of cultivating nuclear weapons, the Indian 
government’s position was that the 1974 explosion in Pokhran was for “peaceful 
purposes”. India thus discontinued its nuclear weapons development after 
demonstrating nuclear capability, despite keeping the nuclear option open.9 India’s 
self-restraint posture on nuclear weapons was not much appreciated, but instead, was 
seen to be too ambiguous and moralistic to constitute a credible deterrent. As a result, 
Beijing did not need to worry much about India’s nuclear ability. This partly explains 
why the nuclear issue was not a serious issue between the two countries by the late 
1980s.
The Sino-Pakistani Nuclear Nexus
The most controversial aspect of China’s nuclear policy was its position towards non­
proliferation. Only since the late 1980s has China adjusted its foreign policy 
orientation to actively take part in the nuclear non-proliferation regime. China joined 
the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in 1985, more than two decades after 
going nuclear, and agreed to place its civilian nuclear facilities under IAEA 
safeguards in 1988. In 1992, it acceded to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of 
Nuclear Weapons (NPT). In addition, China joined the Zangger Committee in October 
1997 and joined the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) in June 2004. In September 2004,
Persistent Military Security Dilemma between China and India,” Journal o f  Strategic Studies, vol.32, 
no.6, December 2009, pp.811-840; John W. Garver, “The security dilemma in Sino-Indian 
relations,” India Review, vol. 1, no,4, October 2002, pp. 1-38; Lowell Dittmer, “South Asia’s Security 
Dilemma,” Asian Survey, vol.41, no.6, Nov.-Dee., 2001, pp.897-906.
9 T. N. Kaul, a senior Indian diplomat had recalled that Indian scientists were capable of producing a 
cheap atom bomb in 1957, but the then Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, did not give them the 
green light. See T. N. Kaul, “Pokhran, China and Pakistan,” The Hindu, May 30, 1998, p. 10.
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China officially submitted its application for membership of the Missile Technology 
Control Regime (MTCR). China was also among the first countries to sign the 
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) in 1996.
Beijing stressed that it had signed all international treaties and joined all relevant 
organizations in the field of non-proliferation, and had faithfully honoured all the 
attendant obligations. China also claimed that it firmly opposed the proliferation of 
weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their means of delivery and had actively 
participated in the international non-proliferation process 10 However, other members 
of international society have long been suspicious of China’s actual performance on 
its nuclear proliferation claims and its connection with the nuclear programmes of 
states like Pakistan, North Korea and Iran.
As far as Sino-Indian nuclear relations are concerned, China’s assistance to Pakistan’s
weapon programme has been a cause of grave concern for India’s security. In the late
1970s, the media published evidence of China’s aid for Pakistan’s nuclear
programme.11 Since then, apart from the conventional military equipment, there have
been continued reports that China had been assisting Pakistan in developing its
missile and nuclear capabilities to compensate for its deficit in weaponry vis-a-vis 
10India. It was surmised that, in 1983, China had transferred a complete nuclear
10 See Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, China's Non- 
Proliferation Policy and Measures, December 2003, Beijing; Information Office of the State Council 
of the People's Republic of China, China's Endeavors fo r  Arms Control, Disarmament and Non- 
Proliferation, September 2005, Beijing.
11 See, for example, “China ‘encourages spread of nuclear weapons’ in Asia,” Radio Peace and 
Progress, April 27, 1979, in BBC Summary o f  World Broadcasts, May 1, 1979.
12 For detailed reports, see “China’s nuclear exports and assistance to Pakistan,” Monterey Institute o f  
International Studies, August 1999, <http://cns.miis.edu/research/india/china/npakpos.htm>;
“China’s missile exports and assistance to Pakistan,” Monterey Institute o f  International Studies,
July 2000, <http://cns.miis.edu/research/india/china/mpakpos.htm>.
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1 ^'weapon design and sufficient uranium to build a nuclear weapon to Pakistan and 
that China supplied nuclear-capable M -ll missiles to Pakistan between 1992 and 
1994.14 With Chinese assistance, Pakistan was believed to have moved toward serial 
production of solid-propellant short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs), such as the 
Shaheen-I and Haider-I. 15 Not surprisingly, Indian Defence Minister George 
Fernandes has accused China of being the “mother” of Ghauri, Pakistan’s 
intermediate range ballistic missile (IRBM).16
China did not deny its military ties with Pakistan, but repudiated the argument that it 
had supplied Pakistan with nuclear expertise and long-range missiles. Chinese 
officials have only confessed that they have provided some conventional weapons, 
including a few short-range tactical missiles. On the issue of missile technology 
transfers, Chinese officials have claimed that China has voluntarily observed the main 
guidelines and parameters of MTCR, and had not exported any missiles capable of
• 17reaching a range over 300 kilometres or with a payload of over 500 kilograms. 
Repudiating the report about China’s missile transfer to Pakistan, Chinese Foreign 
Ministry officials also stressed that China had no intention of assisting any country in
i o
any way to develop ballistic missiles that could be used to carry nuclear weapons.
Similarly, the typical response of Beijing to claims of China’s assistance to Pakistan’s 
nuclear weapons ability was a denial of any knowledge of the nuclear weapons
13 Anil Joseph Chandy, “India, China and Pakistan,” in Kanti Bajpai and Amitabh Mattoo eds., The 
Peacock and the Dragon: India-China Relations in the 21st Century (New Delhi: Har-Anand 
Publications Pvt Ltd., 2000), pp.316-317.
14 Harinder Baweja and Zahid Hussain, “Ghauri: fire in the sky,” India Today, April 20,1998, p.38.
15 The Hindu (internet edition), September 9, 2001; The Pioneer (internet edition), January 10,2003.
^AssociatedPress, April 9, 1998.
17 See Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Zhu Bangzao’s remarks, in N. Ram, “Sino-Indian relations: 
what lies ahead?” Frontline (internet edition), September 12-25, 1998.
18 The statement is available at http://www.people.com.cn/GB/shizheng/3586/20010809/531588.html.
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technology transfer. Although a considerable number of reports suggested otherwise, 
the Chinese maintained that their nuclear cooperation with Pakistan was confined to 
“peaceful purposes”, and that it was all under IAEA supervision.19 Some Chinese 
scholars even argued that Pakistani nuclear technology came from the western
9ftworld. Echoing the Chinese clarification, Pakistan said that its cooperation with
91China was consistent with the two countries’ international obligations. Refuting 
reports of having received any assistance from China in developing missiles, Pakistan
99said that its missile programme was “totally indigenous.” To China’s and Pakistan’s 
embarrassment, however, Iftikhar Ahmed Khan, Pakistan’s former intelligence official 
and military attache at the Pakistani Embassy in China, confirmed China’s assistance
9*7
in developing Pakistan’s nuclear bombs. Abdul Qadeer Khan, known as the father of 
Pakistan’s nuclear weapons programme, also revealed that China had gifted Pakistan 
50 kg of weapon-grade uranium in 1982, and also supplied a blueprint for a simple 
bomb that significantly speeded Pakistan’s nuclear programme.24 International society, 
to a great extent,, holds China responsible for the nuclear proliferation in Pakistan 
irrespective of China’s attempts at self-justification.
Despite China’s protestations of innocence, China’s transfer to Pakistan, particularly 
of missiles and nuclear expertise, was perceived as hostile by India. Given the tension 
and conflict between India and Pakistan, the possible nuclear threat from Pakistan 
loomed even larger than the one from China. Not surprisingly, India had repeatedly
19 N. Ram, “The CTBT will make a real difference,” Frontline, September 12-25, 1998, p. 15.
mYe Zhengjia, “Zhong Yin jianjiao 50 zhou nian -  jingyan, jiaoxun, ji qianjing” (“Sino-Indian 
relations in the past 50 years: experiences, lessons and prospects”), Nartya yanjiu (South Asian 
Studies), no.l, 1999, p.9.
21 Renmin Ribao (People’s Daily), June 29,2000.
22 Hindustan Times (internet edition), February 4, 2002.
23 See Iftikhar Ahmed Khan’s interview with Pingkuo Jihpao (Apple Daily)(Hong Kong), October 4,
2001.
24 See Hindustan Times, November 14, 2009, p.18; The Times o f  India, November 14, 2009, p.25.
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raised the issue of nuclear and missile assistance from China to Pakistan during its 
interactions with China, but Beijing did not deal with India’s concerns seriously.
As a result, even as Beijing worked to improve relations with India by exchanging 
visits, expanding trade, and maintaining peace and tranquillity along the disputed 
border, the perceived threat from China, in terms of China’s nuclear coercion, did not 
evaporate, but remained embedded in the minds of the Indian strategic community. 
On the other hand, China has not felt so much pressure from the Indian side. Such an 
asymmetry in the perception of threat thus encouraged New Delhi to fashion a 
revisionist security agenda, if China continued to ignore New Delhi’s concerns.
2. 2. India’s Pokhran II Nuclear Tests
India *s Reasons fo r  Conducting Pokhran II
China’s nuclear capability, its nuclear connection with Pakistan, and the nuclear-state 
status constituted an imperative incentive for Indian leaders to develop India’s own 
nuclear weapons. However, India’s nuclear weapons programme remained dormant 
between 1974 and 1998. The next two decades after the 1974 test saw India continue 
its efforts to keep disarmament in focus in international fora. India maintained an 
ambiguous stance, showing its nuclear capability and keeping the nuclear option 
without building a nuclear arsenal.
In fact, successive Indian governments had, over time, tried to restore the nuclear tests. 
As the former Indian Defence Minister (and later President), R. Venkataraman, 
recalled, India was ready with full preparations for an underground nuclear test in
34
Of
1983, but was dissuaded from going ahead by external pressure. A similar attempt to 
carry out new nuclear tests was made in 1995, but the then American Ambassador to 
India, Frank Wisner, showed satellite photographs to Indian officials of India’s
Of
preparations for nuclear tests and asked the Indian side to halt the programme.
It was the Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), which won the general 
elections in 1998, that decided to end the long-standing ambiguity over the nuclear 
options. Although the BJP had called for nuclear bombs since the 1980s and had 
included the nuclear option in its electoral manifestos, the issue about the nuclear 
weapons programme did not figure significantly in the elections. That is, very few 
people had expected India would soon conduct nuclear tests when the BJP came to 
office. However, the BJP-led government lost no time in surprising the world in May 
1998 by conducting five rounds of nuclear tests in Pokhran in the northern state of 
Rajasthan. These nuclear tests were known as Pokhran II because India had already 
conducted a nuclear test in 1974 at the same site. In the following weeks, Pakistan 
detonated its own six nuclear blasts, symbolically one more test than India’s, in the 
Chagai hills. Given the long-standing tension between India and Pakistan, there was 
increasing concern that the subcontinent was embroiled in an overt nuclear 
confrontation.
The reasons for the BJP government to go nuclear were mixed and have been well-
97detailed in numerous studies. To put it simply, three main factors were behind the 
decision: India’s perception of its security needs, domestic political considerations,
25 The Hindu, May 27, 1998, p. 13.
26 Ibid., May 26, 1998, p. 12.
27 For a more detailed analysis of New Delhi’s motivations to conduct nuclear tests in 1998, see Hilary 
Synnott, The Causes and Consequences o f  South A sia’s Nuclear Tests (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1999), pp. 12-23; and George Perkovich, India’s Nuclear Bomb: The Impact on Global 
Proliferation (Berkeley: University o f California Press, 1999), pp.404-24.
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and the ambition to make India a world-recognized great power. China might not have 
played a part in the domestic factor behind India’s decision to develop nuclear 
weapons, but played a major part in shaping India’s security perception, and found 
itself relevant in India’s pursuit of becoming a major world power.
The irony is that since India had been an advocate of nuclear disarmament and a 
nuclear weapons-free world for decades, the Indian government needed to find some 
reasons to justify its shift in position. Soon after the first round of nuclear tests in May 
1998, Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee wrote letters to the heads of some 
other countries explaining India’s rationale for conducting the tests. In his letter to US 
President Bill Clinton, Vajpayee argued that India shared borders with a nuclear 
weapons state that had committed armed aggression against India in 1962. He also 
explained that India had an unresolved border dispute with one neighbour, which had 
also materially helped its neighbouring adversary.28
The statement was a clear reference to China, although Vajpayee did not name it 
directly. This parlance, in fact, also reflected New Delhi’s perception and assessment 
of the post-cold war security environment: the end of the Cold War had done little to 
ameliorate India’s security concerns, and China was seen as the major contributor to 
the destabilization of India’s security environment.
The letter then reminded people that the Indian Defence Minister, George Fernandes, 
had earlier commented on the “China threat” theory, when he warned that India was 
encircled by Chinese military and naval activity. He argued that China had extended 
eleven airfields in Tibet, which posed a threat to India’s security, and had set up 
electronic surveillance installations on the Coco islands, 40 km off the northern tip of
28 For the text o f Vajpayee’s letter to Clinton, see New York Times, May 13, 1998, A12.
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the Andaman and Nicobar islands, to observe Indian missile trials and other exercises. 
Furthermore, in an interview with the Indian media, he publicly termed China as 
India’s “potential threat number one”, stressing that the potential threat from China 
was greater than that from Pakistan.29 In his view, “there is a reluctance to face the 
reality that China’s intentions need to be questioned.” Further, he argued that India 
had made the mistake of underplaying or ignoring the potential threat from China, and
1A
had been forced to pay the price in the 1960s. He then called for “tough decisions” 
to counter the potential threat from China.
Fernandes’ comments on China had evoked sharp criticism from Beijing, which had 
officially protested to New Delhi twice in less than a month. China’s Foreign 
Ministry spokesman described Fernandes’ utterances as “ridiculous and not worthy of 
refutation”, but his statements had seriously sabotaged the atmosphere for improving 
relations.33 Initially, the Chinese government did not equate Defence Minister 
Fernandes’ views with the position of the BJP government, because the Indian side 
tried to present his rhetoric as being just an individual statement of opinion. After the 
publication of Vajpayee’s letter, however, Beijing was astonished to learn that the idea 
of permanent suspicion of China were not limited to just a few members of the BJP 
government. It seemed natural for Beijing to associate Defence Minister Fernandes’ 
“China threat” discourse as a prelude for exploding the nuclear weapons.
The Indian posture that China was the principal motive for the decision to go nuclear 
represented a setback for China’s policy towards India. Over the decade before India’s
29 The Hindu, May 4, 1998, p. 1.
30 Press Trust o f India, May 3, 1998.
31 The Indian Express (internet edition), May 4, 1998.
32 The Hindu, May 9, 1998, p. 1.
33 The Hindu (internet edition), May 8, 1998.
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nuclear tests of 1998, the Chinese side had been confident of engaging India and had 
concluded that the relationship had gradually improved. In contradiction to what 
Beijing might have expected, the improvement of Sino-Indian relations in the 1990s 
did not relieve India’s concerns about the military balance between India and China 
and its security environment. On the contrary, the rise of China and China’s relations 
with other South Asian states, especially the surreptitious military transfer to Pakistan, 
had led Indian leaders to conclude that the early 1990s was a greatly troubling 
period.34 Given the continuing deterioration in the conventional balance in favour of 
China, India came to believe that developing nuclear weapons was a better option to 
assert and establish strategic autonomy vis-a-vis China. Just as Indian President A. P. J. 
Abdul Kalam, also known as the father of the Indian nuclear bomb, claimed, “When 
we were surrounded by nuclear armed countries, we didn’t have any alternative but to 
become a nuclear weapon state”.35 That is, the nuclear weapon was considered as an 
instrument to eliminate India’s “China threat” perception.
China’s Reactions to the Pokhran II Nuclear Tests
Like other countries, China was surprised by India’s nuclear tests. However, what 
annoyed China most is not that the Pokhran II tests endangered the nuclear non­
proliferation regime or triggered a nuclear arms race in the subcontinent, but India’s 
use of the “China threat” as justification for resuming testing.
In fact, some Chinese scholars conceded that it was difficult to deny India’s right to 
conduct nuclear tests. The senior Chinese scholar Ye Zhengjia, a former diplomat 
once assigned to India and then a research fellow at the Foreign Ministry’s Institute of
34 Jaswant Singh, A Call to Honour: In Service o f Emergent India (New Delhi: Rupa. Co, 2006), p.l 12.
35 The Hindu (internet edition), May 24, 2005.
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International Studies, argued that it is India’s sovereign right to decide whether to
<1/:
have nuclear weapons or not. Another well-known Chinese nationalist scholar, 
Wang Xiaodong, also stated frankly that he could not find a just reason to oppose 
India conducting nuclear tests. However, India’s use of what Chinese observers and 
commentators call the “China threat” theory as the excuse did enrage China.
The differences were well illustrated by the official statements from Beijing. China’s 
initial reaction to India’s first round of nuclear tests on May 11, 1998 was seen as 
relatively mild and cautious, as it expressed only “serious concerns.” However, after 
learning the content of Vajpayee’ letter, published on May 13, Beijing became 
indignant. China soon adjusted its earlier tone and strongly condemned India’s nuclear 
tests.39 The Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman explained the change in China’s 
attitude towards India’s nuclear tests. As he said, China had exercised restraint in 
expressing its position by merely expressing regret about the tests. On May 13, after 
India had conducted its second round of nuclear tests and the Prime Minister had sent 
a letter to President Clinton alleging that China posed a threat, China raised its voice 
against India’s nuclear tests by issuing a strongly worded statement.40 The Chinese 
statement read:
In disregard o f  the strong opposition o f  the international community, the Indian 
government conducted two more nuclear tests on May 13 following May 11 
nuclear tests. The Chinese government is deeply shocked by this and hereby
36 N. Ram, “Clarifying the facts about 1962 is a precondition,” Frontline, September 12-25, 1998, p. 18.
37 Wang Xiaodong, “99’s duanxiang” (“Thoughts in 1999”) in Fang Ning, Wang Xiaodong and Song 
Qiang, Quanqiuhua yinying xia de qiangguo zhi lu (The way to be great power under the shadow o f  
globalization) (Beijing: Zhongguo shehui kexue chubanshe, 1999).
38 Renmin Ribao, May 13, 1998, p.3.
39 Ibid., May 15, 1998,p.l.
40 Foreign Ministry spokesman Zhu Bangzao’s statement, in N. Ram, “Sino-Indian relations: What lies 
aheadT ’ Frontline (internet edition), September 12-25, 1998.
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expresses its strong condemnation. [...] The Indian government, which itself 
has undermined the international effort in banning nuclear tests so as to obtain 
the hegemony in South Asia in defiance o f  the world opinion, has even 
maliciously accused China as posing a nuclear threat to India. This is utterly 
groundless. This gratuitous accusation by India against China is solely for the 
purpose offinding excuses fo r  the development o f its nuclear weapons.4I
Beijing also launched a propaganda campaign against India. As a symbolic protest, 
China’s state-owned Renmin Ribao (People’s Daily) published two commentator’s 
articles on May 15 and 19 condemning the nuclear tests.42 Some Chinese scholars 
argued that India was trying to present a “China threat” scenario to extract mileage 
out of the ideological differences between China and the West while New Delhi was 
masking its own contradictions with the West to lessen the extent of any possible 
sanctions.43 Some others considered that India’s nuclear tests and Vajpayee’s 
testimony exposed India’s suspicious mind and animosity towards China.
Therefore, the initial task for Beijing in response to India’s nuclear tests was to refute 
the “China threat” discourse proposed by India, instead of echoing the Western 
concerns about nuclear proliferation. China stressed that it was ridiculous to suggest 
that China could pose a threat to any other country because China had no military 
bases and not a single soldier outside its borders. Moreover, the Chinese side argued 
that China was the only country among the five nuclear powers to have promised not
41 Renmin Ribao, May 15, 1998, p .l.
42 Commentator, “Chengba nanya de tumo” (“Plot to achieve hegemony over South Asia”), Renimin 
Ribao, May 15, 1998, p.4; Commentator, “Lishi bu rong fouren, shishi sheng yu xiongbian” 
(“History shall not be denied, facts speak louder than words”), Renmin Ribao, May 19, 1998, p.4.
43 The Hindu, May 20, 1998, p. 14.
40
to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon states and nuclear-free zones.44
The then Chinese Ambassador to India, Zhou Gang, even said that “China, being a 
socialist country, does not believe in posing a threat to any neighbouring nations, let 
alone India. [...] The slogan Hindi-Chini bhai bhai is still very popular with the people 
of China,” 45 though this defence sounded unpersuasive. Claiming that Beijing’s 
defence policy was defensive in nature, Zhou said that any fear of a “China threat” 
was entirely unfounded and was fabricated with ulterior motives 46
Stressing that their nuclear tests were more “legitimate” than India’s, China also 
argued that the circumstances and context in which China conducted its first tests in 
October 1964 were totally different from those prevailing in 1998. The Chinese 
stressed that their nuclear weapons programme was developed when China faced 
threats from the superpowers. China’s nuclear weapons were acquired and developed 
against the background of the monopoly of the former Soviet Union and the United 
States, the Chinese argued, while India faced no such threat from China.
Beijing aimed to clear its name as a motive for the Indian nuclear tests, repeatedly 
arguing that the Indian tests had nothing to do with India versus China, but were 
related to India’s ambition to dominate South Asia. In a statement on India’s nuclear 
tests, China accused India of pursuing a hegemonistic ambition in South Asia and 
triggering a new round of the arms race in the subcontinent47
Meanwhile, Chinese officials began to list India’s “China threat” theory as the main
44 See, for example, “The Chinese Embassy Responds,” The Washington Post, May 30, 1999, p. B06.
45 The Indian Express (internet edition), September 15, 1998.
46 Press Trust o f  India, March 9, 1999.
47 Renmin Ribao, May 15, 1998, p. 1.
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irritant in Sino-Indian relations. For example, the then Chinese Ambassador to India, 
Zhou Gang, argued that the main cause for the upset in Sino-Indian relations was that 
some personalities in India had accused China of posing a threat to India’s security so 
as to justify India’s nuclear tests. The official Chinese line was that a prerequisite for 
the development of healthy Sino-Indian relations was the understanding that neither 
side constituted a threat to the other, and that the basis of their relationship was the 
Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence jointly initiated by the two countries.49
Not satisfied with New Delhi’s responses, Beijing asked the Indian side to take 
concrete steps to declare that China did not constitute a threat to India or any other 
countries. As well as suspending the border dialogue, military exchanges also 
remained dormant in the wake of the Pokhran-II tests. Moreover, calls began to be 
made for a change in China’s policy towards India. Chinese scholar Song Dexin, for 
example, argued that it is imperative for China to chart an alternative policy instead of 
sticking to the policy of ‘good-neighbours’ because India still treats China as a threat 
and held on to a Cold War mentality.50 In a warning tone, another senior Chinese 
South Asian specialist, Ma Jiali, said, “If India regards China as a rival or enemy, it is 
possible for China to be that way.”51 Despite the re-normalisation process that had 
taken place since the late 1980s, Sino-Indian relations were not as optimistic as they 
seemed on the surface.
48 Press Trust o f  India, March 9, 1999.
49 See “Foreign Ministry News Briefings,” Beijing Review, July 5, 1999, p. 15; These principles are 
mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, non-interference in 
each other’s internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence.
50 Song Dexin, “Shi xi Zhongguo zhoubian anquan huanjing zhong de Yindu yinsu” (“A tentative 
probe into the India factor in the China’s surrounding security environment”), Nanya yanjiu jiakn, 
no.2, 1999 pp.36-42.
51 N. Ram, “The CTBT will make a real difference,” p. 15.
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China’s Adjusted Posture
The deadlock between Beijing and New Delhi following the nuclear tests has 
prompted China and India to modify their approaches to dealing with their bilateral 
relations. It was not in the interest of India to return to a relationship of conflict with 
China. Although Prime Minister Vajpayee cited China as the reason behind the 
decision to test, it was not India’s intention to go nuclear at the cost of Sino-Indian 
rapprochement. In some respects the Chinese were right to say that New Delhi used 
China as the rationale for going nuclear, in effect playing the “China threat” card to 
ease Western pressure in the wake of the nuclear tests. Yet New Delhi appeared to 
have expected Vajpayee’s letter to remain confidential, and was upset when the US 
officials leaked it to the press. India’s tactic of mentioning China as a threat then 
became a diplomatic stumbling block, as the tone and content of Vajpayee’s letter 
soon caused China to harden its position toward India’s nuclear tests.
In order to mend relations, the Indian side took several initiatives to placate the 
Chinese. First was the statement by Brajesh Mishra, the Principal Secretary to the 
Prime Minister, who said that India wanted to have “the best of relations” with China 
and urged China to return to dialogue. This was followed by Vajpayee’s statement 
that some misunderstandings between China and India had been created only by the 
“distorted version of statements” appearing in the media.54 However, Beijing expected 
a more credible commitment from New Delhi.
52 The Indian Express (internet edition), May 14, 1998.
53 The Hindu (internet edition), May 22, 1998.
54 “Recent Nuclear Test in Pokhran,” Lok Sabha Debates (English version), Twelfth Series 2, no.3, 
May 29, 1998, column 394.
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As part of the plan to manage the situation in the wake of the nuclear tests, in 
December 1998, Jaswant Singh was appointed Minister for External Affairs, the 
portfolio previously retained by Prime Minister Vajpayee himself. Aware of the 
importance of engaging China, the new minister lost no time in seeking a revival of 
talks with China. He asked the Chinese side to return to the negotiating table, and 
argued that China should help India “untie the knot” through frequent consultations 
and talks.55 The Chinese side expressed its appreciation of his statement, but did not 
make any commitment.56
In February 1999, Indian officials were sent to Beijing in an attempt to urge their 
counterparts to restart the dialogue on the boundary question. The official visit 
brought about a positive result with an announcement by the Chinese Foreign 
Minister Tang Jiaxuan just a few weeks later that the Chinese side had recently 
acknowledged the statements issued by Indian leaders that China posed no threat to 
India.57 Tang’s announcement came as the first positive signal of China’s desire to put 
behind it the bitterness that had arisen in the wake of India’s nuclear tests. During 
Indian External Affairs Minister Singh’s visit to China in June 1999, he endorsed 
China’s argument that the precondition for developing China-India relations was that
CO
neither side saw the other as a threat.
Despite India’s efforts to engage China, the reason behind the softening of Beijing’s 
rigid stance towards New Delhi came partly from India’s diplomatic success in 
allaying international suspicion about its nuclear tests. In July 1998, for example, the
55 TheHindu(internet edition), December 25, 1998.
56 Renmin Ribao, December 29, 1998, p.4.
57 Ibid., March 8, 1999, p .l.
58 Ibid., June 15, 1999, p.4.
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ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) decided not to condemn India’s nuclear tests, 
ignoring China’s displeasure. India also successfully repaired its relations with most 
of the major powers by conducting formal consultations and resuming high-level 
visits. Eight rounds of dialogue between India and the US were held between June 
1998 and January 1999. Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee visited France in September 
1998. The visit was followed by the first meeting of the Indo-French Strategic 
Dialogue in October 1998. Russian Prime Minister Yevgeny Primakov visited India in 
December 1998, and Indian President Kocheril Raman Narayanan visited Germany 
on September 6 to 10, 1998. Brajesh Mishra, the Principal Secretary to Prime Minister 
and later India’s National Security Advisor, visited the United Kingdom and France in 
June 1998 and January 1999 respectively. The India-Japan Foreign Office 
consultation was conducted in January 1999. As other major powers had been 
conducting official dialogues with India, China became increasingly isolated at the 
international level in continuing to urge New Delhi to abandon its nuclear programme. 
It was against this background that China began to moderate its position on India, 
although it was still angry with way in which India allayed suspicions by using the 
“China threat” as justification of for its nuclear tests.
Following the trend to restore the pre-Pokhran-II relationship, at the twelfth Joint 
Working Group (JWG) meeting on the boundary problem in April 2000, Beijing and 
New Delhi agreed to resume high-level military interactions, which had been 
suspended after India’s nuclear tests in May 1998. Chinese Foreign Minister Tang 
Jiaxuan visited India in July 2000, followed by Lt. General Tian Shugen, Vice 
President of the Academy of Military Science, in August 2000. It was the first 
exchange between the two armies after the PLA (People’s Liberation Army) Chief of 
General Staff Fu Quanyou had visited India in April to May 1998. Subsequently, two
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Indian naval ships paid a good-will visit to China in September 2000. Clearly, there 
was a positive shift in the tone and content of the bilateral relationship.
Despite its resentment of India's nuclear tests, China did not want to adopt a course of 
conflict and a hostile policy posture. Still, China did not see India as a serious security 
threat, and was not willing to escalate tensions between the two countries, if  this 
would have an adverse affect on its priority of development. In pursuing the goal of 
rising in peace and building a well-off society, the Chinese leadership strived to 
improve China’s relations with the major powers, neighbouring countries and the 
Third World.59 Officials in Beijing argued that there were no serious problems 
between India and China and no fundamental conflict of interest, but that a lack of 
communication and contact had sometimes led to misunderstanding.60 In other words, 
Beijing was expressing confidence that India’s suspicion about China could be 
dispelled if the both sides increased exchanges in various fields. There was a growing 
recognition that mutual understanding between the two countries was not enough and 
needed to be improved. This point was shared with New Delhi.
A comprehensive dialogue mechanism was formed with the aim of promoting an 
improvement of and a development in bilateral relations through dialogue. Despite the 
existing negotiation mechanism on boundary problem, a security dialogue was 
established in June 1999 during Indian External Affairs Minister Singh’s visit to 
China. Three rounds of the dialogue were held between March 2000 and September
2002. An India-China Eminent Persons Group was constituted during Indian President
59 For this point, see Zheng Bijian, “China’s ‘Peaceful Rise’ to Great-Power Status,” Foreign Affairs, 
vol. 84, no.5, September/October 2005, pp. 18-24; Yiwei Wang, “The dimensions of China’s 
peaceful rise,” Asia Times Online, May 14, 2004.
60 See Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Wang Yi’s statement, in The Times o f India (internet edition), 
October 4,2002.
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Narayanan’s state visit to China May-June 2000, and the first meeting of this group 
took place in New Delhi on September 17 to 18, 2001. The group was expected to 
serve as an important advisory agency for the two governments. The India-China 
dialogue mechanism on counter terrorism was established during Chinese Premier 
Zhu Rongji’s visit to India in January 2002 to address concerns in the wake of the 
September 11 events. The first meeting was held in New Delhi on April 23,2002.
The dialogue mechanism appeared to be a new feature of Sino-Indian relations in the 
post-Pokhran era, but it is still questionable whether both sides can make use of it to 
enhance mutual understanding and further strengthen bilateral relations. Despite the 
assumption that it is seeking a stable and friendly relationship with India, Beijing 
needs to keep pace with the changes when fashioning its India policy. In fairness, the 
so-called “constructive partnership of cooperation oriented towards the twenty-first 
century” had not worked out as satisfactorily as hoped since its proclamation61 
Despite the continued engagement, China remained more cautious about India’s 
perception of China. For example, a Renmin Ribao commentary article published in 
2001 criticised the “China threat” content in the annual report of India’s Ministry of 
Defence.62 It reflected that China was still sensitive to the “China threat” discourse.
On the other hand, China showed flexibility in its policy towards India. The major 
figures of the BJP-led government, including Prime Minister Vajpayee, Deputy Prime 
Minister and Home Minister Lai Krishna Advani, and Defence Minister Fernandes
61 In December 1996 when Chinese President Jiang Zemin visited India, a new diplomatic initiate was 
taken as China and India agreed to establish “a constructive partnership of cooperation oriented 
towards the twenty-first century” (mian xiang ershi yi shiji de jianshexing hezuo huoban guanxi) as 
the goal of developing bilateral relations.
62 Zhao Zhangyun, “Bu fu zeren de lundiao” (“Irresponsible statements”), Renmin Ribao, June 7, 2001, 
p.3.
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were all considered as hardliners by the Chinese and as such were not popular in 
either political or academic circles in China, but Beijing still invited them to visit 
China.
Beijing’s flexibility bore some much needed fruit. During Indian Prime Minister Atal 
Bihari Vajpayee’s visit to China from June 22 to 27, 2003, both sides issued a 
Declaration on Principles fo r  Relations and Comprehensive Cooperation, which 
stated, “The two countries are not a threat to each other. Neither side shall use or 
threaten to use force against the other.” Chinese experts evaluated the clause as a de 
facto  non-war pact.64 It was a diplomatic effort by Beijing to mend what it saw as the 
damage done by India’s use of the “China threat” to justify its development of a 
nuclear weapons programme.
Apparently, China considers that India has made a public apology by declaring that it 
did not see China as a threat. India’s low-profile attitude in dealing with the “China 
threat” after the nuclear tests fostered a perception of benign intentions and thus 
reduced the perception of threat in the eyes of China, and thus influenced the degree 
to which China would like to take a softer approach toward India.
2.3 India’s Nuclear Doctrine and Posture
Although China and India showed a willingness and a capability to manage the 
diplomatic aftershock of India’s nuclear tests, suspicions and distrust still remained.
63 See Qian Feng, “Yindu, shei dui Zhongguo zui qiang y in g ” (“W h o  are the most hard-line figures 
towards China in India?”), Renmin wan (People’s website), April 5, 2001, at 
<http://www.people.com.cn/GB/junshi/60/20010405/433542.html>.
64 Xinhua, June 26, 2003.
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With India’s emergence as a nuclear power in its neighbourhood, for the Chinese, a 
more significant question that needed to be answered was whether a nuclear India 
would undermine China’s security.
In fact, the Chinese have not ignored India’s military power in their assessment of 
Sino-Indian relations. The Chinese analyst Chen Fengjun identified India’s military 
capability as the most noticeable component of its national strength.65 However, few 
in China had taken India seriously or treated India as a strategic threat before India 
transformed to a nuclear weapon power. Such a mindset was dramatically changed as 
India has been empowered by nuclear weapons. In assessing India’s nuclear weapons 
programme, the major concern for China was that China lost most of its nuclear 
superiority against India. No mater how credible India’s nuclear weapons are, the 
Chinese perceived India’s nuclear weapons as an unpleasant factor in its security 
environment. The quantitative and qualitative improvement of India’s nuclear forces 
has led to an increased perception of threat in China. As a result, China is still very 
reluctant to recognise India’s status as a nuclear state and tries to underline the 
illegitimacy of India’s nuclear weapons programme.
India’s Nuclear Deterrent against China
Since Indian strategists had branded China’s and Pakistan’s nuclear capability as the 
main security imperative in the development of a nuclear weapons programme, the 
implication was that New Delhi intended to use its nuclear weapons to counterbalance 
China’s strength. In other words, India’s possession of nuclear weapons had made an 
impact on China’s and Pakistan’s strategic environment.
65 Chen Fengjun, “lun yindu zai shijie de diwei”(“India’s place in contemporary world”), Nanya yanjiu 
jika  (South Asian studies quarterly),, no.l, 1999, pp.6-7.
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In the case of Pakistan, it was well-recognised that India had previously enjoyed 
massive superiority over Pakistan in conventional military strength. However, 
Pakistan had taken the same step to conduct tests and to declare itself a nuclear- 
weapons state on the heels of India’s nuclear blasts. India has not substantially 
increased its strategic advantage vis-a-vis Pakistan. Ironically, as result, the option of 
joining the nuclear club had to some extent neutralized India’s conventional military 
strength against Pakistan, since Pakistan was also armed with a nuclear deterrent. 
Worse, there were no signs that the nuclearisation of India and Pakistan could 
effectively help to reduce the long-standing conflict between the two countries. 
Months after India and Pakistan had declared themselves nuclear states, the two 
countries engaged in a major military confrontation between May and July 1999 in 
the Kargil district of the disputed Kashmir region. The conflict was, in fact, the first 
direct military confrontation between India and Pakistan in nearly thirty years, and 
thus was considered by some as the fourth Indo-Pakistan war. The Kargil conflict 
proved that the nuclear deterrent did not work to make military confrontation between 
India and Pakistan less likely. In the view of many, the subcontinent became less 
secure as a result of the tit-for-tat nuclear tests by India and Pakistan. After the nuclear 
tests of 1998, the Indian Nobel prize laureate Prof. Amartya Sen, speaking in a 
sardonic tone, argued that, “Bangladesh is probably now the safest country to live in, 
in the subcontinent”.66
The tension between India and Pakistan in fact did not serve China’s interests either. 
Beijing had always been reluctant to be dragged into an India-Pakistan military stand-
66 Amartya Sen, The Argumentative Indian: Writings on Indian Culture, History and Identity (London: 
Penguin Books, 2005), p.258.
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off, and had concerns about the possibility of a Pakistan-India nuclear holocaust. 
Besides, it also worried about the impact of a nuclear confrontation in its 
neighbourhood. That was one of the reasons why, instead of supporting Islamabad’s 
adventure, China asked both India and Pakistan to show restraint during the Kargil 
crisis.
In addition to the possible India-Pakistan nuclear conflict, for Beijing, a more critical 
question was whether a nuclear-armed India posed a threat or a serious challenge to 
China’s security. China had become a member of the nuclear club decades before 
India and its- nuclear weapons programme remained many years in advance of India’s. 
However, India’s decision to go down the route of developing nuclear weapons has 
neutralised China’s perceived superiority in terms of military strength. Rationally, 
China will no longer be able to use nuclear blackmail and coercion against India, 
because the latter is also equipped with nuclear strike ability. Just as Dr. Shanta 
Nedungadi-Verma of Delhi University suggested, “With India being a nuclear power, 
Beijing would not like to antagonise India beyond a certain point.” This is why the 
then Indian External Minister Jaswant Singh argued that the nuclear tests acquired for
zo
India the “strategic space” and rewarded India with strategic autonomy.
Indeed, some analysts in China were very confident that India remained unable to 
pose a threat to China. For example, the senior Chinese scholar Ye Zhengjia once said 
that China was not very worried about India’s targeting China.69 Chen Fengchun of
67 Yukteshwar Kumar and Ramananda Sengupta, “Hindi-chini bye bye?” Outlook (internet edition), 
April 3,2000.
68 The Hindu, January 4, 1999, p. 13.
69 N. Ram, “Clarifying the facts about 1962 is a precondition,” Frontline (internet edition), September. 
12-25, 1998, p. 18.
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Peking University also expressed the belief that India did not constitute a serious
7flthreat to China. Even so, China has kept an eye on India’s nuclear build-up and has 
tried to interpret India’s real intentions toward China in the context of nuclear issue. 
Before the nuclear tests, Chinese analysts deemed that China’s western frontier was
71stable and peaceful. However, India’s nuclear tests changed that opposite view. After 
the nuclear tests, the Chinese side suddenly found that India had developed unknown 
facets.72
Despite lacking a detailed analysis about how India’s nuclear weapons programme 
would affect China’s security environment, Chinese scholars identify India’s nuclear 
weapons as a negative factor. The conclusion is that South Asia is no longer a region 
that poses only a minimum threat to China’s security. Instead, the view is that South 
Asia might become the region with the greatest potential threat.73 Contrary to the 
earlier optimism, the Chinese have become more cautious, seeing Sino-Indian 
relations as an “unstable” factor in China’s security environment.74
India’s Nuclear Doctrine
Conducting nuclear tests indicates that a country is willing to take the step to cross the 
nuclear threshold, but is not necessarily proof of a country’s capacity for mass 
destruction and a nuclear deterrent. The effectiveness and the credibility of the nuclear
70 Zhongguo shibao (China Times)(intemet edition), September 20, 2000.
71 Ye Zicheng and others, Diyuan zhengzhiyu Zhongguo waijiao ("Geopolitics and China’s 
diplomacy”)  (Beijing: Beijing Chuebanshe, 1997), p.429-450.
72 Yuan Di, “Yindu he xuanze yu duai hua ‘zhanlue siwei” (“India's nuclear option and 'strategic 
thinking' on China,”) Nanya yanjiu jikan, no.3 (1998), pp. 1-4.
73 Yang Chengxu ed., Zhongguo anquan huanjing toushi (Perspectives o f  China’s Security Along Its 
Boundaries) (Beijing: Zhongguo qingnian chubanshe, 2003), p. 165.
74 Song Dexin, “Shi xi Zhongguo zhoubian anquan huanjing zhong de Yindu yinsu” (“A tentative 
probe into the India factor in China’s surrounding security environment”), pp.36-42.
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deterrent hinge on guidance over the conditions and possible scenarios under which 
the nuclear weapons will be used. Another significant factor contributing to the 
nuclear deterrent is the delivery system. In the case of China and India, in order to 
examine its implications for China-India relations it is imperative to contemplate 
India’s nuclear strategy and its development.
Although Indian officials made some statements about its nuclear arms immediately 
after Pokhran II, exactly how India might stage a nuclear strike was still largely a 
matter of speculation. That is why the Indian attitude towards nuclear weaponisation 
was characterized by ambiguity and uncertainty by some Indian pundits.75 In fact, it 
took a nuclear India fifteen months to release its first formal declaration on the subject 
of its nuclear weapons, policy, the draft Report of the National Security Advisory 
Board on Indian Nuclear Doctrine on August 17, 1999, which in essence was adopted 
as official policy in January 2003.
The document appeared to be an attempt to reassure the world that India has a 
responsible, considered nuclear arms policy, a clear command structure, and is 
determined to build up an assured nuclear retaliation. According to the doctrine, the 
fundamental purpose of Indian nuclear weapons is to deter the use and threat of use of 
nuclear weapons by any state or entity against India and its forces. India forswears 
first use of nuclear weapons and maintains a “minimum credible deterrent”. 
Meanwhile, it promises not to be the first to initiate a nuclear strike, although it will 
respond with punitive retaliation if the deterrent fails. India will not resort to the use 
of or threat to use nuclear weapons against states that do not possess nuclear weapons, 
or are not aligned with nuclear-weapons powers.
75 For example, see Sen, The Argumentative Indian, pp.260-262.
53
Similar to China’s nuclear position, one element of India’s nuclear doctrine is that it 
unequivocally renounces the first use of nuclear weapons. The commitment to no- 
first-use has explicitly underscored India’s lack of any intention to use nuclear 
weapons as a tool of pre-emptive policy and its intention to use them instead simply 
to dissuade attempts by any state at nuclear blackmail. Though it is tempting to 
dismiss the no-first-use commitment as a mere boilerplate, and although the efficiency 
of the no-first-use policy is also questioned by some analysts, the deterrent nature of 
India’s nuclear doctrine appears clear. In effect, then, the principal role of India’s 
nuclear force is to protect the nation from the prospect of nuclear blackmail and 
coercion at the hands of countries such as China or Pakistan.
Since the Chinese side also claims that China will not be the first to use nuclear 
weapons, the no-first-use principle has become a set of double safety valves between 
China and India to avoid a nuclear clash. Even though the two countries are equipped 
with nuclear weapons, a nuclear war between China and India therefore remains less 
likely.
As was noted earlier, among the five nuclear weapon states, China was the first 
country to commit to no-first-use of nuclear weapons. The Chinese even proposed 
that all nuclear-weapon states should commit themselves to the no-first-use of nuclear 
weapons before the goal of complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear 
weapons is achieved, and should abandon the policies of nuclear deterrence based on 
the first use of nuclear weapons and reduce the role of nuclear weapons in their 
national security policy. China has also called for a multilateral treaty among nuclear- 
weapon states on a mutual policy of no-first-use of nuclear weapons against each
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other. In January 1994, China formally presented a draft text of the Treaty on the No- 
First-Use of Nuclear Weapons to the other four nuclear-weapon states. At the same 
time, China also worked vigorously on arrangements among nuclear-weapon states on 
the mutual no-first-use of nuclear weapons and the mutual de-targeting of nuclear 
weapons at each other. In September 1994, China and Russia declared that they would 
not be the first to use nuclear weapons against each other and would not aim their 
strategic nuclear weapons at each other. In June 1998, China and the US declared the 
de-targeting of their nuclear weapons against each other. In May 2000, China and the 
other four nuclear-weapon states issued a joint statement declaring that their nuclear 
weapons are not aimed at each other.
Meanwhile, India reached an agreement on nuclear CBMs with Pakistan. As early as 
in 1988, India and Pakistan agreed that they would not attack each other’s nuclear 
facilities and would annually exchange a list of civilian nuclear facilities. During Mr. 
Vajpayee’s visit to Lahore in February 1999, India and Pakistan agreed to negotiate a 
range of CBMs. The two sides undertook to provide each other with advance 
notification in respect of ballistic missile tests. India has also held expert-level talks 
on CBMs with Pakistan since June 2004, trying to find ways to achieve nuclear risk 
reduction.
However, no similar agreement has been reached between China and India. Some 
Chinese scholars had suggested, before Pokhran II, that all nuclear countries should 
reach an agreement undertaking not to be the first to use nuclear weapons under any
77circumstances. After India’s nuclear tests in 1998, Chinese academics soon ruled out
76 Information Office of the State Council of the People’s Republic o f China, China s Endeavors fo r  
Arms Control, Disarmament and Non-Proliferation, Beijing, September 2005.
77 Liu Huaqiu and Zheng Hua, “Confidence-building Measures in Asia”, in Michael Krepon ed.,
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78  ►a similar agreement between India and China. Such a position contradicted China’s 
existing policy and shows that China remains unwilling to recognise India’s nuclear 
status.
The Indians acknowledged that differences existed in Sino-Indian relations, especially 
on the nuclear issue, and used the first ever security dialogue to explain India’s 
nuclear policy. However, Chinese officials diplomatically maintained their tough 
stance and asked India to implement in earnest the UN Security Council Resolution 
1172 and to renounce its nuclear weapons programme.79
As a new initiative to deal with the new nuclear order in South Asia, India’s External 
Affairs Minister K. Natwar Singh, suggested in June 2004 that India, Pakistan and 
China should develop a common nuclear doctrine. However, it appeared to be too 
early to expect China and India to sit together to coordinate their nuclear strategy. The 
use of nuclear capability is related to strategic deterrence and is at the heart of military 
strength. While China and India still endeavour to address conventional CBMs to 
avoid conflicts, it is still premature to turn our attention to the nuclear CBMs.
Moreover, it is not easy for either side to reach a compromise on all nuclear issues. 
China insisted that India should join the NPT and CTBT unconditionally and oppose 
the American proposal of a Theatre Missile Defence (TMD) system. On the contrary, 
India considers the NPT and CTBT as being against its own national interests and 
supports the TMD. However, Natwar Singh’s idea underscored India’s new Congress
Chinese Perspectives on Confidence-building Measures, Report No. 23, (The Henry L. Stimson 
Center, May 1997), p.6.
78 “Indians were very friendly towards China,” Frontline (internet edition), September 12-25, 1998.
79 See for example, Press Trust o f  India, March 7, 2000.
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government’s policy of cooperation towards China. India’s self-chosen belief in itself 
as a responsible and rational nuclear weapon power, as its nuclear doctrine tries to 
manifest, will help to minimise the risk of nuclear and missile conflict with Pakistan 
and China.
Since the prevention of any nuclear war in the neighbourhood is also in China’s 
interests, the experiment to coordinate their positions and stop squabbling over 
bilateral differences should have won approval from Beijing. The Chinese side 
considered Singh’s proposal a goodwill gesture, but has chosen not to react so far, 
because it has not been in favour of according nuclear status to India and bringing it 
on a par with China. Accepting the proposal for a common nuclear doctrine even in 
principle would mean acknowledging India as a nuclear power, which China did not 
intend to do. Chinese Assistant Foreign Minister Shen Guofang instead asked the 
international community to keep to the spirit and principles enshrined in the NPT as
Q A
well as the consensus reached in the UN Security Council resolution 1172. There 
was yet no sign that Beijing accepted the reality and would stop asking India to 
renounce its nuclear weapon programme.
Although the two sides have begun to include civil nuclear cooperation on the agenda, 
currently, China has no intention of discussing the nuclear CBMs such as de-targeting 
committee members to avoid any endorsement. The Chinese leaders also avoid 
making any reference to India’s de facto status as a nuclear-weapon state.
India’s Nuclear and Missile Programme
80 Ibid., June 29, 2004.
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Part of India’s nuclear doctrine, such as the no-first-use principle, underlined the value 
of reducing the risk of a nuclear war with China. However, part of the doctrine also 
emphasized the need to maintain a credible minimum nuclear deterrent against China.
According to its nuclear doctrine, India needs to develop an effective deterrent against 
a potential adversary and ensure that India can and will retaliate with sufficient 
nuclear weapons to inflict destruction and punishment. Indian policymakers appear 
confident that a small nuclear force capable of surviving a first strike could meet this 
requirement. That is, India’s strategy is a kind of mutual assured destruction. Since a 
nuclear deterrent cannot be effective unless backed by an appropriate delivery system, 
the doctrine also recommended that India should develop a “triad” strategic defence 
system in which nuclear weapons could be delivered by land-based missiles, aircraft 
and submarines.
A  decade after Pokhran H, however, India has yet to reach the target of completing its 
nuclear triad. Though India, in February 2007, successfully test-fired its first-ever 
SLBM, the K-15 (Sagarika), it is currently limited to surface-to-surface missiles and 
fighters like Mirage-2000s to carry nuclear weapons. Since India has a relatively 
limited capability to launch nuclear weapons from planes and submarines, the surface- 
based missiles, especially the Agni series, are at the very core of the Indian nuclear 
programme and have attracted much more attention.
The Agni missile is part of the Integrated Guided Missile Development Programme 
(IGMDP) launched by India in 1983. Under the scheme, India first test-fired the 700- 
km Agni in May 1989, but suspended further testing after three test flights in 1994. 
Only after Pokhran II, in order to acquire a credible nuclear deterrent, India decided to
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restore the testing to further advance the missile programmes relentlessly.
On April 11, 1999, ignoring US appeals for restraint in testing weapons, India ended 
five years of uncertainty by successfully test-firing an Agni-II missile with a range of 
around 2,000 km. The testing of the Agni II missile raised fears of a new arms race in 
South Asia, as Pakistan soon test-fired its Hatf-V (Ghauri-II) missile, which has the
O 1
capability to cover almost the whole territory of India. Although some analysts may 
be tempted to assess the test-firing of Agni missiles in the context of Indo-Pakistani 
relations, as a  deterrent against Pakistan, Agni I has sufficient range and Agni-II does 
not pose any major additional threat to Pakistan. On the contrary, it is China that 
needs to worry about the development of Agni-II.
With this type o f nuclear-capable missiles, India’s nuclear warheads could reach 
targets inside China. The Chinese side was aware of the China-specific feature of the 
missile. Meanwhile, Beijing rebuked India for deliberately playing the “China threat” 
card as a reason for test-firing Agni-II. The Chinese side also condemned the Agni- 
II tests, saying that it was a violation of UN Security Council resolution 1172 and 
warned that it might trigger a new arms race in South Asia.83 A Chinese commentator 
warned that India’s statement regarding China as the target of attack in fact ran 
counter to Indian leaders’ expression of their attitude that China and India did not 
constitute threat to each other. As a result, the Chinese said it was difficult to believe 
in the sincerity of India, which had repeatedly expressed its willingness to improve its
81 The Hindu (internet edition), April 13, 1999.
82 Gu Ping, “yao zhengzhi duihua, buyao junbei jingsai” (“Political dialogue-yes; arms race-No”), 
Renmin ribao, April 15, 1999, p.6.
83 Renmin ribao, April 4, 1999, p.4.
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relationship with China.
The Indian side, however, showed no signs of compromising over the development of 
the nuclear weapons programme, and insisted that it would undertake all necessary 
steps to ensure it maintained a credible minimum nuclear deterrent. As the then Indian 
Defence Minister Fernandes said, the test of Agni-II was “an effort to acquire a
o r
credible minimum deterrent needed for India’s security.” Indian Prime Minister 
Vajpayee said that India would not accept any restraints on its research and 
development capabilities, and that his government had decided “to maintain the 
deployment of a deterrent that is both minimum but credible”
Against China’s wishes, both the 700-km Agni-I and the 2,000-km range Agni-II have 
been inducted into the armed forces. Although the Agni-II can reach deep into China, 
it in fact still does not cover all China’s major cities. Therefore, India needed to 
extend its missile coverage of China, something that would make Indian nuclear strike 
capability more credible. Around 2002, India began to work on the longer-range 
Agni-III missile. Although the Agni-III’s maiden launch in July 2006 failed, it was 
followed by two other successful test-firings in April 2007 and May 2008.
The new missiles gave a boost to India’s nuclear deterrent capability vis-a-vis China, 
as they are capable of striking targets deep inside China, such as Beijing and Shanghai. 
Although Indian officials have claimed that the missile testing was not country- 
specific, the Agni-III missile has once again revealed the China-specific nature of 
India’s nuclear strategic concerns. Almost all the Indian media chorused that India had
84 Gu Ping, “yao zhengzhi duihua, buyao junbei jingsai,” p.6.
85 The Hindu, January 19, 2001, p. 1.
86 Xinhua, December 15, 1998.
60
finally achieved credibility in its nuclear deterrent posture vis-a-vis China, something 
for which it had been striving for quite some time. India has inched closer towards 
building a “minimum credible nuclear deterrent” against China since Pokhran II.
Chinese strategic analysts also deemed that the Agni-II and Agni-III are China- 
specific missiles. However, despite the diplomatic statements, Beijing did not take 
serious steps to interrupt India’s nuclear weapon programme. Beijing also did not 
respond to the Indian tests by entering into an arms race, one of the major reasons 
being that China’s nuclear and missile arsenal is still in a different league from India’s.
Agni-III is expected to be ready for operational deployment by 2010 or so. Meanwhile, 
India would also like to have ICBMs and SLBMs. However, India’s stark asymmetry 
vis-a-vis China in terms of delivery capability remains. China already has a wide array 
of missiles. In the surface-to-surface category, China’s arsenal includes the DF-4 
(CSS-3) with a range of 4,850 km, the DF-5/5A (CSS-4) with a 13,000-km range, the 
DF-31 (under development and tested) with a range of 8,000 km and the DF-41 (not 
tested) with a range of 12,000 km.87 China also owns the JL-1 and is developing the 
7,200-km range JL-2 SLBM. Thus, China’s nuclear strike ability is still far ahead of 
India’s.
It is true that India needs more time to counter the stark strategic imbalance with 
China in terms of nuclear and missile arsenals. It is foolhardy for India to assume all 
is in the relationship with China by citing possession of the Agni-III. However, the 
narrowing of the military asymmetry with China provided a significant boost for 
Indian, even if their strike range would be much less than those of Chinese missiles.
87 Hindustan Times, May 8, 2008, p. 10.
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As India moves closer towards building a credible nuclear deterrent against China, it 
gains more faith in its ability to deal with China without making humiliating 
concessions.
In other words, although India is still in the process of building and deploying a 
nuclear arsenal capable of threatening China militarily, India’s perception of a “China 
threat” seems to have abated. Ironically, an India empowered with a nuclear military 
force may not be disadvantageous to the development of Sino-Indian relations. 
Although Chinese missiles can target any major city in India, the Indian side has 
deemed that it is sufficiently empowered to dissuade China from any aggression. That 
is why some analysts in India have argued that the development of missiles reflects a 
strategic mindset that seeks to augment military capability as a way of keeping the 
peace.88
Fortunately, all this activity on the missile front has not adversely affected the 
overtures of efforts to reduce sources of tension between India and China. However, it 
has not assuaged the apprehensions either in the region or globally. Even before the 
1998 nuclear tests, some analysts in China were aware that India’s nuclear-weapons 
programme was targeting China.89 As India is determined to develop and deploy a 
credible minimum nuclear deterrent, it has established the ability to strike well 
beyond its immediate border zone. As a result, India’s nuclear capability constitutes a 
negative factor in China’s security environment. In the long run, as India’s nuclear 
strike capability becomes more credible, Beijing will find it imperative to take India’s 
nuclear and missile capabilities more seriously.
88 Editorial, “India’s latest strategic weapon,” The Hindu, May 9,2008, p. 12.
89 Ye Zicheng and others, Diyuan zhengzhi yu Zhongguo waijiao, p.430.
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2.4. India’s Status as a Nuclear Weapon State
At least two implications stem from India attaining an identity as a nuclear weapon 
state. First, it would help India to break the nuclear monopoly, and share the same 
privileges as the five nuclear states. Second, it is considered as a step toward making 
India a world power. Despite the perception and concerns from the “China threat”, 
another motivation behind India’s decision to cross the nuclear threshold is a desire to 
secure the status of being a major power.
After Pokhran II, India considered itself a fully fledged nuclear power. However, it 
seemed more difficult for India to muscle its way into the world nuclear order than it 
had expected. India’s wish to be acknowledged as a de jure nuclear-weapon state, 
alongside the five recognised nuclear powers, was not accepted by the international 
community.
Great-Power Status and India’s Nuclear Capability
Some Indians were of the opinion that India shared similar characteristics with China, 
but its international status was inferior to that of China. The reason, they tended to 
conclude, was the lack of nuclear weapons and not having UN Security Council 
membership. As a result, many saw being identified as a nuclear-weapon state as the 
entry card to  the exclusive club of major world powers. The popular logic within 
India is that if India possesses its own nuclear weapons, it will follow China and other 
nuclear weapons states to be recognised as a major player in international society and 
secure higher international status. Robert Ross’ study has provided an interesting
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comparison. He found that Chinese nationalism drives a widespread popular demand 
for construction of an aircraft carrier and a large blue-water navy, which are seen as 
traditional symbols of great power status. That is, the desire to be recognised as a 
great power, rather than security, is the reason behind China’s naval ambition.90 
Namely, countries such as China and India tend to go after status symbols of great 
power, such as aircraft carriers or nuclear weapons to enhance their international 
standing.
Chinese leaders do in fact believe in the relevance between international status and 
the possession of nuclear weapons. Deng Xiaoping in the late 1980s argued that were 
it not for the atomic bomb, the hydrogen bomb and the satellites, China would not 
have its present international standing as a great, influential country.91 With the same 
logic, China is aware of India’s embracing nuclear weapons as a step towards 
becoming a great power. However, it has refused to accord India this status as a 
nuclear weapon state to prevent India from sharing an international status similar to 
his own.
The 1998 tests can certainly be read as a signal of New Delhi’s ambitions of securing 
the status of a great-power. Although some analysts in New Delhi hoped the 
possession of nuclear weapons would give India membership of the club of great 
powers, Pokhran II did not advance the cause of India’s putative elevation to 
permanent membership of the UN Security Council. The possession of nuclear
90 Robert Ross, “China’s Naval Nationalism: Sources, Prospects, and the U.S. Response,” International 
Security, vol.34, no.2, Fall 2009, pp.46-81.
91 Deng Xiaoping, “China must take its place in the field of high technology, October 24, 1988,” in 
Selected Works o f  Deng Xiaoping, Volume III (1982-1992) (internet edition), at 
<http://english.peopledaily.com.en/dengxp/voI3/text/c 1920.html>.
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weapons did not automatically grant India any symbolic status, such as a seat on the 
UN Security Council. Nowadays, nuclear weapons are not the only factor contributing 
to the status of a great power. The reason is not so difficult to understand if  account is 
taken of Pakistan also having nuclear weapons. Pakistan is the first Islamic state and 
might be seen as a representative of the Islamic world in the nuclear club, but it is 
unlikely that Pakistan can ever move up the league table of great powers. That is, 
India’s rise as a world power might be widely expected, but it is not yet fully assured
09of that status even after becoming a nuclear power.
Part of the opposition to granting nuclear status to India comes from the concern that 
the recognition of India’s status as a nuclear weapon state would further damage the 
international nuclear non-proliferation regime. India used to argue that since New 
Delhi had not signed the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) or joined the 
Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT), it had not broken any international 
agreements by choosing to test nuclear devices. India had identified the CTBT and 
NPT as being discriminatory in character. India argued that the NPT in 1960 granted a 
monopoly over nuclear weapon powers to various states, including China, and denied 
this capability to the rest. Even after the nuclear tests of 1998, the Indian side was still 
reluctant to accede to the nuclear non-proliferation regime. The Indian argument for 
not signing the CTBT or NPT was as follows: “If India is not recognised as a nuclear 
weapon state and does not enjoy an equal status with the five nuclear weapon power 
states, then it will have to bear the obligations and will not have any benefit.” Even 
so, India’s Pokhran II nuclear tests still received much criticism, questioning the 
timing and rationale of the tests. All this while, an international campaign went on
92 Edward Luce, In Spite o f  the Gods: The Strange Rise o f  Modem India (London: Little, Brown, 2006),
pp.262-263.
93 Pranab Mukheijee, “Should India sign the CTBT?” The Hindu, May 26, 1998, p. 10.
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against India and Pakistan, both of which faced sanctions and international isolation.
The concerns about the international nuclear non-proliferation regime thus provided 
China with a warranty against India’s nuclear weapons. China argued, “This act by 
India is nothing but an outrageous contempt for the common will of the international 
community for the Comprehensive Ban on nuclear tests and a hard blow to the 
international efforts to prevent nuclear weapon proliferation.”94 At the international 
diplomatic level, China also tried to persuade the international community to put 
pressure on India to desist from nuclearisation on the grounds that India was 
undermining the global non-proliferation regime.
Given China’s controversial role in building the nuclear and missile capabilities of 
Pakistan, China’s, condemnation of and concern over India’s nuclear programme was 
unlikely to have much credibility. However, it was not difficult for China to gamer 
international support to halt India’s nuclear programme, as India’s and Pakistan’s 
nuclear tests did deliver a blow to the regime. The UN Security Council passed 
Resolution 1172 on June 6, 1998 calling on India to cease the development of ballistic 
missiles capable of delivering nuclear weapons. Under the cloak of the resolution, 
Beijing toughened its opposition to India’s nuclear programme, asking India to fulfil 
all the requirements of Resolution 1172 and to renounce its nuclear weapons 
programmes.
China was also opposed to any deal that would allow India to maintain a “minimum 
nuclear deterrent” in return for joining the CTBT. China has adopted the view that it 
would be a direct violation of the Security Council Resolution 1172 to negotiate, or
94 The Hindu, May 15, 1998, p .l.
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even discuss, with India its insistence on maintaining a minimum nuclear deterrence 
capability.95 Since India had become able to target China with nuclear weapons, 
whether the Indian side decided to sign the CTBT was seen as a factor in China’s 
security.96 China asked India to sign and ratify the CTBT and adhere to the NPT 
unconditionally. As a result, among the five nuclear powers, China was seen as the 
country that had adopted the toughest line in the wake of the tests. Meanwhile, 
Chinese academics ruled out the proposal to conclude an agreement that neither side
07would use nuclear weapons against the other.
India was unhappy about China’s response, as it argued that Beijing was hardly in a 
position to preach to India on what it should or should not do, because over the years, 
China had carried out more than forty nuclear tests, and even as late as July 1996 had
QQ
gone on a “testing spree”. In an equally harsh statement, India referred to China’s 
record of nuclear tests, including those that took place while the CTBT was being 
finalised, arguing that “[i]f China, with a large nuclear arsenal built with the 
experience o f over 44 tests, felt compelled to test again in July 1996 (when the CTBT 
was in the final stages) for its own security, then it should be possible to understand 
the rationale of India conducting a limited number of tests after a 24-year- long period 
of voluntary restraint.” 99 Thus, the Indians expected the international community 
would appreciate the compulsion of security behind the nuclear explosion.
95 Ibid., January 28, 1999, p. 14.
96 Ming Zhang, China s Changing Nuclear Posture: Reactions to the South Asian Nuclear Tests 
(Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1999), p. 15.
97 “Indians were very friendly towards China,” Frontline (internet edition).
98 See, for example, the statement issued by the BJP senior vice-president, Jana Krishnamurthi, in The
Hindu, May 16, 1998, p. 11.
99 The Hindu, May 20, 1998, p.l.
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To alleviate concerns from the critics, India made a number of moves to demonstrate 
that it was a responsible nuclear state. These included a voluntary moratorium on 
testing, offers to convert this moratorium into a formal obligation through 
negotiations, to abide by some of the provisions of the CTBT, to tighten government 
control over the export of sensitive materials and technologies and to participate 
seriously in the FMCT negotiations.100 President A. P. J. Abdul Kalam also announced 
that India would never be a proliferator of weapons of mass destruction even though it 
was not a signatory to the NPT.101 Apparently, India tried to convince the international 
community that India was a responsible nuclear state, and hoped the international 
community would not use the nuclear non-proliferation concerns as the reason to 
undermine India’s de jure status as a nuclear weapon state.
lndia-US Nuclear Agreement
Although China had adopted a stubborn position against India’s nuclear weapons 
programme, of greater relevance to New Delhi was the need to modify the reaction of 
the US, which was leading world opinion in condemnation of India.102
In reaction to India’s 1974 nuclear test, the US terminated nuclear cooperation with 
India and proposed the formation of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) as a 
mechanism to control the transfer of nuclear technology. The NSG then prohibited the 
transfer of nuclear technology to India. The US had successfully thwarted India’s plan 
to conduct nuclear tests in the mid-1990s. In response the Pokhran II tests, US 
President Clinton immediately cancelled a scheduled visit to India. The US and a 
number of partners also imposed economic sanctions against India, which lasted till
100 Muchkund Dubey “The World Nuclear Order and India,” The Hindu, May 27, 1998, p. 12.
101 The Hindu (internet edition), May 24, 2005.
102 Jaswant Singh, A Call to Honour, p. 127.
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September 22, 2001 and was lifted due to the needs of the post-September 11 
cooperation on anti-terrorism.
At the same time, however, the Clinton administration realised that Washington had to 
engage the new de facto  nuclear power in dialogue. Fourteen rounds of talks on the 
nuclear issue were held between the US Deputy Secretary Strobe Talbott and Indian 
External Affairs Minister Jaswant Singh from June 1998 to September 2000.103 The 
Indo-American relationship improved over the course of the talks. President Clinton 
then, visited India in March 2000, and India’s then Prime Minister, Atal Bihari 
Vajpayee, visited Washington in October 2000. Although differences on proliferation 
issues were not fully resolved, these engagements allowed the US to gradually 
recognise India’s, status as a nuclear state.
India-US relations continued to witness intensive engagement towards a qualitative 
transformation over the following years. This was well reflected in their efforts to 
normalise the nuclear issues between the two countries. In addition, a framework for 
dialogue was established across a spectrum of issues. There were also intensive 
interactions at a high level, and joint military exercises increased in frequency.
US President George W. Bush and Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee announced in 
January 2004 the joint statement “Nest Steps in the Strategic Partnership” (NSSP) that 
described the vision for the Indo-US strategic relationship, including an expansion of 
cooperation or dialogue on civilian nuclear activities. The move was termed an 
important “milestone” or “manifestation of the qualitative change” in India-US
103 For an account o f this dialogue, see Strobe Talbott, Engaging India: Diplomacy, Democracy, And  
the Bomb (New Delhi: Penguin Books India, 2004)
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relations.104 NSSP marked an important shift in the nuclear dialogue between India 
and the US.
In July 2005, Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and President George W. Bush 
ended the long-standing nuclear dispute between the two nations, which had lasted 
since May 1998, by agreeing to cooperate in the area of civilian nuclear energy. In the 
Joint Statement, the Bush administration acknowledged India as “a responsible state 
with advanced nuclear technology”, and committed itself to seeking agreement from 
Congress to adjust US laws and policies, and working to adjust international regimes 
to allow full civil nuclear energy cooperation and trade with India. In exchange, New 
Delhi agreed to segregate civilian and military nuclear facilities and programmes, and 
voluntarily place its civilian nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards. India would 
assume the same responsibilities and practices as other nuclear-weapon states, 
continuing India’s unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing, and would adopt nuclear 
non-proliferation measures. The statement became a road map for India-US nuclear 
cooperation.
India and the US finally reached consensus on the nuclear issue in May 2006 during 
President Bush’s three-day visit to India. The two countries agreed on India’s plan to 
separate its civilian and military nuclear reactors, and to put fourteen of the twenty 
two existing nuclear reactors under IAEA safe-guards. In return, the US and other 
countries would relax measures restricting the export of advanced nuclear technology 
and materials to India. The Bush administration would work towards amending US 
domestic laws to accommodate the policy change. Thereafter, the US Congress in
104 Ministry of External Affairs, Government o f India, Annual Report (1 January 2003 -31 March 
2004), p.88;p.l98.
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December 2006 passed the Hyde Act, allowing, in principle, nuclear commerce with 
India.
In July 2007, the two countries announced the fmalisation of the deal after months of 
tough negotiations on a bilateral pact, and unveiled the text of the bilateral pact, called 
the 123 agreement. The deal helped to bring India out of international nuclear 
isolation. The separation of civilian and military reactors acknowledged that part of 
India’s nuclear facility was for military use, thus implicitly recognising India as a 
nuclear-weapon power, but without conferring de jure status given the constraints of 
the NPT. It is a goal India had been pursuing for a long time.
In order to implement the Indo-US nuclear deal, the US also helped India to secure 
approval from the 35-member Board of Governors of the IAEA, which agreed with 
the India-specific safeguards agreement in August 2008. Fourteen of India’s twenty 
two existing and future nuclear reactors would be under the IAEA’s inspection. In 
September 2008, the 45-nation NSG granted India a waiver from the existing rules 
forbidding nuclear trade with a country that had not signed the NPT. India not only 
could obtain nuclear fuel and technology from the US, but also could access to the 
global market for nuclear fuel and technology. For example, India soon pencilled in 
nuclear deals with France and Russia in the following months. That is, the US played 
a crucial role in ending India’s international nuclear isolation, but did not monopolise 
civil nuclear cooperation with India.
The long-standing constraints on India’s acquisition of nuclear fuel and technology 
had adversely affected its civilian programme. Due to the lack of fuel, Indian reactors 
were operating at low capacity. If the US is to lead the world in lifting the curbs on
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nuclear supplies to India, India will be able to use nuclear energy to meet part of its 
energy demands to sustain its economic growth. Moreover, under the deal with the US, 
India’s military nuclear facility would remain outside of international purview. That is, 
both India’s economy and military will benefit from the ending of nuclear isolation.
The question that arises is why the US so generously helped India to access the 
nuclear material and gain nuclear status without joining the CTBT and NPT. If it is 
argued that the deal in fact strengthened global non-proliferation efforts by bringing 
India into the international non-proliferation fold, it should be pointed out that in 
contrast to its efforts to push for a nuclear deal with India, the US refused to have a 
similar deal with Pakistan. Despite the concerns expressed by the non-proliferation 
community, the deal faced strong opposition from India’s Left-wing parties, which 
ultimately withdrew their parliamentary support for the government led by Prime 
Minister Manmohan Singh. The deal was criticized as being nothing more than a 
cementing factor for an Indo-American alliance, with India becoming a junior partner 
and ally of the US in its long-term Asian strategy, at the cost of India’s independent 
foreign policy and strategic autonomy. Many analysts also deemed that the aim of the 
nuclear deal was to cultivate India as a power that could limit China’s rise.
As negotiations progressed and India debated the merits and demerits of the nuclear 
deal in the domestic arena, the Chinese also closely assessed and scrutinized the 
development. There was a great outpouring of analytical views and judgments on the 
issue within China. As an implicit objection, Beijing continued to argue that there 
should be no country-specific exemption in a global nuclear regime. Even though 
international society is going to recognise India’s nuclear status, the Chinese argued, it
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should not adopt “double standards” in dealing with India’s nuclear issues.105
The Chinese side further pointed out that the Indo-American deal would help India 
expand its nuclear arsenal. India would fuel its civilian reactors with imported 
uranium while conserving native uranium fuel for weapon-grade plutonium 
production. The transfer of advanced technology would also help India advance its 
missile programme.106 It was estimated that India, therefore, could produce 50 nuclear
| A*!
warheads per year instead of the present level of 6-10 warheads. The Chinese also 
suspected Washington’s strategic intention of pushing an Indo-American nuclear deal. 
It was recalled that as early as 1997, a US report had already suggested that 
Washington could treat a nuclearised India as a valuable partner and cultivate India as 
a  nuclear power against China.108
In fact, New Delhi also needed Beijing’s support at the NSG and IAEA, as China is a 
key member of the two groups. Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh had tried to 
secure China’s support while meeting Chinese President Hu Jintao on the sidelines of 
the G-8 summit in Sapporo, Japan. China was reluctant to give India a firm assurance 
in this regard, although the Chinese side expressed its willingness to cooperate with 
India on civilian nuclear use.109 The Indian side was optimistically hopeful of China’s 
support, as Indian Prime Minister Singh said that he had “a strong feeling that when
105 Liu Xuecheng, “Mei Yin minyong he hezuo de zhanlue hanyi” (The strategic implication o f Indo- 
American nuclear deal), Ya Fei zongheng (Asia & Africa Review), no.6,2006, p.l 8.
"*lbid .
107 Tian Jingmei, “Mei Yin he neng hezuo de xianzhung, yingxiang ji qianjing” (US-India Nuclear 
Energy Cooperation: Current Situation, Impact and Prospects), Xiandai guoji guartxi 
(Contemporary Internal Relations), no.8, 2006, pp.53-56; p.63.
108 Liu Xuecheng, “Mei Yin minyong he hezuo de zhanlue hanyi” (The strategic implication o f Indo- 
American nuclear deal), p. 19.
109 Hindustan Times, July 9, 2008, p.l 1.
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the matter comes before the relevant international fora, China will not be a 
problem.”110
Contrary to India’s expectation, however, China made a last-minute objection to 
India’s case at the NSG meeting in September 2008, trying to boycott the resolution 
of lifting the nuclear embargo on India. The US President, George W. Bush, then 
made a phone call to the Chinese President, Hu Jintao, to persuade China to 
compromise on the issue. The Chinese Ambassador to India was also recalled to 
India’s Ministry of External Affairs at midnight. When New Delhi protested against 
China’s  stand in the matter, China insisted that it did not present a hurdle for New 
Delhi to obtain the unanimous approval of the NSG. This again demonstrated that 
Beijing and New Delhi do not share a common understanding on certain issues related 
to their international status and security concerns.
Finally, with the assistance of the US, India obtained some kind of formal recognition 
of its de facto status as a nuclear weapon state. The psychological advantage that 
nuclear status would confer is also important for India when dealing with China. The 
acquisition of the nuclear identity brought India a little closer to being treated on a par 
with China in terms of its international position.
2.5 Conclusion
To highlight the nuclear issues in China-India relations, this chapter illustrated that 
China’s nuclear capability against India has been a source of India’s “China threat” 
perception, and contributed to developing the asymmetry of the threat perceptions
110 The Asian Age, July 8, 2008, p.3.
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between the two countries. Moreover, India’s nuclear tests and weapons programme 
could be seen as one of the most dramatic steps adopted by India to reduce the 
asymmetry in the perception of threat between China and India.
India’s nuclear tests of 1998 brought about a new phase in China-India relations. The 
China factor played a significant role in India’s decision to develop nuclear weapons, 
and the threat to India’s security from China was identified by the Indian side as the 
major motivation for its Pokhran-II nuclear tests. Beijing was offended by the series 
of anti-China statements that had emanated from New Delhi and India’s references to 
the “China threat” in its initial justification of nuclear tests. On the other hand, India 
was upset by Beijing’s condemnation of the tests and its insistence that India should 
roll back its nuclear programme and sign the NPT. China opposed acceptance of 
India’s minimum deterrence demand and urged India to renounce its nuclear weapons 
and join the non-proliferation treaty. The tensions between China and India have been 
further compounded by the nuclear issue.
It is hard to estimate the economic and social cost of the nuclear programme, but 
politically, India has successfully withstood international pressure and sanctions, and 
has almost been accepted as a fully fledged nuclear power. No matter whether the 
subcontinent might be more secure as a result of the nuclear developments or not, 
India did gain some benefit, including a strategic balance vis-a-vis China as well as an 
enhancement in India’s international standing. As C. Raja Mohan has pointed out, 
“The new sense of self-confidence vis-a-vis China and the prospect of an inevitable 
strategic parity with Beijing allowed New Delhi to approach its bilateral problems 
with China in a more practical manner.”111 Being a nuclear state, India’s strength and
111 C. Raja Mohan, “The evolution of India’s nuclear doctrine,” in Atish Sinha and Madhup Mohta eds.,
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identity has changed: India has become a more resolute neighbour now, compared to 
what it was during the years of non-alignment.
The shared understanding is that India’s nuclear weapons development has helped 
reduce the strategic gap between China and India, because the nuclear tests and 
subsequent weapons programme has given India more military strength and self- 
confidence. Especially, the Indian side has seldom restated the worsening security 
situation that justified its need for acquiring a nuclear deterrent. However, the 
asymmetry of the threat perception between the two countries still remains and 
conditions China-India relations.
However, it should be also noted that China still does not worry much about the 
possibility that India itself presents a serious challenge to China. China is concerned 
with India’s ensuing attempts to maintain a credible nuclear deterrent and to secure a 
de jure nuclear power status, but it feels confident that China’s overall strength 
remains greater than India’s. Even though China adhered to a hard-line policy towards 
India’s nuclear programme, in fact, it did not take any apparent actions to block 
India’s initiatives. What worries China is India’s improved security ties with the US. 
Since the US must also view China as a potential adversary, there would be a growing 
convergence of American and Indian objectives in dealing with China.
Indian Foreign Policy: Challenges and Opportunities (New Delhi: Academic Foundation, 2007), 
p. 1025.
Chapter 3: The Tibet issue in Sino-Indian Relations
Since the 1950s, Tibet has been a nettlesome issue in Sino-Indian relations. It may 
have seemed that the issue was less controversial than other delicate problems, such 
as border disputes and the Sino-Pakistani military cooperation, because New Delhi 
has officially recognised Tibet as being part of China since 1954. Furthermore, neither 
China nor India wants to clash directly on the Tibet issue and so they have reached 
certain agreements over Tibet’s status. However, as this chapter will illustrate, the 
issue of Tibet remains unsettled, and this has resulted in the accumulation of a culture 
of distrust between China and India.
For China, the Tibet issue is an internal matter in which no foreign countries have any 
right to interfere. The Chinese have argued that India has officially recognised 
Chinese claims over. Tibet since 1954 when the two countries signed an agreement 
regarding trade and intercourse between the Tibet region and India. Therefore, if India 
keeps its promise to adhere to the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, as the 
Chinese believe they should, the Tibet issue will not come up in the agenda of Sino- 
Indian relations.1 However, the interactions over the last decade seemed to be against 
such an expectation. India’s sincerity in honouring its commitment is frequently
1 The Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence are mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, 
mutual non-aggression, non-interference in each other’s internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, 
and peaceful coexistence, as guiding principles in their bilateral relations. The Five Principles of 
Peaceful Coexistence were first put forward by the late Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai when he met with 
an Indian delegation on 31 December 1953. These principles was then documented when it was 
incorporated into the Preamble of the Agreement Between the People’s Republic o f  China and the 
Republic o f  India on Trade and Intercourse Between Tibet Region o f  China and India, and were 
further advocated in the respective joint statements enunciated by Premier Zhou Enlai and his Indian 
and Burmese counterparts during his visit to the two countries in June 1954.
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questioned by the Chinese side, which has repeatedly expressed concerns about the 
anti-China activities of exiled Tibetans in India.
As will be suggested in this chapter, however, the Chinese have failed to engage India 
in a worthwhile dialogue on the Tibet issue, especially regarding India’s treatment of 
the exiled Tibetan leader, the Dalai Lama, and the Tibetan govemment-in-exile. 
Given its own considerations, India cannot always conform to China’s demand to 
stand away from the Tibet issue. More significantly, the Tibet issue is identified as 
strategic leverage against China. As the Indian side is still obsessed with the security 
threat from China, the Tibet issue is one of the bargaining chips India can use when 
dealing with China. India’s particular role in the Tibet issue, especially India’s hosting 
of the Tibetan leader, Dalai Lama, and tens of thousands of his followers, gives New 
Delhi a say in the matter.
Not surprisingly, given that China sees Indian involvement in Tibet issues, even 
sympathy or moral support towards the Tibetans, as a misconduct that breaches the 
spirit of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence and interferes in China’s internal 
affairs, the Tibet issue began to undermine the mutual trust between China and India.
In fact, New Delhi has been cautious of playing the Tibet card against China. Many 
Indian strategists have acknowledged the strategic significance of the Tibet card when 
dealing with China. Given the asymmetrical perception of threat, India has not been
2 For the Chinese view that the Indian side has violated its promise by supporting the Tibetans, see 
Wang Hongwei, Ximalayashan qingjie: Zhong-Yin guanxi yanjiu (The Himalayas sentiment: A 
study of Sino-Indian relations) (Beijing: Zhongguo zangxue chubanshe, 1998), pp. 129-151; 352-354; 
Zhao Weiwen, Yin Zhong guanxi feng yun lu (A record of the changes in India-China relations) 
(Beijing: shishi chubanshe, 2000), pp. 103-140.
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confident enough use the leverage offered by the Tibet issue, as the Indians are 
worried China will take the opportunity to retaliate against India. As a result, India’s 
Tibetan policy has been characterised by ambivalence. Mostly, New Delhi avoids 
angering Beijing by limiting the Tibetans’ anti-China protests in India, and endorses 
China’s claims over Tibet. India does not support Tibetan independence in public. On 
the other hand, it sees the benefits of making Tibet an autonomous region, and allows 
the Tibetan govemment-in-exile to operate in India. Furthermore, India is reluctant to 
comply with China’s demands to abandon its influence over the Tibetan question. As 
the Indians are still concerned with a possible threat from China to its security, the 
Tibet issue remains an important source of leverage against China.
The Chinese are not satisfied with India’s dealing on and attitude to the Tibetan 
question, but they also expect to marginalize the Tibet issue in Sino-Indian relations 
in order to avoid India’s involvement. Beijing’s continued suspicion about India’s 
sincerity and intentions on the Tibetan question has contributed to the formation of a 
culture of distrust between the countries, which is also one of the features of Sino- 
Indian relations. Unless Beijing and the Tibetans reach a final agreement on Tibet’s 
relations with China, India’s role and involvement in the Tibetan question will still be 
seen as a thorn in Beijing’s side, and a source of mistrust.
To illustrate further the significance of the Tibet issue in Sino-Indian relations, this 
chapter will analyse China’s concerns regarding Tibet, and the peculiar role the issue 
plays. This chapter will then delve into India’s debate over playing the Tibet card 
against China. Although China and India have reached some consensus, this chapter 
will conclude that the issue is still far from being completely resolved. The Tibet issue 
will continue to emerge and affect China-India relations.
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3.1 India’s and China’s Tibetan Questions
Since the signing of the Seventeen-Point Agreement fo r  the Peaceful Liberation o f  
Tibet on May 23, 1951, Tibet has been under the control of the Chinese authorities. 
However, the Chinese side failed to settle the Tibetan question completely, as Beijing 
did not forge a benign relationship with the Tibetans after the so-called “peaceful 
liberation”. The Tibetan leader, the Dalai Lama, and his followers chose to go into 
exile in India instead of cooperating with Beijing after the 1959 uprising. With India’s 
consent, a Tibetan govemment-in-exile was established in India in 1960, aiming to 
call into question China’s claims and its control over Tibet.
Traditionally, Tibet was a society that comprised the unification of state and Tibetan 
Buddhism; the Dalai Lama is seen as the incarnation of Buddhist God of Compassion. 
Therefore, the Dalai Lama has more charisma for the religious-minded Tibetans than 
has the atheist communist regime. Thus, the aim of Beijing’s policy is to eradicate the 
influence of the exiled spiritual leader, the Dalai Lama, in the Tibet Autonomous 
Region (TAR). Unsatisfied with the Dalai Lama’s stance and policy, since 1993, 
Beijing has refused to hold official dialogues with him on the grounds that he was not 
sincere in the dialogue, but aimed to split Tibet from the motherland. Informal contact 
was also severed after November 1998. Currently, Tibet’s status and its relationship 
with China are still debated in the international arena, and remain a sensitive and 
intractable issue for China’s diplomacy.
As regards the ownership of Tibet, the Chinese argue that the central government of 
China has continuously exercised sovereignty over Tibet since the region was 
officially incorporated into the territory of China’s Yuan Dynasty (1271-1368). The
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Chinese government termed its military march into Tibet in 1950 as “peaceful 
liberation”.3 However, the opposite view has been successfully promoted outside 
China. The Tibetans and their supporters claim that before the PLA marched into 
Tibet, Tibet had been an independent state. Repudiating China’s claims over Tibet, the 
Tibetan side argues that the traditional relationship between China and Tibet was a 
religious priest-patron one, which was established during China’s Yuan Dynasty.4 
Such a relationship, from the Tibetan perspective, was mainly of a religious nature 
and did not suggest that Tibet was a vassal state of the Chinese.5
Aware of the power gap between Beijing and the Tibetan govemment-in-exile, the 
Dalai Lama chose an indirect approach to challenge Beijing’s control over Tibet by 
accusing China of damaging Tibet’s ethnic culture, religious belief and ecological 
environment. The Dalai Lama also rejected the Chinese accusation that he was 
splitting Tibet from the “motherland”, saying that he called only for “self-rule” or 
“high degree autonomy” in Tibet, which is inscribed in the Chinese constitution. As 
early as 1987, the Dalai Lama proposed a Five-Point Peace Plan at a Congressional 
Human Rights Caucus in Washington, D.C. The aim of the plan was to make Tibet an 
international peace zone, calling for an end to China’s use of Tibet as a site for nuclear 
weapons production and the dumping of nuclear waste. The plan was repeated at the 
European Parliament in Strasbourg, France. The Dalai Lama stressed that the aim was
3 Information Office of the State Council of the People’s Republic o f China, Tibet -  Its Ownership and 
Human Rights Situation, Beijing, September 1992; CPC Tibet Autonomous Regional Party 
Committee and People's Government o f the Tibet Autonomous Region, “lishi jinbu de huihong 
huajuan—jinian Xizang heping jiefang wushi zhounian”(“A splendid picture scroll of historical 
progress —  commemorating the fiftieth anniversary of liberating Tibet”), Renmin Ribao, May 23,
2001, p.6.
4 The Government o f Tibet in Exile, Tibet: Proving Truth from Facts, July 1993.
5 Tsering Shakya, The Dragon in the Land o f  Snows: A History o f  Modem Tibet since 1947 (London:
Pimlico, 1999), p.xxiii.
81
to preserve Tibet’s unique culture and religion. Although under great pressure, the 
Dalai Lama has strictly adhered to a policy of non-violence in his approach to Beijing.
The Dalai Lama also claims that he is advocating genuine and greater autonomy in 
Tibet, which the Chinese constitution has already mentioned. In other words, the 
Dalai Lama has agreed to end activities aimed at establishing Tibet’s independence, 
but he has demanded that Beijing should grant “authentic” autonomy to Tibet 
according to the PRC constitution.
However, the Chinese have doubted the sincerity of the Dalai Lama’s suggestion for 
the “genuine autonomy” of Tibet within China, partly because the Dalai Lama still 
refuses to accept the argument that Tibet has been part of China for several hundred 
years, A Chinese diplomat argued that if the Dalai Lama does not recognise Tibet was 
part of China before 1951, then the logical consequence would-be as follows: “The 
action of the People’s Liberation Amy in 1951 was an illegal aggression; Tibet now is 
an “occupied country”; the Dalai Lama has been forced to agree that Tibet can be 
within China; and, finally, Tibetans have the definite right to declare Tibetan 
independence when the opportunity arises in the future.”6
Furthermore, Beijing suspects that the “genuine autonomy” proposed by the Tibetan
•j
govemment-in-exile would be the first step on the path towards independence. 
Despite irregularly scheduled contact and dialogue between Beijing and Dharamsala, 
there is no breakthrough on the Tibetan question.
6 Mao Siwei, “Five questions on the Tibet issue, ” The Hindu, June 4, 2008, p. 13. 
1 Ibid.
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China's “Liberation ” o f Tibet
During the early 1950s, China’s “liberation” of Tibet appeared the only issue that 
might worsen Sino-Indian relations. In October 1950, Beijing dispatched troops into 
Tibet to “liberate” the region. The Tibetan authority was then compelled to send 
representatives to Beijing to negotiate its status and relationship with the new China. 
On May 23, 1951, the Chinese and Tibetan deputations signed the Seventeen-Point 
Agreement fo r  the Peaceful Liberation o f Tibet. The agreement stated that the Tibetan 
people would return to “the big family of the Motherland”, and Beijing would not 
alter the existing political system in Tibet and promised that the Tibetan people would 
have the right to exercise national regional autonomy under the leadership of China’s 
central government.
Chinese military action against Tibet came as a shock to the Indians. When India 
became independent in 1947, it inherited, the existing treaty rights and obligations of 
British India regarding Tibet.8 It also wanted to continue British policy toward Tibet, 
namely, treating Tibet as an autonomous buffer region between India and China, 
while recognising Chinese suzerainty, but not sovereignty over Tibet.9 Although the 
Indian leadership did not give a detailed definition of the “suzerainty”, the core 
element of its Tibetan policy was to maintain Tibet’s autonomy.10
Therefore, India soon branded China’s military actions against Tibet as an “invasion”,
^Bfrim Sandhu, Unresolved Conflict: China and India (London: Sangam Books Limited, 1988), p.85.
9 Dawa Norbu, “Tibet in Sino-Indian Relations: The Centrality of Marginality,” Asian Survey, vol.
XXXVII, no. 11, November 1997, p. 1079.
10 In his cable to the Indian Ambassador to China, Indian Prime Minister Nehru said, “Regarding use o f 
the word ‘sovereignty’ or ‘suzerainty’, the question is rather academic...Autonomy plus sovereignty 
leads to suzerainty. Words are not important. What we do attach values to is the autonomy of Tibet.” 
See “Cable to K. M. Panikkar,” in S. Gopal ed., Selected Works o f  Jawaharlal Nehru, Second Series, 
Volume Fifteen, Part II  (New Delhi: Jawaharlal Nehru Memorial Fund, 1993), p.350.
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and sent several notes to the Chinese government to lodge protests. Despite these 
diplomatic gestures, however, India was not willing to confront China over the issue. 
The Indian Prime Minister, Jawahalal Nehru, said in Parliament on February 12, 1951 
that he would not allow the event to affect India’s policy or desire to maintain friendly 
relations with China. He even had no intention of letting the development affect 
India’s China policy in general, and the policy regarding the admission of China into 
the United Nations in particular.11
Despite the diplomatic protest, it seemed that Nehru, from the beginning, believed
that China would take possession of the whole of Tibet and no other external force,
including India, could change that. In November 1950, Nehru suggested that “it may
be taken for granted that China will take possession, in a political sense at least, of the
whole of Tibet. There is no likelihood whatsoever of Tibet being able to resist this or
stop it. It is equally unlikely , that any foreign power can prevent it. We cannot do 
12so.” He then denied the possibility of Indian military intervention in Tibet by 
arguing that India had neither the resources nor the inclination to send armed 
assistance to Tibet.13 That is, Nehru was unwilling to assist Tibetan independence at 
the expense of Sino-Indian relations. However, he still thought that India might “be 
able to help Tibet to retain a large measure of her autonomy.”14
India’s policy of non-intervention in the Tibet issue was strengthened when China’s 
takeover of Tibet was legalised by the conclusion of the Seventeen-Point Agreement. 
India soon accepted China’s claim over Tibet by refusing to sponsor the Tibetan
' 1 “Cable to B. N. Rau,” Ibid, p.335.
12 “Policy regarding China and Tibet,” Ibid., p.343.
13 “Tibetans Free to Appeal to the United Nations,” Ibid., p.335.
14 “Policy regarding China and Tibet,” Ibid., p.346.
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appeal to the UN against the PLA’s invasion. In order to solve India’s inherited 
historical rights regarding Tibet, such as the deployment of military guards, China and 
India began negotiations in December 1953. The two countries finally signed the 
agreement regarding trade and intercourse between India and Tibet in April 1954, 
setting up the legal framework for India’s relations with the post-“liberation” Tibet. 
India finally agreed to accept China’s sovereignty over Tibet while using the term the 
“Tibet region of China”.
India’s reluctance to become involved in the China-Tibet imbroglio was still clear in 
1956- when the Dalai Lama and the Panchen Lama visited India to attend the 
celebrations of the 2,500th anniversary of the birth of Buddha. The young Dalai Lama 
was considering seeking exile in India. Aware of the situation, Chinese Premier Zhou 
Enlai flew to India to persuade him to return to Tibet. Meanwhile, Nehru told Zhou 
that he would not tempt the Dalai Lama to stay in India, but he would grant him 
asylum if he asked for it. In fact, Nehru himself urged the Dalai Lama to return to 
Tibet and cooperate with Beijing on the basis of the Seventeen-Point Agreement. 
Nehru also told the Dalai Lama that India was not prepared to support Tibet’s 
independence.15 The crisis ended when the Dalai Lama agreed to return to Tibet.
India’s reluctant attitude and caution did not prevent the Tibetan question from being 
a controversial issue between China and India, and the Tibet issue continued to test 
Sino-Indian friendship. In May 1959, the PLA moved into Lhasa to quell the most 
serious revolt since the “peaceful liberation”, and there were rumours among the 
Tibetans that the PLA would harm the Dalai Lama. As a result, the Dalai Lama and
15 The Fourteenth Dalai Lama, Freedom in Exile: the Autobiography o f  the Dalai Lama o f  Tibet (Kent: 
Hodder and Stoughton, 1990), p.56.
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his associates decided to escape from Tibet. With foreign assistance, especially of the 
US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the Dalai Lama successfully fled to India and 
asked for political asylum.16 New Delhi soon granted asylum to the Dalai Lama and 
his followers. Nehru’s daughter, Indira Gandhi, was involved in setting up an all-party
|  n
Central Relief Committee for the Tibetan refugees.
India was still not willing to challenge China over the Tibet issue; hence, India 
abstained from voting on the UN General Assembly resolution that criticised the 
Chinese, of violating of human rights in Tibet. The Indian government hoped that such 
an abstention would facilitate eventual conciliatory efforts towards a peaceful solution 
o f  the Tibetan problem.
Howeverr the Dalai Lama’s exile sparked a wave of sympathy towards Tibet and 
condemnation of China among the Indian public. In order to find a peaceful resolution 
to the Tibet issue, Nehru tried to play the role of mediator and requested Beijing to 
send the Panchen Lama, the second highest ranking leader in Tibet, or any other 
Chinese representatives to come to India to meet the Dalai Lama and discuss the
•  1 0situation of Tibet. However, Beijing rejected the proposal. To Beijing, the Tibet 
issue was entirely an internal issue, and China was not prepared to allow a third party 
to become involved.
Furthermore, China was very displeased with India’s condemnation in the wake of the 
Dalai Lama’s exile. It began to suspect that the Indian government had masterminded
16 For details, see Ibid., pp. 151 -157.
17 Jad Adams and Phillip Whitehead, The Dynasty: The Nehru-Gandhi Story (London: Penguin Group 
and BBC Worldwide Ltd., 1997), pp. 176-177.
18 Sandhu, Unresolved Conflict: China and India, p.l 14.
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the event. Mao Zedong even ordered the Chinese official publicists to directly identify 
“British imperialists and Indian expansionists” as the force that wished to separate 
Tibet from China, in place of the phrase “imperialist, Chiang bandit clan, and foreign 
reactionary”.19 This was the first warning that Chinese leaders had changed their 
minds about India in the wake of the deterioration of the Tibetan question. However, 
China also held the possibility of maintaining an amiable and stable relationship with 
India, because it did not want India to become another security concern along the 
border.
The 1959 uprising in Tibet resulted in the exodus of the Dalai Lama and his followers 
across the Himalayas, and later the establishment of the Tibetan govemment-in-exile 
in Dharamasalay a town in Himachal Pradesh, the northern state of India. Albeit the 
Indian government officially regards Tibet as a part of China, there is continuing 
speculation regarding India’s sincerity. In contradiction to its promise that anti-China 
political activities by the Tibetans are not permitted on Indian soil, India has not 
prevented the exiled Tibetans from running a govemment-in-exile in Dharamasala, 
which continues to mount international pressure to illegitimatise China’s rules and 
claims over Tibet. It is also self-deceptive to suggest that the Dalai Lama is merely 
treated as a religious leader, because he is indeed the pivot of the Tibet govemment- 
in-exile, not to mention that the Dalai Lama’s status in the international society was 
further promoted when he received the Nobel Peace Prize in 1989.
That is why China maintains that India has failed to observe the Five Principles of 
Peaceful Coexistence and its promise regarding Tibet. From the Chinese point of view,
19 Wu Lengxi, Shi nian lun zhan(l956-1966): Zhong Su guanxi huiyilu (Ten years of controversy 
(1956-1966): memoir about Sino-Soviet relations)(Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe, 1999), 
p. 198.
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since India has recognised Chinese sovereignty over Tibet, no matter how the Indian 
side tries to justify providing accommodation to the exiled Tibetan group, India has 
violated the agreement. It has repeatedly expressed its concerns about the anti-China 
activities by the exiled-Tibetans in India, as the Dalai Lama continues to campaign for 
Tibetan rights from India where the govemment-in-exile is based.
Today, there are more than 130,000 Tibetan refugees rehabilitated in India. The 
presence of the Tibetan govemment-in-exile and the Tibetan Diaspora on Indian soil 
give India a  peculiar role and position on the Tibet issue, which cannot be replaced by 
any other country, irrespective of China’s views on the matter. Any activities by the 
Dalai Lama and the govemment-in-exile will inevitably remind Beijing that it is India 
that shelters the “anti-China” Tibetans.
India’s Peculiar Role in the Tibet issue
Although China seems to have sufficient confidence to quell any threat emanating 
from nationalism or religious fundamentalism and the challenge to its territorial 
integrity, the outcome has not always been as it expected. To a great extent, the 
international assistance to the exiled-Tibetans has aggravated the existing pressures 
emanating from Tibet’s disaffections. With the approach of “non-violence” and an 
emphasis on Tibet’s unique culture, the Dalai Lama and his Tibetan govemment-in- 
exile have successfully mounted an international propaganda campaign against 
China’s claims and rule over Tibet. The overseas visits of Chinese leaders are often 
marred by the protests organised by pro-Tibetan independence groups, especially 
when the leaders travel to India or to Western countries. The Tibetan demonstrators 
always gain a significant amount of international publicity, while China’s image and
88
“face” is badly tarnished by the media coverage. The Dalai Lama’s being awarded the
Nobel Peace Prize in 1989 was seen in China as part of the international conspiracy.
Therefore, the Chinese used to attribute their failure to crack down on the Tibetan
separatist sentiment to the internationalisation of the Tibet issue and to foreign
interference. In the eyes of the Chinese, the Tibet issue is not a product of Tibetan
nationalism, but has been incubated by anti-China forces. China argues that there was
no such word as “independence” in Tibetan vocabulary before the British invasion,
20and stresses that foreign intervention in Tibet is at the root of the Tibet issue. The 
attitude of some Western countries to the Tibetan independence movement has 
angered Beijing and led to a hostile reaction from China.
The Chinese side has also criticised the international pressure promoting negotiations 
between the Chinese government and the Dalai Lama, arguing it represents 
interference in China’s internal affairs and the use of Tibet as leverage against China. 
Not surprisingly, China has asked other countries to respect China’s sovereignty and 
territorial integrity and not to provide a platform for the Dalai Lama to conduct anti- 
China activities.
In an attempt to refurbish China’s image abroad, China’s State Council has issued 
many policy papers on Tibet, including Tibet — Its Ownership and the Human Rights 
Situation (1992), New Progress in Human Rights in the Tibet Autonomous Region 
(1998), The Development o f  Tibetan Culture (2000), Tibet s March toward 
Modernization (2001), Ecological Improvement and Environmental Protection in 
Tibet (2003), Regional Ethnic Autonomy in Tibet (2004), and Protection and 
Development o f  Tibetan Culture (2008). The frequency and length of the white papers
20 Press Trust o f  India, July 27, 2004.
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on Tibet highlight China’s concerns about the Tibetan question, and China’s eagerness 
to win international understanding to reverse the current sympathetic trend towards 
the Dalai Lama and the Tibetan govemment-in-exile.
In general, China is now more concerned with the US support for the Dalai Lama’s
01activities than with the support offered by other foreign countries. China saw the US 
policy towards Tibet as part of America’s strategy of containing China. However, 
unlike other foreign countries, India plays a peculiar role in the Tibetan question, 
which cannot be ignored.
As China saw India’s sheltering the Dalai Lama as a breach of the spirit of the Five 
Principles of Peaceful Coexistence to interfere in China’s internal affairs, the Tibet 
issue began to shatter the mutual trust between China and India. In retaliation to 
India’s Tibet policy, China encouraged the Naga and Mizo rebellions in northeast 
India. The overt support continued until the late 1970s.
On the other hand, India has been cautious in handling the Tibet issue. In October
1987, when a riot broke out in Tibet and caused the death of at least six Tibetans,
India soon declared that the disturbance was an internal affair of China and decided
not to exploit China’s strategic vulnerability. The Indian army then took precautionary
measures on the Ladakh-Tibet border to prevent the arrival of any refugees. A
spokesman from India’s Ministry of External Affairs stated that India did not
recognize any govemment-in-exile and considered the Dalai Lama a religious leader
and temporal head of the Tibetans. The major reason for this policy stance was that
21 For a Chinese account of the US support for the Tibet independence movement, see The Human 
Rights Society o f China, “Meiguo zhichi Dalai jituan fenlie huodong poxi” (“ Looking into US 
Support for Dalai Clique's Separatist Activities”), Renmirt Ribao, May 26, 2001, p.5.
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border talks were scheduled for November that year.22
In fact, despite its supposed commitment to the above policy, the Indian side is very 
reluctant to comply with China’s demands on the Tibet issue or to accept China’s 
policy towards Tibet. In addition to the role as host to the exiled Tibetans, there are 
several sound reasons for India to pay more attention to the Tibet issue in many of its 
actions, sometimes at the risk of angering China.
First, it is religious sentiment that inspires Indians’ sympathy for the Tibetans. Ancient 
India was the birthplace of Tibetan Buddhism, which has been the pillar of Tibetan 
politics and society. The Indians see Buddhism as one of India’s religions, and some 
Hindus view it as part of their “religious geography” and “the repository of lost Indian 
treasures and culture”.23 The Dalai Lama himself has also described Hinduism and 
Tibetan Buddhism as twin sisters,24 and has suggested that India and Tibet are bound 
more by spiritual relations than by political ones. That is, while some Western 
countries are fascinated by the mystical element of Tibetan Buddhism, it is the 
emotion of religious kinship that affects the Indians when dealing with the Tibet issue. 
Therefore, the Indian government cannot ignore the Indian public’s support and 
sympathy towards the exiled Tibetans and is not able to crack down on all exiled 
Tibetan’s activities as Beijing wishes, even though those activities are seen as 
unfriendly or anti-China by the Chinese side. However, China denounces the claimed 
cultural significance between India and Tibet. The Chinese side argue that India has
22 Robert Delfs, “Tibet’s Turbulent Monks,” Far Eastern Economic Review, October 15, 1987, pp.8-10; 
Salamat Ali, “India Plays It Cool,” Far Eastern Economic Review, June 9, 1988, pp. 13-14.
23 Norbu, “Tibet in Sino-Indian Relations,” p. 1089.
24 The Hindu, January 29,2001, p.9
25 The Hindu (internet edition), December 9, 2002.
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exaggerated the India-Tibet affinity.
Second, India is a democracy, and allows the free expression of a variety of opinions. 
In India, opinions regarding the Tibet issue range from those seeking Tibet’s 
independence to those who exhort the government to rein-in the Tibetan govemment- 
in-exile. This freedom of expression is integral to the Indian ethos. No matter how 
uncomfortable and uneasy the Chinese government feels about the pro-Tibetan voice 
and the movement of freedom of Tibetan protestors, the Indian government cannot 
restrict the freedom to voice support for the Tibetan independence movement. Nor can 
the Indian government ban the opposition and retired officials from engaging with the 
so-called “Dalai clique”. Rejecting the attitude of the Chinese authorities, senior 
Indian diplomats have argued that it is impossible for “India to abandon its 
democratic norms, to meet Chinese concerns relating to the presence of the Dalai 
Lama.”27 Indian parliamentary politics have also opened a door for the Tibetan lobby. 
It has been said that the Dalai Lama’s advisers have supported certain Indian 
politicians at the time of elections.28 The Chinese apparently understand that the 
freedom of expression is guaranteed in India, but they cannot accept that the right is 
extended to the Tibetan exiles as well.
Third, and perhaps most importantly, India’s ambivalent Tibet policy stems from its 
concerns over the geo-strategic implications of China’s takeover of Tibet. China’s 
domination of Tibet can be seen as an indication of the power struggle between the
26 Ye Zicheng and others eds, Diyuan zhengzhiyu Zhongguo waijiao (Geopolitics and Chinese 
diplomacy) (Beijing: Beijing chubanshe, 1997), p.445.
27 See C.V. Ranganathan and Vinod C. Khanna, India and China: The Way Ahead After “Mao's 
India’s War” (New Delhi: Har-Anand Publications, 2000), p. 176.
28 Subramanian Swamy, India's China Perspective (Delhi: Konark Publishers Pvt. Ltd., 2001), p.25.
29 Editorial, “Chinese Checks,” The Times o f  India, June 10,2008, p. 18.
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conflicting rivals. Explaining the strategic importance of Tibet, George Ginsburgs
and Michael Mathos have suggested, “He who holds Tibet dominates the Himalayan
piedmont; he who dominates the Himalayan piedmont threatens the Indian
subcontinent and may well have all of South Asia within his reach, and with that all of 
1
Asia.” The argument may appear simplistic, but it reflects Tibet’s geopolitical 
significance. If Tibet is controlled by an unfriendly force, it is believed to pose a 
direct threat to India. Unfortunately, China seemed to be such a case. China’s 
acquisition of Tibet made it India’s biggest neighbour, and India’s defeat in the 1962 
war with China proved that the Chinese acquisition, of Tibet was a menace to India’s 
security. The Dalai Lama has reminded India that since China’s occupation of Tibet, 
the Tibet-India border has become one of the most fortified regions between the two 
countries. By the late 1970s, the Indians, were worried about a two-front attack from 
Tibet in the east and Pakistan in the west.
India’s security concern about the threat from Tibet is heightened by the fact that 
China has built up a military arsenal in Tibet. Once a militarily weak buffer zone 
between empires, Tibet has now been militarised to the point of containing at least 
120,000 Chinese troops and ten military airfields.33 Indian Army Chief Gen. Deepak 
Kapoor admitted that China’s military modernisation and improvement of the 
infrastructure in Tibet could affect India’s security in the long term.34 Although India
30 Dawa Norbu, “India, China and Tibet,” in Kanti Bajpai and Amitabh Mattoo eds., The Peacock and 
the Dragon: India-China Relations in the 21st Century (New Delhi: Har-Anand Publications Pvt 
Ltd.,2000), p.275.
31 George Ginsburgs and Michael Mathos, Communist China and Tibet: the First Dozen Years (The 
Hague: M. Nijhoff, 1964), p.210.
32 Press Trust o f  India, January 21, 2004.
33 Wang Lixiong, Ran zang: Xizang de mingyun (Sky Burial; the fate of Tibet) (Hong Kong: Mingjing 
chubanshe, 1998), p.128.
34 The Asian Age, July 4,2008, p.3.
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has strategic interests while negotiating the CBMs with the Chinese in raising 
concerns regarding the Chinese military build-up, China has maintained that its 
military deployments in Tibet are not open to discussion.
Another factor of concern to India about Tibet is the emplacement of Chinese nuclear- 
tipped missiles in Tibet. Of the countries bordering Tibet, India might be the possible 
target of China’s nuclear weapons. These missiles are capable of reaching all Indian
i f
cities, and thus Tibet is considered a serious threat to India.
The same strategic considerations over Tibet’s geostrategic value made the Indian side 
watchful o f  China’s Grand Western Development project. Although China attempted 
to give an economic colour to the infrastructure development in this region, the Indian 
side expressed its concerns over the security implications. Some Indian strategic 
analysts saw China’s mega-infrastructure build-up in the Tibet region as “tentacles” 
that not only strengthen China’s grip on these restive regions and enable China to 
further exploit natural resources, but also advance China’s capability to move troops 
and weapons stockpiled in its other neighbouring military regions. They argued that 
these strategic links, including the rebuilding of the Lhasa-Beijing Highway, would 
double China’s military deployment and multiply the missile deployment in Tibet. 
Therefore, they concluded that China’s Tibet-related western development would 
affect India’s strategic environment and increase India’s vulnerability. Since China
35 Gurmeet Kanwal, “India’s National Security Strategy in a Nuclear Environment,” Strategic Analysis, 
vol. XXIV, no. 9, December 2000, pp.1591-1628.
36 This point o f view was shared by the Tibetan govemment-in-exile; see The Times o f  India, August 31, 
2001 .
37 Subhash Kapila, “China’s infrastructure development in the western regions: strategic implications,” 
Paper no.210, March 15,2001, South Asia Analysis Group (website), < http://www.southasiaanalysis 
.org/%5Cpapers3%5Cpaper210.htm>.
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and India are still far from being friendly partners, any Chinese move to consolidate 
its hold on Tibet serves to aggravate the Indian strategic analysts.
Although the Indian side remains very concerned about China’s takeover of Tibet, 
from Nehru’s administration onward, the Indian government has clearly 
acknowledged the fact that Tibet is under China’s control and it is very difficult for 
India alone to help Tibet split from China. In addition, the Indian leaders need to take 
account of India’s own domestic situation if India wants to accommodate Tibet’s 
independence. Like China’s far-flung communities of Tibet and Xinjiang, India’s 
Northeast and Kashmir are India’s weak spots. China was accused of sponsoring Naga 
and Mizo insurgencies in India’s northeast by the late 1970s. It also backed Pakistan’s 
stand on the Kashmir issue. Any Indian public support for Tibetan independence 
would possibly result in China taking revenge by interfering in India’s domestic 
discord, especially the agitation in Kashmir and the northeast region. Obviously, 
China will not allow the secessionist movement of the Tibetans to succeed, and will 
not weaken its hold on Tibet. Even if making Tibet a security buffer would serve 
India’s interests, the Indian side has to be very cautious about any mention of Tibet’s 
independence. As a result, although India has a particular role and special relationship 
with Tibet, the Indian government has had no intention of supporting Tibetan 
independence in public.
Tibet’s Significance to China
The Tibetans have won international sympathy and garnered a certain amount of 
support against Beijing. No matter how great the international pressure is, however, 
China finds it unacceptable to give up its claims to Tibet. Explaining briefly why
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Tibet is significant for China’s territorial integrity, Chinese President Jiang Zemin said 
that Tibet is of importance to China’s grand western development strategy, national 
unity, social stability, and the unification and security of the motherland, and is 
concerned with China’s national image and international struggle. In sum, this 
statement reflects how the Tibet issue is associated with China’s concerns regarding 
state sovereignty, territorial integrity, and peripheral security.
First of all, the Tibetan question is related to Chinese concerns about state sovereignty 
and territorial integrity. According to Chinese President Hu Jintao, Beijing’s conflict 
with the “Dalai clique” is not an ethnic problem, a religious problem, or a human 
rights problem. He claimed that it is a problem concerning the need to safeguard 
national unification or to avoid splitting the motherland. The Tibet Autonomous 
Region (TAR) covers an area of 1.2 million square kilometres, accounting for one- 
eighth of the total area of China and one-third the size of India. It is the second-largest 
of China’s autonomous regions and provinces after Xinjiang. The “Greater Tibet” 
proposed by the Tibetan govemment-in-exile covers even larger areas, including the 
Tibet Autonomous Region, the whole of Qinghai Province, half of Sichuan Province, 
one-third of Gansu Province, one-fourth of Yunnan Province, and one-fifth of the 
Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region. It spans about 2.4 million square kilometres, 
nearly one quarter of China’s territory.40 No Chinese leader could afford the political 
cost of losing such a vast area of land, particularly under the pressure of Chinese 
nationalism.
38 See Jiang Zeming’s statement in the Fourth Tibetan Work Forum, in Renmin Ribao, June 30, 2001, 
p .l.
39 The Asian Age, April 13, 2008, p.4.
40 Mao Siwei, “Five questions on the Tibet issue,” p. 13.
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China also cannot ignore Tibet’s geographical significance to its security when 
considering the Tibetan question. In fact, modem history demonstrates that the 
internationalisation of the Tibet issue is due to its geographical significance, which 
has turned this region into a point of contention between various powers since the 
mid-eighteenth century. With an average elevation of 4,000 metres above sea level 
and sharing borders with India, Nepal, Bhutan and Myanmar, the enormous Tibet 
region has been seen by the Chinese as a backdoor and adds immense depth to 
China’s defence. Conversely, if  Tibet is out of Chinese control, China’s “new” 
southwest frontier would recede approximately one thousand kilometres from the 
present Tibet-India border, leaving China’s southwest region open to greater external 
danger. Chinese experts on Tibet believe that, were Tibet to gain independence, it 
would ally itself with India. As a result, the Chinese argue, the Indian military would 
advance, thus posing an immediate threat to the Chinese heartland “without firing a 
shot”.41 Were this to happen, China’s soft underbelly of vulnerability would be 
exposed to foreign powers.
China’s security concerns to its west have intensified since the US launched the global 
war against the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. Some neighbouring Central Asian 
states are forging new strategic ties with the US while India, Pakistan and even Nepal 
have been cooperating with the US. Against this background, Tibet’s strategic value 
becomes more apparent because it still secures a strategic depth for the Chinese 
heartland. From the Chinese perspective, they have to prevent Tibet from sliding into 
the embrace of other countries whereupon it could be used as a cat’s paw to check 
China.
41 Wang Lixiong, Ban zang, p. 140.
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The Chinese have tried to quash the Tibetan separatists’ sentiment with a mixed 
approach: a blend of economic development and religious repression. China expected 
that its “strike hard” campaign, combined with economic development, could reduce 
the Dalai Lama’s magnetism and inspiration to the Tibetan people and their desire for 
independence. However, it resulted in the Tibetan govemment-in-exile accusing 
China of secretly adopting a Nazi-style “final solution” to end Tibetan resistance to 
China’s rule. The plans allegedly include further flooding of Tibet with Chinese 
settlers and manipulation of senior religious circles to create divisions among 
Tibetans” overseas.42
It would appear, however, that in the final analysis, China’s policy regarding Tibet has 
not been very successful. For example, the 2008 Beijing Olympic torch relay was 
hampered by Tibetan protesters. Until now, around 2000-3000 Tibetans have been 
fleeing to India from Tibet every year. Beijing remains unable to win the hearts of the 
Tibetan people. Although China claims that it has broken the Tibetan independent 
movement, the spokesman for the Ministry of National Defence, Hu Changming, 
admitted that China faces an independence movement in Tibet that forms a major 
security threat to China.43 After six decades of rule in Tibet, aspirations of Tibetans’ 
separatist and the ethnic tension between the Hans and the Tibetans continue to cause 
concern to Beijing. In March 2008, the demonstration for the 49th anniversary of the 
failed 1959 Tibetan uprising against Beijing’s rule led to the most serious and violent 
riots in the region for decades. This event highlighted how the Tibet issue continues to 
cause concern to Beijing even though it seems unlikely that Tibet could split away 
from China in the near future.
42 “Han Habitat,” Far Eastern Economic Review, September 9, 1993, p. 14.
43 The Press Trust o f  India, January 20, 2009.
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3.2 Renewed Challenges
China-lndia Agreements on Tibet Issue
A new phase of Sino-Indian relations started with Indian Prime Minister Rajiv 
Gandhi’s China visit in 1988. The two countries also agreed to accommodate each 
other on the Tibet issue. The Chinese side expressed concern over anti-China 
activities by some Tibetan elements in India, while the Indian side “reiterated the 
longstanding and consistent policy of the Government of India that Tibet is an 
autonomous region of China and that anti-China political activities by Tibetan 
elements are not permitted on Indian soil.”44
This discourse, that “Tibet is an autonomous region” then became India’s official 
answer in response to the Tibetan question, and has been confirmed by the Indian side 
repeatedly in subsequent high level exchanges. For example, when Chinese Premier 
Li Peng visited India in 1991, the position was written into the Sino-Indian 
Communique.
Semantic nuances may, however, be noted. The Indian side holds that its “long­
standing and consistent policy” is that Tibet is “an autonomous region of China”; this 
does not echo China’s usage that Tibet is “an inalienable part of China”. China 
maintains that India reconfirmed its promised position that Tibet belongs to China and 
thus disappointed the Tibetan govemment-in-exile.45 According to John W. Garver, 
the use of the phrase ‘autonomous region’ reminded Beijing of the promise it made in
44 Sino-Indian Joint Press Communique, Beijing, 23 December 1988.
45 Zhao Weiwen, Yin Zhong guanxi fengyun lu, p.319.
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1954-57, when India endorsed China’s ownership of Tibet.46
Even if India is not clandestinely encouraging Tibet to move towards independence, 
the Indian side is in favour of Tibet’s claim to a higher degree of autonomy. Tibet as a 
peaceful zone, a non-nuclear zone, or a zone of ahimsa (non-violence) proposed by 
the Dalai Lama,47 will serve India’s geo-strategic interests and reduce India’s threat 
perception of China. That is why the Indian government prefers Tibet to be an 
“autonomous region” with reference to Tibet as part of China. Since India is not 
willing to give up the Tibetan cause and does not wish to annoy Beijing over the Tibet 
issue, one of the best options for India to address the Tibetan question is to endorse 
the proposal of a “high degree of autonomy”. As a result, preserving Tibet’s 
autonomous status has become the core element of India’s Tibet policy.
However, China has rejected the Dalai Lama’s gaol of implementing “real autonomy” 
in Tibet, saying he is seeking independence in the guise of autonomy. Beijing even 
snubbed the Dalai Lama’s proposal for adopting a “one country, two systems” 
formula to solve the Tibetan question, an approach that Beijing has implemented in 
Hong Kong and Macao.48
Beijing, in seeking a good neighbourly policy, and hoping to improve relations with 
India, is willing to shelve the differences between the two countries. Thus, it hoped to 
encourage India to keep its promise to stand aloof from the Tibet imbroglio. As a
46 John W. Garver, Protracted Contest: Sino-Indian Rivalry in the Twentieth Century (Seattle and 
London: University of Washington Press, 2001), p.72.
47 Press Trust o f  India, January 21, 2004.
48 See Information Office of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China, Regional Ethnic 
Autonomy in Tibet, Beijing, May 2004.
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positive gesture, Beijing tended to play down India’s role in the Tibet problem. In its 
white paper Tibet—Its Ownership and Human Rights Situation, issued in September 
1992, Beijing made no reference to India’s involvement in the Tibet independence 
movement and “the Dalai Clique’s separatist activities”, but maintained that the issue 
was concocted by old and new imperialists, i.e., the British Empire and the US.49
This was a far cry from Beijing’s previous official stand. In fact, some Chinese still 
continued to criticise India’s involvement in the Tibetan independence movement. For 
example, the former Chinese ambassador to India, Yang Gongsu, has repeatedly 
accused India of supporting the 1959 uprising.50 Interestingly, some in India also 
acknowledge that India participated in the Khampa rebellion sponsored by the CIA in 
the early 1950s. Eric Gonsalves, a veteran Indian diplomat, admitted that India was a 
participant in Western efforts to destabilise China through Tibet.51 Subramanian 
Swamy, President of India’s Janata Party and a former Indian minister, also revealed 
that, in the 1980s, the Indian government raised an 8,000-strong commando group of 
Tibetans, the members of which woke up every morning in special camps with cries 
of “Long live the Dalai Lama. We shall liberate Tibet”.52 It is naive to suggest that 
Beijing was not aware of these activities. In contrast to its public silence on India’s 
involvement, the Chinese government, in fact, remained very attentive to the India-
49 Information Office o f the State Council of the People’s Republic of China, Tibet—Its Ownership and 
Human Rights Situation, September 1992, Beijing.
50 See Zhang Zhirong, “Zhong yin guanxi de huigu yu fansi— Yang Gongsu dashi fantan lu” (“The 
retrospection and reconsideration of Sino-Indian relations—an interview with Ambassador Yang 
Gongsu”), Dangdaiyatai (Contemporary Asia-Pacific Studies), no.8, 2008, pp. 17-25; also Yang 
Gongsu, Zhongguo fandui waiguo qinlue ganshe Xizang difang douzhen shi (The history o f  China s 
struggle to oppose the foreign invasions and interferences on Tibet reg/ow)(Beijing: Zhongguo 
zangxue chubanshe, 1992), pp.280-292.
51 Eric Gonsalves, “Positive agenda for positive action: better India-China understanding,” in Tan 
Chung ed., Across the Himalayan Gap: An Indian quest fo r  understanding China (New Delhi: Gyan 
Pub. House, 1998). The article is available at http://www.ignca.nic.in/ks_41058.htm.
52 Subramanian Swamy, India's China Perspective (Delhi: Konark Publishers Pvt. Ltd., 2001), p.26.
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Tibet linkage. A confidential Chinese document, revealed by the Tibetan govemment- 
in-exile, identified that India’s support for the Dalai Lama’s group was the most 
“odious” among that of foreign countries. Therefore, this white paper’s silence on 
India’s involvement was a clear demonstration of China’s resolve not to let the Tibet 
issue become an obstacle to the Sino-Indian rapprochement.
Beijing’s cautious treatment of the Tibet issue in Sino-Indian relations signals that the 
Chinese would like to develop relations in other fields while shelving the differences 
between India and China. On the other hand, they also hope to encourage India to 
extricate itself from the Tibet embroilment while stressing that common interests 
outweigh the differences. In addition, from the Chinese perspective, the Tibetan 
question is an internal affair and not open to negotiations by any third party. That is 
why the Director-General of the Asia Department of the Chinese Foreign Ministry, Fu 
Ying, argued that the Tibet issue was not on the agenda because “it is not a bilateral 
problem between China and India.”54 For Beijing, overemphasis on India’s role in the 
Tibet issue would only give India greater leverage against China, and contribute to the 
internationalisation of the Tibet issue.
The continuous effort to reduce the significance of the Tibetan question in China- 
India relations were seen during Indian Prime Minister Narasimha Rao’s visit to 
China in 1993. The Tibetan question received a relatively perfunctory treatment in the 
talks between the Indian Prime Minister Rao and the Chinese leaders as they focused
53 “Yuan yuan liu chang de Yin Zang youyi”(“Long course and remote source of Indo-Tibetan 
friendship ”), Xizang-zhiye (The Website of Tibet), at <http://www.xizang-zhiye.org/b5/world /guoji/ 
tdguoji06.html>
54 Statement of Fu Ying, Director-General of the Asia department o f the Chinese Foreign Ministry; see 
Press Trust o f  India, January 9, 2002.
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on the border talks.55 Similarly, during Chinese President Jiang Zemin’s state visit to 
India in 1996, the Tibet issue was raised only during the meeting between Chinese 
Foreign Minister Qian Qichen and his Indian counterpart Inder Kumar Gujral.56 These 
developments reflected that China and India shared the common aspiration to 
marginalize the Tibet issues while improving relations in other fields.
India’s Nuclear Tests and the Tibet Issue
Sino-Indian relations seemed to reach a new high as China and India agreed to 
establish a constructive partnership of cooperation oriented towards the 21st century 
during Chinese President Jiang Zemin’s visit to India in 1997. Although Beijing was 
satisfied with the new tenor of India-China relations, their differences over Tibet were 
far from being resolved, but rather were shelved. China’s good neighbourly policy 
towards India was dealt a serious blow by India’s detonation of nuclear devices in 
1998. Despite years of mistrust and frosty forbearance, Beijing was not so blind as not 
to notice that the Indian side had accommodated the activities of exiled Tibetans. The 
nuclear tests and subsequent missile programme not only delayed the normalization 
process of Sino-Indian relations in general, but also triggered China’s unhappiness 
about India’s management of the Tibet issue. In contrast to the previous silence, China 
did not hide its anger as it again criticised India’s approach towards the Tibetan 
problem.
The Dalai Lama’s comments on India’s nuclear tests had been a new source of tension
55 “Bordering on peace: China and India ease tensions along frontier,” Far Eastern Economic Review, 
September 16, 1993, p.13.
56 “‘Headway’ made in improving ties with India,” Xinhua, November 29, 1996, FBIS-C7/7, December 
3, 1996.
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between China and India. Commenting on India’s nuclear tests, the Dalai Lama said 
that he was saddened to hear about the series of nuclear tests conducted by India, but 
argued that as long as some of the major world powers continued to possess nuclear 
weapons, it was not right to condemn India’s nuclear tests outright.57 The Dalai 
Lama’s statement in defence of India’s right to test and bear nuclear arms took the 
same line the Indian government used to rebut critics. Although the Dalai Lama also 
endorsed the call made by China for a ban on nuclear weapons by all countrips, his 
decision not to condemn India’s nuclear blasts was a new source of dissatisfaction for 
Beijing.
The state-owned Renmin Ribao (People’s Daily) then carried a commentator’s article 
further criticising India, saying that India had played a “disgraceful” role in the Tibet
CO
issue and that the Indian authority concerned had let the Chinese people down. In an 
article rebuking India’s nuclear tests, the state-run news agency, Xinhua, condemned 
that India allowed the Dalai Lama’s group to conduct separatist activities, and claimed 
that there was an underhand relationship between India and Tibet.59
China felt even more uncomfortable after Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee held a 
meeting with the Dalai Lama and Defence Minister Fernandes promised to adhere to 
the notion of China’s suzerainty over Tibet. China reacted strongly and expressed 
“deep resentment and regret” over the meeting between Vajpayee and the Dalai Lama, 
saying it violated the commitment of the Indian side not to allow the Dalai to engage 
in anti-China political activities in India and claiming that the event amounted to
57 Indian Express (internet edition), May 16, 1998.
58 Xinhua Agency Commentray, “Jiujing shi shei zai gao weixie” (Who is posing threat actually?), 
Renmin Ribao, May 18, 1998, p.4.
59 Renmin Ribao, May 18, 1998, p.4.
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interference by New Delhi in China’s internal affairs. 60 Meanwhile, Chinese 
strategists were concerned with this development and argued that India, anti-China 
forces in the West and the Dalai Lama were using this opportunities and challenge 
China’s sovereignty over Tibet.
The issue of secessionist movements in India was also raised for consideration as a 
counter to India promoting the Tibet card. There was speculation that China would not 
hesitate to use the “Kashmir” card if India played the Tibet card against China. There 
was also a minority view in the Chinese government that problem areas such as 
Punjab and the north-eastern region should also be placed at the forefront of 
diplomatic affairs if India continued to play the Tibet card.61 Chinese scholars also 
linked the Kashmir cause to the Tibet issue, in an attempt to encourage India to step 
away from the Tibet issue. Senior Chinese scholar Ye Zhengjia stated that “India has 
its problems -  in the north-eastern region, in Kashmir, in Punjab. On Tibet, it’s the 
same kind of problem. If we interfere with each other, there can be no friendship, no 
normal relationship.”62
On the other hand, India’s nuclear tests and the war against terror unleashed new 
strategic uncertainties for China on its south-western frontiers, and further highlighted 
Tibet’s strategic value. Some Chinese strategic analysts argued China’s security 
environment in the south-west had suffered because India’s nuclear tests posed a 
potential threat to Tibet. Assessing the Chinese security environment after India’s 
nuclear tests, the Chinese strategic analyst Zhang Wenmu concluded that China’s 
security concerns were “urgent in the east; serious in the west” {dong j i  xi zhong), and
60 The Hindu, October 23,1998, p.l.
61 John Cherian, “Wrong signals,” Frontline (internet edition), November 7-20, 1998.
62 See N. Ram, “Clarifying the facts about 1962 is a precondition,” Frontline, September. 12-25, 1998, 
p.l 8.
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cautioned against India’s desire to include Tibet in an India-controlled union.
China’s immediate and harsh criticism of India’s Tibet policy after India’s 1998 
nuclear tests proved that India’s assistance to the Dalai Lama’s government remained 
a thorn in the flesh in Beijing’s side, and could easily arouse the indignation of the 
Chinese. Apparently, Beijing sensed that a nuclear India might change its official 
policy toward Tibet. Again, it exposed Tibet as an unresolved issue between China 
and India. China, in fact, has been very suspicious of India’s real policy towards Tibet, 
although the Indian side reiterates that its long-standing and consistent position that 
Tibet is an autonomous region of China and that it does not allow Tibetans to engage 
in anti-China political activities in India.
The Karmapa Event
While Chinese suspicions over India’s intentions regarding Tibet deepened after 
India’s nuclear tests, the Tibet issue was further compounded by the seventeenth 
Karmapa Lama Ugyen Trinley Doije’s flight from Tibet to India in January 2000. The 
Karmapa Lama is the spiritual leader of the Kagyu lineage of Tibetan Buddhism and 
ranks third in importance in Tibet’s Buddhist hierarchy, second only to the Dalai 
Lama and Panchen Lama.64 More significantly, unlike the controversial selection of 
the 11th Panchen Lama, he has been recognised by both Beijing and the Dalai Lama, 
and therefore, possesses legitimacy. The fact that the 14-year-old Lama had received 
Beijing’s patriotic education and had still decided to escape certainly caused China
63 Zhang Wenmu, “Yindu de diyuan zhanlue yu Zhongguo Xizang wenti”(“India’s geo-strategy and 
China’s Tibetan question”), Zhanlue yu guanli (strategy and management), no. 5, 1998, p. 108.
64 There are four main schools o f Tibetan Buddhism: the Nyingma, the Sakya, the Kagyu Sect, and the 
Gelug School. The Dalai Lama belongs to the Gelug, or Yellow, sect of Tibetan Buddhism.
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considerable embarrassment. The Karmapa’s flight not only suggested the failure 
China’s of patriotic education to indoctrinate the Tibetan leader, but also showed that 
the destabilising influences in Tibet would continue to pose significant political and 
other kinds of obstacles in China’s quest to defend its sovereignty and territorial 
integrity.
The Karmapa’s flight also once again drew international attention to China’s dubious 
record in Tibet. In a bid to counteract the effect of the event and to “save face”, China 
claimed that the .young Karmapa had gone abroad to retrieve religious artefacts, 
musical instruments and ritual black hats that had been used by the previous Karmapa 
Lama and had been left in the Rumtek monastery in Sikkim. The Chinese stressed that 
his Indian sojourn “did not mean to betray the state, the nation, the monastery, and the 
leadership.”65
More importantly, the Karmapa’s decision to leave China and to join the Dalai Lama’s 
side was damaging to Beijing’s assumption that the Tibet issue would naturally be 
resolved when the present Dalai Lama was out of the picture. Before the Karmapa’s 
departure, Beijing had tried to push forward the Karmapa Lama to replace the Dalai 
Lama as an alternative leader to the Tibetans. However, now the situation has been 
gradually reversed. Not only can the Karmapa not be used as a tool against the Dalai 
Lama, but there is a new belief that the Karmapa could be the transitional successor to 
the Dalai Lama, who is now in his 70s.66
It was believed that Beijing was playing a “waiting game” with the Dalai Lama to win
65 Xinhua, January 7,2000.
66 The Times o f  India, April 9, 2008, p. 19.
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ultimate control over Tibet. A senior Chinese official was quoted as saying that the 
Chinese did not need to engage in dialogue with the Dalai Lama because it would be 
10 years, at the most, before the Tibetan leader died. The Chinese official argued that, 
when the Dalai Lama died, the issue of Tibet would be resolved for ever. That is, in 
the eyes of the Beijing, the Tibetan question is the equivalent of “the Dalai Lama 
question”. Beijing believed the Tibetan question would cease to exist once the present 
Dalai Lama had passed away.
Indeed^ regarding the confrontation between Beijing and the Tibetan govemment-in- 
exile, time is on the side of the Chinese. In the Tibet Autonomous Region, Hans 
immigrants are expected to outnumber the Tibetans in the next few years. Meanwhile, 
the young generations of exiled Tibetans are losing their original Tibetan identity, and 
developing a new identity that is closer to that of their host countries. Kesang Takla, 
Secretary for the Department of Information and International Relations of the 
Tibetan govemment-in-exile, admitted that more and more Tibetans in India are 
gradually considering themselves as Indians. The Chinese might be happy to see the 
exiled Tibetans neutralised by host states and alienating themselves from Tibet, while 
the aboriginal Tibetans are diluted by the external immigrants. With the lack of a 
significant figure with the charisma and the iconic international status of the present 
Dalai Lama, the Tibetan govemment-in-exile will find it more difficult to inspire the 
Tibetans to rise against China. It will also be an arduous task for the successor of the 
present Dalai Lama to consolidate the different factions within Tibetan Buddhism. As 
the Dalai Lama himself agreed, “If the Dalai Lama is simply replaced by another
67 Lodi Gyaltsen Gyari, “Don’t shut out the Dalai Lama,” Far Eastern Economic Review, January 20,
2000, p.28.
68 Lin Chao-chen, Zuihou de Dalai Lama (The Last Dalai Lawa) (Taipei: Shibao chubanshe, 2000),
p. 141.
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senior lama, then the other sects will not agree/’69 It is also likely that the new leader 
will not be able to restrain the violence-prone fractions, such as the Tibetan Youth 
Congress, which is infamous for its appeal to use violent means to promote the 
Tibetan independence movement. A leadership vacuum in the wake of the Dalai 
Lama’s death will inevitably lead to the collapse and split of the Tibetan govemment- 
in-exile. This is the scenario Beijing anticipates.
Some media reports also have revealed that the Chinese government has already set
70up a. task force, to search for the next reincarnation of the Dalai Lama. Just as it 
selected his own reincarnation of the Panchen Lama in 1995 and the Reting Lama 
reincarnation in December 1999 without the Dalai Lama’s blessings, Beijing will 
attempt to appoint its own favourite reincarnation of the next Dalai Lama. Though 
Beijing’s appointee may not be accepted by all Tibetans, it will benefit Beijing 
because the “two Dalai Lamas” controversy could undermine the legitimacy and 
influence of the one accepted by the Tibetan govemment-in-exile.
Aware of the change in the wake of the Karmapa’s departure, Beijing found it less 
credible to use its own puppet Panchen Lama as a symbol to legalise its rule over 
Tibet since neither the Dalai Lama, the Karmapa Lama nor the two major leaders of 
the Sakya sect were on its side. Therefore, Beijing was obliged to take the initiative of 
resuming the contact with the Dalai Lama. The Dalai Lama’s elder brother, Gyalo 
Thondup, who had long been an emissary between Beijing and Dharamasala, was 
invited to visit Beijing in October 2000. He visited China again in July 2002 and was 
permitted to enter Tibet for the first time since 1959. Just several weeks later, two
69 Taipei Times, January 29, 2001.
70 The Indian Express (internet edition), February 18, 2000.
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high-level figures from the Tibetan govemment-in-exile, the Dalai Lama’s special 
envoy to the United States, Lodi Gyaltsen Gyari, and his envoy to Europe, Kelsang 
Gyaltsen arrived in Beijing and then visited Tibet. Although Chinese officials still 
decline to recognise this visit as official contact, in reality, the visit carried great 
significance and sparked hopes of the resumption of a formal dialogue between the 
Dalai Lama and Beijing. The Dharamsala delegation was allowed to visit China and 
hold eight rounds of meetings with Beijing officials between May 2003 and January 
2010. Although there was no significant breakthrough, China has recognised that 
there is some kind of contact between the central government and the Dalai Lama.
However, it is unlikely that China has shown flexibility on the issue of Tibetan 
independence. While, receiving the delegation from the Dalai Lama, Beijing still took 
a hard-line attitude towards the Dalai Lama by blocking him from making any visits 
outside India. Some analysts were wondering whether discreet international pressure, 
particularly from Washington, might have been the major factor in encouraging 
Beijing to resume the dialogue. However, the resumption of high-level contact 
between the two sides indicates that Beijing is now aware that it cannot depend on the 
“waiting for a natural resolution” approach to solve the Tibet issue.
The Karmapa Lama arrived at a time when the diplomatic establishment in New Delhi 
was trying to mend fences with Beijing in the wake of the 1998 nuclear tests. In fact, 
the Indians were more confounded than excited by the Karmapa’s unforeseen arrival 
although India supports Tibet’s autonomy. Such confusion was well reflected in the
71 •initial reactions of major Indian English newspapers. Some were worried that it
71 For an account of major Indian newspapers’ responses to the Karmapa issue, see Amitabh Mattoo, 
“Imagining China,” in Bajpai and Mattoo eds., The Peacock and the Dragon, pp. 14-17.
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might be deliberate plot by the Chinese to disturb India’s domestic peace, while others
79welcomed him to stay.
The dilemma for the Indian government was whether to grant the Karmapa Lama 
political asylum. The Indian Defence Minister Fernandes, a known hardliner towards 
China, was the first high-ranking Indian official to say that the Karmapa Lama could 
stay in India. In fact, from the Indian perspective, granting the Karmapa Lama 
sanctuary on the grounds of humanity did not signify any change in India’s Tibet 
policy,73 because India had already sheltered the Dalai Lama and tens of thousands of 
Tibetans. However, China also made it plain that it did not want the Karmapa Lama to 
obtain political asylum in India, and reminded the Indian government of its 
commitment to the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence. China expressed a hope 
that India would adhere to its commitments in this regard, especially the policy of 
mutual respect, and non-interference in each other’s internal affairs. Beijing also 
hoped that the Karmapa Lama would not be allowed to engage in political activities 
and that New Delhi would not allow him to be used by other foreign powers in 
strategies or plots against China.74
India took a cautious attitude towards the Karmapa’s arrival and did not want to 
provoke Beijing. As a result, New Delhi played down the issue of political asylum by 
granting only refugee status to the Karmapa Lama. More significantly, the decision 
was made one year after the Karmapa’s arrival and, currently, he is still prevented
72 See, for example, Editorial, “Beware o f a trap,” The Hindustan Times (internet edition), January 13, 
2000.
73 For this point, see Editorial, “The Karmapa conundrum,” The Indian Express (internet edition), 
January 13, 2000.
74 See Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Sun Yuxi’s statement, in Press Trust o f  India, September 
20, 2000.
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from visiting Sikkim, where another Karmapa Lama resides.75 As a low-profile 
protest, the Chinese called off a medical delegation, which was scheduled to visit 
India to assist the victims of the Gujarat earthquakes.
The Karmapa issue provided a new opportunity for China and India to measure the 
importance of the Tibet issue in Sino-Indian relations and reconsider their approaches. 
The Indian government’s statecraft in managing the Karmapa issue once again proved 
their reluctance to challenge Beijing directly over the Tibet issue. However, India’s 
decision to host the Karmapa Lama also revealed that India would not conform to all 
of China’s expectations over the Tibet issue, but would continue to accommodate 
exiled Tibetans. Furthermore, the event once again reminded people that India is the 
host to the Tibetan govemment-in-exile and plays a particular role in the China-Tibet 
embroilment, as international media also took notice of the possibility that the 
Karmapa might continue the Dalai Lama’s political mission.76 As a result, it was 
inevitable that India’s sheltering of the Karmapa and the Karmapa’s presence in India 
would affect China-Tibet-India interactions, especially in the post-Dalai Lama period. 
On the other hand, China’s dilemma is that it does not want the Tibet issue to become 
a bilateral issue, but it has not been able to marginalise India’s role.
3.3 The Tibet Card
India's Self-Restraint Approach
75 Both Beijing and the Dalai Lama recognised Ugyen Trinley Doije as the Karmapa Lama. However, 
Shamar Rinpoche, one the o f senior Lamas responsible for finding the reincarnation o f the Karmapa, 
rejected the authenticity o f Ugyen Trinley Doije, and claimed another boy Thaye Dorje to be the real 
Karmapa.
76 David Van Biema, “The World’s Next Top Lama,” Time (internet edition), May 15,2008.
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In the wake of new developments, such as the Karmapa’s stay in India, China felt it 
imperative to bring the Tibet issue to the China-India agenda. An initial shift was seen 
during Chinese Premier Zhu Rongji’s visit to India in January 2002. The most 
contentious issues that came up in discussions between the two sides were the Dalai
77Lama and the activities of Tibetan refugees in India ; Beijing understood that it 
needed to raise the Tibet issue with New Delhi rather than applying the cool-down 
policy by ignoring India’s role.
Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee’s visit to China in 2003 marked another effort by both 
sides to improve relations despite the controversy caused by India’s nuclear tests. A 
new document, The Declaration on Principles fo r  Relations and Comprehensive 
Cooperation between the Republic o f  India and the People s Republic o f  China, was 
signed to mark their progress in an effort in finding common ground in bilateral 
relation. However, the Tibetan problem again became a significant topic for 
discussion between the two sides. On the Tibet issue, the declaration stated, “The 
Indian side recognizes that the Tibet Autonomous Region is part of the territory of the 
People’s Republic of China and reiterates that it does not allow Tibetans to engage in 
anti-China political activities in India.” In fact, just before Vajpayee’s visit, the Indian 
side had decided to ignore both the Tibet and Sikkim issues and concentrate on
70
economics and border clarification. The Indian Ambassador to China, Shivshankar 
Menon, even argued that Tibet was no longer an issue in India-China relations, adding
70
that the Chinese government was appreciative of the Indian position on Tibet. 
Nonetheless, Beijing was not satisfied with a repetition of India’s previous stance, and 
wanted India to make a more categorical commitment to recognise Tibet as an
77 The Times o f  India (internet edition), January 16, 2002.
78 Prabhu Chawla, “Dancing with The Dragon,” India Today (internet edition), July 7, 2003.
79 Asian News International, June 22, 2003.
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inalienable part of China.
By signing the statement, India had, for the first time, used the official Chinese 
description, the “Tibet Autonomous Region”, to refer to Tibet and acknowledged it as 
part of the territory of the People’s Republic of China (see Table 2). In essence, the 
new discourse did not represent any change in India’s Tibet policy, but the Chinese 
side soon expressed its appreciation for India’s support in stating its policy in black 
and white. The state-run Xinhua news agency lost no time in hailing India’s apparent 
recognition of Tibet as part of China. The spokesman of the Chinese Foreign Ministry, 
Kong Quanj then affirmed that India’s stand on Tibet helped to “enhance confidence 
and defuse suspicions”.80
On the other hand, however, from, the Indian perspective, the declaration did not 
represent any shift in India’s position either on Tibet or on the presence of the Dalai 
Lama or other Tibetan refugees in India. Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee argued that 
“there is no change in our decades-old policy”, because “Indians have never doubted 
that the Tibet Autonomous Region is a part of the territory of the People’s Republic of 
China”.81
Literally, the declaration regarding Tibet replaced the reference to “Tibet” with the 
phrase “Autonomous Tibet Region”. However, since India had already recognised 
Chinese sovereignty over Tibet, there was no substantive change in India’s stand. In 
other words, the new discourse on Tibet was notional rather than substantive. To 
conclude, it would appear that the new reference to Tibet in the joint declaration
80 The Hindu (internet edition), June 27, 2003.
81 Press Trust o f  India, July 23, 2003.
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reflected Beijing’s growing nervousness about Tibet, due to a series of new 
developments, including the Karmapa’s escape and India’s nuclear tests.
The subsequent high-level visits saw Beijing and New Delhi satisfied with the new 
discourse on Tibet. The 2005 Joint Statement by China and India and the 2006 Joint 
Declaration by India and China stated that “The Indian side reiterates that it has 
recognized the Tibet Autonomous Region as part of the territory of the People’s 
Republic of China and that it does not allow Tibetans to engage in anti-China political 
activities in India.”, and that “The Chinese side expressed its appreciation for the 
Indian positions.” With the issues of such statements to the Tibetan question, both 
China and India might have thought again that they had reached consensus over the 
handling of the Tibet issue.
However, the mixture of India’s denial of any change and China’s delight with the 
new formulation indicated that their understandings and expectations did not converge. 
The Indian Government still refused to endorse China’s argument that Tibet is an 
integral and “inalienable” part of Chinese territory. However, because of fears about 
China’s aggressive reactions, New Delhi usually bowed to Chinese pressure to curb 
Tibetan activities while allowing the Tibetan govemment-in-exile to operate in India. 
For example, India’s Cabinet Secretariat was reported to have issued a circular asking 
all ministers to keep away from a function to congratulate the Dalai Lama after he had 
been honoured with the Gold Medal bestowed by the US Congress.
In March 2008, some exiled Tibetans organised the “Return March to Tibet” to mark 
the anniversary of China’s 1959 crackdown in Tibet. They planned to reach Tibet by
82 Press Trust o f  India, November 6, 2007.
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Table 2: Indian Statements on Tibet
Date Document Description
April 29, 1954 The Agreement between India 
and China on Trade and 
Intercourse between Tibet 
Region o f China and India
Desirous o f promoting trade and cultural 
intercourse between the Tibet Region o f China 
and India and o f facilitating pilgrimage and 
travel by the peoples o f China and India.
August 2, 1958 Notes sent by the Ministry of 
External Affairs to the 
Embassy of China in India
The Government o f India recognises that the 
Tibetan region is part of the People’s Republic 
of China.
December 23, 1988 India-China Joint Press 
Communique
The Chinese side expresses concern over anti- 
China activities by some Tibetan elements in 
India. The Indian side reiterates the 
longstanding and consistent policy of the 
Government of India that Tibet is an 
autonomous region o f China and that anti- 
China political activities by Tibetan elements 
are not permitted on Indian soil.
December 16, 1991 India-China Joint 
Communique
The Chinese side expresses concern about the 
continued activities in India by some Tibetans 
against their motherland and reiterates that 
Tibet is an inalienable part of Chinese territory 
and that it is firmly opposed to any attempt or 
action aimed at splitting China and bringing 
about the “independence of Tibet”. The Indian 
side reiterates its long-standing and consistent 
position that Tibet is an autonomous region of 
China and that it does not allow Tibetans to 
engage in anti-China political activities in 
India.
June 23, 2003 Declaration on Principles for 
Relations and Comprehensive 
Cooperation between the 
Republic of India and the 
People’s Republic of China
The Indian side recognises that the Tibet 
Autonomous Region is part of the territory of 
the People’s Republic o f China and reiterates 
that it does not allow Tibetans to engage in 
anti-China political activities in India. The 
Chinese side expresses its appreciation for the 
Indian position and reiterates that it is firmly 
opposed to any attempt or action aimed at 
splitting China and bringing about 
“independence of Tibet”.
April 11,2005 Joint Statement of the 
Republic of India and the 
People’s Republic of China
The Indian side reiterates that it recognizes the 
Tibet Autonomous Region as part of the 
territory of the People’s Republic of China and 
that it does not allow Tibetans to engage in 
anti-China political activities in India. The 
Indian side recalls that India was among the 
first countries to recognize that there is one 
China and its one-China policy remains 
unaltered. The Indian side states it will 
continue to abide by its one China policy. The 
Chinese side expresses its appreciation for the 
Indian position.
November 21,2006 Joint Declaration by the 
Republic of India and the 
People’s Republic of China
The Indian side reiterates that it has 
recognized the Tibet Autonomous Region as 
part o f the territory o f the People’s Republic of 
China, and that it does not allow Tibetans to 
engage in anti-China political activities in 
India. The Chinese side expresses its 
appreciation for the Indian position.
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January 14,2008 A Shared Vision for the 21st 
Century o f the People’s 
Republic o f China and the 
Republic of India_________
(No reference to Tibet)
travelling on foot from Dharamsala to Tibet’s border in a protest at China’s rule over 
Tibet by the time the Beijing Olympics began on August 8 of that year. For China, the 
initiative was a serious provocation. Indian police arrested approximately a hundred 
Tibetans to stop the march. Later on, a fresh riot followed by an anti-government 
protest erupted in Lhasa on March 14, 2008, leading to a massive crackdown. The 
People’s Liberation Army was moved into Lhasa to maintain order. The Chinese 
government accused “the Dalai clique” of orchestrating the protests in Tibet.
In New Delhi, demonstrations had also been seen outside the Chinese Embassy. The 
Tibetan exiles repeatedly tried to storm the Chinese embassy and were detained by the 
Indian police. Meanwhile, a group of Tibetan students, who planned to hold a 
candlelight vigil at the India Gate, were stopped from doing so by Indian police. In 
addition, the Indian Ambassador in Beijing, Nirupama Rao, was summoned after 
midnight by the Chinese Foreign Ministry, which wished to express China’s concerns 
over these demonstrations by Tibetans at the Chinese embassy in New Delhi. The fact 
that she was summoned after midnight was seen in New Delhi as an unfriendly 
gesture.
To avoid embarrassing China, India imposed a series of restrictions on Tibetan 
activists and protesters. India’s Foreign Minister, Pranab Mukheijee, even publicly 
warned the Dalai Lama, saying that India would continue to offer him hospitality, but 
that, during his stay in India, he and his followers should not engage in any political
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activity or any action that could adversely affect relations between India and China.
India also made great efforts to reassure Beijing that the Olympic Torch Relay in New 
Delhi would pass off smoothly under the cover of massive security. The Chinese 
government lauded India for its handling of the Tibet issues; as the Chinese 
Ambassador to India Zhang Yan said, China appreciated these goodwill gestures.84 
India’s self-restraint and muted response to the protests in Tibet might have made 
Beijing feel comfortable and might have earned praise for India from Beijing, but 
within India, a section of the media described the government’s kowtowing to China 
as “chicken-hearted”.85 The former Defence Minister, George Fernandes, also said, “It 
is a disgrace that China should say that India has done well.”
Given India’s use of extreme caution regarding the Olympic torch relay in New Delhi, 
the Chinese may have felt slightly more confident. India was not, however, entirely 
toeing the Chinese line. In early 2008, the exiled Karmapa Lama travelled to the US. 
It was the first time the Indian government allowed him to travel outside India in the 
eight years since he had escaped from Tibet. As the Olympic torch relay turned into 
a public relations disaster for China, the Karmapa’s trip to the US had the potential to 
ruin Sino-Indian relations; it was a sign that India did not give up its influence over 
the Tibet issue.
The visit to China by the Indian External Affairs Minister, Pranab Mukherjee, in June
83 The Hindu (internet edition), April 2, 2008.
84 Zhang Yan, “A perspective on India & China-India ties,” The Hindu (internet edition), July 1, 2008.
85 Jug Suraiya, “From Taslima to Tibet, India proves chicken,” The Times o f  India, March 21, 2008,
p. 18.
86 The Times o f  India, March 31, 2008, p. 14.
87 Ibid., p. 19.
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2008, after the turmoil regarding Tibet, was another example that China and India 
were willing to make further concessions on the issue. However, the talks between 
Mukheijee and his Chinese counterpart, Yang Jiechi, were not able to break new 
ground; instead the two minsters became vexed with the differences between New 
Delhi and Beijing, including those regarding the Tibet issue. It seems that Chinese 
officials expressed their objections about the media coverage given to the Dalai Lama 
and the Tibetan youth movement to Mukheijee. The two sides found it difficult to
oo
concentrate on areas where the two countries could have common interests.
Tibet’s India Card
As far as Beijing is concerned, it would like to avoid Tibet playing a central role in 
India’s strategies vis-a-vis China. Indian policy-makers also want to downplay the 
Tibetan factor in China-India relations as it seeks to improve relations with China. 
However, India’s peculiar role in the Tibet issue cannot be ignored; India has been 
dragged into the Tibet issue even though New Delhi was very mindful of managing 
the prickly and difficult relationship with China. Recent interactions between Beijing- 
Dharamsala-Delhi show that such a trend is still a factor in Sino-Indian relations.
After the sixth round of talks between Beijing and Dharamsala in 2007, there were no 
plans to hold further talks in the immediate future. However, because of the riots of 
March 2008 in Tibet, both sides held the seventh and eighth rounds of talks in July 
and November 2008. 89 Ironically, the only consensus between Beijing and 
Dharamsala was that the talks failed to make progress on the contentious Tibet issue
88 Editorial, “Chinese Checks,” The Times o f  India, June 10, 2008, p. 18.
89 The Asian Age, November 18, 2008, p. 1.
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and both sides vowed not to compromise on the status of Tibet. The Tibetans’ 
frustration and disappointment over the fruitless talks with Beijing mounted.
The Dalai Lama admitted that his attempts to secure greater autonomy for the region 
through negotiation with the Chinese government had not succeeded. He then called a 
gathering of around 600 Tibetan leaders for a six-day special meeting to discuss the 
direction and the future strategy of the Tibetan movement against Chinese rule: the 
issue was whether to continue following the middle way for Tibetan autonomy, or to 
press for complete independence and self-determination.
As Tibetans became frustrated at the lack of progress in the talks with Beijing, the 
Dalai Lama directly, asked New Delhi to help resolve the crisis at the centre of 
strained border ties between Asia’s two biggest nations. He argued, “India and Tibet 
have the relationship.of a ‘guru and chela’ (master and disciple), and when the chela 
is in trouble, the guru must look after him”.90 The Dalai Lama even, called himself a 
“son of India” and pointed out that Over Tibetans have developed very close ties with 
India over the years.91 The Dalai Lama also voiced his support for New Delhi over the 
boundary problem, arguing that China should accept the reality that Arunachal 
Pradesh belongs to India, and should shed its rigid stand and find a mutual solution to 
the border dispute. However, he also termed India’s attitude towards the Tibet issue 
as overcautious despite the help and support India had offered the Tibetans over the
93years.
90 The Times o f  India, November 21, 2008, p.l 1.
91 Indo Asian News Service, March 31, 2009.
92 United News o f  India, January 21, 2009.
93 Indian Express (internet edition), November 24,2008.
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The Dalai Lama’s direct plea for India’s involvement in the Tibet issue presented the 
Indian government with a dilemma. There are varied perceptions in India about the 
benefit or otherwise of the Tibet card. C. Raja Mohan commented that when there is 
relative tranquillity in Tibet, India and China have reasonably good relations. Vice 
versa, he argued, when Sino-Tibetan tensions rise, India’s relationship with China 
deteriorates. The current restiveness in Tibet and the collapse of the talks between the 
exiled Tibetan leadership and Beijing are likely to affect New Delhi adversely.94
Besides, Srikanth Kondapalli of Jawaharlal Nehru University noted that India’s 
Ministry of External Affairs viewed Tibet as a liability as, in his opinion, it was 
India’s decision to grant asylum to the Dalai Lama that led to China’s attack on 
India.95 Sometimes, India’s special links with Tibet have compelled New Delhi to be 
involved in the Tibet issue even if it wishes to avoid it. In the view of K 
Subrahmanyam, a senior Indian strategic affairs analyst, “Tibet is not a card 
politically and strategically, but India has an obligation to the Tibetan people and their 
culture.”96
Of course, Beijing will not recognise India’s moral obligation over the Tibet issue. On 
the contrary, it views India as taking advantage of the India-Tibet relations. China has 
long suspected the real intention of foreign countries for helping the exiled Tibetans. 
Some Chinese have argued that the Dalai Lama’s crowning glory comes from the 
value that he represents as a focus of anti-China forces.97 Any assistance can be seen
94 C. Raja Mohan, “India’s Tibet Ambiguity,” Indian Express (internet edition), November 27,2008.
95 The Times o f  India, November 23, 2008, p. 10.
96 Ibid.
97 The Human Rights Society o f China, “Meiguo zhichi Dalai jituan fenlie huodong poxi,” Renmin 
Ribao, May 26, 2001, p.5.
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as part of grand plan to weaken or contain China. Seen from a broader perspective, 
the Tibet issue could provide New Delhi with politico-military options in the future to 
ally itself with other countries to discomfit China strategically.
Thus, the Chinese side also worries that the Tibetan question has become a platform
on which anti-China forces could work together to contain China. For example, China
criticised the Dalai Lama for being a tool that allows the US to contain China, and
sees the US as the mastermind behind the Tibetan separatist activities.98 Particularly,
since India has a particular position and influence over the Tibet issue, some Chinese
researchers have warned that the Tibet issue may bring the US and India closer
together because any countries wanting to play the “Tibet card” will have to take
actions on Indian soil. In fact, some Chinese scholars have also warned that India is
00likely to play “Tibet card” to please the US. China worries that the US and India 
may conspire to support exiled-Tibetans, which would casta new question mark over 
China’s security environment.
India’s Strategic Ambiguity on Tibet
Although India has occasionally reined-in the anti-China activities, the Chinese side 
still suspects India’s sincerity and considers India’s action to be sort of political tactic. 
As Rajiv Sikri, a former secretary in India’s Ministry of External Affairs, said, China 
remains uncertain and anxious about India’s Tibet policy despite extracting significant 
concessions from India on Tibet.100 On the one hand, New Delhi recognises that Tibet
98 Ibid.
99 Liu Xuecheng, “Leng zhan hou Meiguo anquan zhanlue zhong de Nanya” (“South Asia on the US 
Strategic Chessboard in Post-Cold War era”), Nanya yanjiu jikan, no.l, 1996, p. 12.
100 The Asian Age, March 31, 2008, p. 1.
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is an autonomous region of China, but, on the other hand, it allows exiled Tibetans to 
conduct “anti-China political activities” in India. It seems reasonable for the Chinese 
side to conclude that India has been involved in double-dealing and using Tibet as a 
trump card to be played against China.
The Indian strategic community has appeared divided on how to tackle the Tibetan 
problem while New Delhi has tended to maintain an ambiguous posture towards Tibet. 
Some Indian strategic analysts have candidly argued, “If it becomes necessary, India 
should also be ready to play the Tibet card .101 However, the Indian government is 
very cautious in dealing with the Tibet issue, and avoids giving the impression that 
they use the issue as possible leverage against China. Some Indian analysts have 
argued that, despite the dramatic rise in international support for exiled Tibetans since 
the late 1980s, New Delhi has consciously refused to take advantage of the situation
| f\*y
and has done nothing to raise political hackles in Beijing. That is why Brahma 
Chellaney of the Delhi-based Centre for Policy Research criticised that “India 
continues to sit on the sidelines and does not examine the implication of the Tibetan 
card.”103
However, India does see and has used the Tibetan question as a “quid pro quo” in its 
negotiations with China. Such a strategy can be traced back to Nehru’s period. Nehru 
informally proposed a deal to Zhou Enlai: India would give up its claims over Tibet if 
China would in return respect the status quo on the border.104 Furthermore, India has
101 Gurmeet Kanwal, “India’s National Security Strategy in a Nuclear Environment,” Strategic Analysis, 
vol. XXIV, no. 9, December 2000, pp. 1591-1628.
102 C. Raja Mohan, “Tibet static in China,” The Hindu (internet edition), June 23, 2003.
103 Shishir Gupta, “Tibet: Chinese Checkers,” India Today, October 7,2002, p.60.
104 Dawa Norbu, “Tibet in Sino-Indian Relations: The Centrality of Marginality,” Asian Survey, vol. 
XXXVII, no. 11, November 1997, p. 1087.
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publicly played the Tibet card at least twice in recent times since the 1980s. Srikanth 
Kondapalli points out that in 1987 and 2003, when China began supplying arms to the 
Royal Nepalese Army, India played the Tibet card. In 2003, the Indian Foreign 
Secretary, Shyam Sharan, went to Dharamsala to meet the Dalai Lama as a message to 
China that it should not interfere in India’s ‘backyard’.105
Even if the Indian side did not treat the Tibet issue as a card to be played against 
China, the Indian side still saw New Delhi’s stance towards the Tibet issue as a 
bargaining chip and as a. means of forcing China’s reciprocity. Many Indian scholars 
maintain that the settlement of the border and the status of Tibet are interlinked issues. 
That is, India will reserve ambiguities in its Tibetan policy as long as there is no 
definitive settlement of the boundary.106 Yet any assistance India renders to the Dalai 
Lama and his government, from the point of view of the Chinese, is part of the effort 
to cripple China. Sino-Indian relations thus suffer.
The Chinese side has also argued that, with an improvement in Sino-Indian relations, 
the Indian government would take a hard-line toward the Tibetan separatists whereas 
if bilateral relations were to deteriorate, the Indian side would accommodate Tibetan 
separatists to pressure China. The Chinese side made the criticism that every time the 
Indian side wants China to make concessions over a territorial dispute or India feels 
threatened by China, some Indian political figure will publicly support the cause of 
Tibetan independence.107 In sum and substance, the Chinese accuse India of holding a
1 HR“dark mentality” toward the Tibet issue. They consider that the Indian government
105 The Times o f  India, November 23, 2008, p. 10.
106 The Asian Age, March 31, 2008, p. 1.
107 Yang Pingxue, “Qian xi zhiyue Zhong Yin guanxi fazhan de jige zhuyao yinsu” (“A trial analysis o f 
factors limiting development of Sino-Indian relations”), Nanya yanjiu jikan, no.l, 2002, p.40.
108 Sun Jinzhong, “Toushi Zhong Yin guanxi jiuge” (“A Look at the Sino-Indian Disputes in
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has been trying to play the “Tibet card” against China, although it recognises Tibet is 
a part of China. Dominated by this thinking, the Chinese side finds it difficult to trust 
New Delhi over the Tibetan question.
3.4 Conclusion
The Tibet issue has been an endless source of friction between China and India, and 
has also been a significant factor in shaping India’s and China’s mutual threat 
perceptions. The incorporation of Tibet into the PRC in 1950 brought China and India 
face to face across the Himalayas. Therefore, the Indian strategic community has long 
seen China’s takeover of Tibet and its build-up there as a threat to India’s security. On 
the other hand, India can use Tibet to gain strategic leverage against China because it 
has a special influence on the Tibetan question.
India has officially recognised Tibet as one part of China by signing the 1954 
agreement, which speaks of the “Tibet region of China”. In the post-Cold War era, 
both China and India have made certain efforts towards improving relations. On the 
surface, political disagreement over the Tibet issue seems to have been put aside to 
pave the way for more cooperation in other fields. Meanwhile, New Delhi has not 
supported Tibetan independence in public. The Tibet issue can hardly ignite a major 
military conflict between China and India. The consensus between Beijing and New 
Delhi is that the Tibet issue should not be allowed to become an obstacle to greater 
cooperation. Both sides are unwilling to adopt a conflictual course and hostile policy 
posture towards each other.
Since an independent Tibet is not currently a possibility, India is constantly in search
Perspective”), Nanya yanjiu jiakn, no. 1, 2002, pp.50-51.
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of ways to show support for a higher level of autonomy in Tibet. To some extent, 
India’s position of not supporting Tibet’s independence in public is a way to alleviate 
China’s concerns. However, the distrust continues to prevail between the two 
countries over the issues of India giving shelter to the Dalai Lama and his followers, 
and India’s supporting Dalai Lama’s “real autonomy”.
The Tibet issue also reflect India’s dilemma under the system of asymmetrical threat 
perceptions. India can use Tibet issue as a trump card to increase pressure on China, 
but it is worried about China’s possible punitive reactions. That is, the asymmetry in 
threat perceptions has made India be very cautious of taking countermeasure. 
Nevertheless, the Indians will keep playing the Tibet card as an option, albeit 
reluctantly. It can be safely argued that for most Indians and India’s current crop of 
leaders, their support to the Tibetan claim does not show any malice toward China, 
because the Indian government has not attempted to stir up a rebellion against China’s 
rule. However, India’s mild stance does not meet Chinese expectations.
Compared to other issues between China and India, Tibet is one of the few issues that 
have irked China more than it has troubled India. Beijing intentionally applied a cool­
down policy to ignore India’s role in order to reduce the significance of the Tibetan 
question in Sino-Indian relations and to encourage India to stay away from the issue. 
Although China and India seemed to have already found some common ground on the 
Tibet issue, as mentioned in some joint diplomatic documents, both sides have failed 
to agree on a healthy way to address each other’s concerns relating to the Tibet issue. 
There is no denying that India still plays host to the Dalai Lama and the Tibetan 
govemment-in-exile, and thereby occupies a crucial position in the tortured politics of 
the Tibet issue. The repeated mention of the Tibet issue in bilateral communiques
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indicates that the India-Tibet linkage remains a concern to Beijing.
The Chinese side naturally resents the Indian interest in Tibetan affairs, and sees 
India’s warm reception of the Dalai Lama as a violation of a cardinal principle of non­
interference in one another’s internal affairs. Rather, the Chinese have tended to 
interpret India’s assistance to the exiled Tibetan as India’s wish to treat Tibet as an 
instrument against China. According to the Chinese perception, the only way to 
remove the Tibetan question from the agenda of Sino-Indian relations is for the Indian 
side, to keep its promise and follow the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence. India 
has already followed some steps, such as banning political activities by the Tibetan 
govemment-in-exile in India.
The discord over Tibet will be a constant that both sides must address, as the future of 
Tibet and Tibetan emigres and India’s hosting of the Karmapa Lama will continue to 
affect the course of the Sino-Indian relationship. Any discord in bilateral relations 
could easily make their mutual distrust re-emerge, and the Tibetan question, once 
again take centre-stage again.
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Chapter 4: The Sino-Indian Border Problem
The China-India border covers a distance of some two thousand kilometres, which is 
divided into three sections: the western, middle, and eastern sectors 1 (see Map 1). 
The western sector involves the boundary between Kashmir in India, and Tibet and 
Xinjiang in China. The middle sector runs from the Tibet-Kashmir-Punjab border 
junctions to the Nepal-Tibet-Uttar Pradesh border junction, while the eastern sector 
starts at the junctions of the China-India-Bhutan border and extends to the junction of 
China-India-Myanmar border.
Both sides generally agree on the boundary of the middle sector, but serious 
differences remain regarding the eastern and western sectors, which involve large 
disputed areas. In the western sector, India accuses China of occupying about 38,000 
square kilometres of Indian territory in Kashmir, in addition to 5,180 square 
kilometres ceded by Pakistan to China under the Sino-Pakistan border agreement of 
1963. On the other hand, India also argues that Aksai Chin, located in the western 
sector, is part of India’s Ladakh region, but it has been occupied by China since the 
late 1950s as part of Xinjiang. In the eastern sector, the Chinese claim about 90,000 
square kilometres in India’s Arunachal Pradesh region and repudiate the legality of the 
McMahon Line, which has been considered the Sino-Indian international borderline 
by the Indian side.2
1 The Chinese consider the disputed border between China and India to be 2,000 kilometers long. The
Indian side suggests that the Sino-Indian border is about 4,060 kilometers long because it should 
include the Tibet-Sikkim border and the one between Xinjiang and Pakistan-controlled Kashmir.
2 For a discussion on the McMahon Line, see Neville Maxwell, India’s China War (London: Jonathan
Cape, 1970), pp.39-64.
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The incompatible claims of the two sides over the disputed territory along the border 
led to a brief but significant war in October 1962 and strained Sino-Indian relations. 
Diplomatic relations at the ambassador level were cut off and were restored only in 
1976. The two countries have tried to use dialogue to solve the border problem since 
1981. Various kinds of official dialogue mechanisms have been proposed, including 
the eight rounds of vice-minister talks between 1981 and 1987, the Joint Working 
Group (JWG) Meetings, and the Expert Group; the latest are Special Representative 
Meetings.3
Although the Tibet issue had led to a gradual deterioration in China-India relations, it 
was the border dispute that eventually destroyed the “bhai bhai” friendship between 
Beijing and New Delhi. The deadlock following the border problem ruined the mutual 
trust. The significance of the boundary issue in China-India relations was well- 
recognized, as it was seen as the main obstacle to improving bilateral relations.
More importantly, the border dispute and the war have been the major factors leading 
to the construction of the asymmetrical perception of threat between the two sides. It 
is no secret that, after the 1962 border war, the Indian strategic thinkers treated China 
as a potential rival, not as a partner. Annual reports issued by the Indian Ministry of 
Defence have been guardedly articulated the view that China is India’s most potent 
threat.4
3 See, for example, Alastair Lamb, The China-India Border (London: Oxford University Press, 1964); 
Maxwell, India’s China War, Steven A. Hoffman, India and the China Crisis (Berkeley: University 
of California Press, 1990); Xuecheng Liu, The Sino-Indian Border Dispute and Sino-Indian 
Relations (Lanham, Md.: University Press o f America, 1994).
4 Manoj Joshi, “George in the China Shop,” India Today (internet edition), May 18, 1998.
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There exists a vast body of literature centred on the 1962 border war, which has 
provided some insight as to the origins and developments of the border dispute. This 
chapter will instead focus on evaluating the progress made by new rounds of border 
talks, particularly after the 1998 nuclear tests, the aim being to shed light on the recent 
development of the boundary question. This chapter will illustrate that when it comes 
to forging amicable relations, China and India are burdened with the legacy of the 
boundary problem and how the asymmetrical perception of threat regarding the 
boundary issue has made China and India fashion different approaches toward solving 
the. boundary problem. India tends to be deeply apprehensive of threats stemming 
from the unresolved Sino-Indian border issue, while China appears less concerned 
about similar threats from India. The fact that efforts aimed at resolving the boundary 
dispute have so far borne little fruit has. frustrated the two countries, and helped 
consolidate the mistrustful mindset of the 1960s.
4.1 Legacy of the Border Dispute
1962 Border War
The border dispute between China and India emerged as China began to lay a 750- 
mile road from Xinjiang to Tibet in March 1956. The Chinese opted to construct the 
road cutting through the Aksai Chin region. Unfortunately, India also claimed the 
inhospitable mountainous region as a part of northern India. In fact, the Indians did 
not discover this strategic road until it was already completed. Beijing did not mention 
it during a series of summits with New Delhi. India was thus surprised to realise the 
road had been built via Aksai.
The basic debate involved in the Sino-Indian border dispute was whether the Sino-
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Indian frontier had ever been formally demarcated on the ground. According to India, 
the western border between India and China was demarcated by the 1842 agreement 
between the Tibet and Kashmir authorities and the eastern border between China and 
India was demarcated by the McMahon Line of the 1913-1914 Simla Conference.5 
However, China maintained that, historically, no agreement on the Sino-Indian 
boundary had ever been concluded between the Chinese central government and the 
Indian government. Beijing also claimed that the Chinese central government did not 
send anybody to participate in the conclusion of the treaties mentioned by India, nor 
in their subsequent ratification. China found further support in the fact that the British 
government in 1899 had proposed to delineate this part of the boundary formally with 
the Chinese central government, but the proposal had already been rejected by the 
Chinese government. Regarding the McMahon Line in the eastern sector, China 
asserted that it was illegal and a product of British imperialist policy. Moreover, the 
Chinese argued, the McMahon Line had never been discussed at the Simla 
Conference, but had been determined by the British representative and the Tibetan 
representative through an exchange of secret notes at Delhi in March 1914.6 The 
Chinese not only rejected the McMahon Line, but also laid claim to 90,000 square 
miles in the area shown on the Indian maps.
In fact, by the late 1950s, the Indian side held the belief that there was no border 
dispute between China and India. During his visit to China in 1954, Indian Prime 
Minister Nehru had raised a question with Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai, saying that he 
had discovered some maps published in China that gave a different borderline
5 This McMahon Line was later marked on the map attached to the Simla Treaty as part o f the
boundary between Tibet and the rest of China.
6 “Letter from the Prime Minister of China to the Prime Minister o f India,” in Alan Lawrance ed., 
China’s Foreign Relations since 1949 (London: Routhledge & Kegan Paul Ltd., 1975), pp.122-126.
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between the two countries, and Zhou had replied that those maps were merely reprints 
of the old pre-liberation maps and that the authorities concerned had not had the time 
to revise them yet. After the discovery of the Xinjiang-Tibet road, Nehru wrote to 
Zhou Enlai, trying to remind his counterpart that since no border questions had been 
raised during the negotiation of the agreement concerning Tibet, the Indians were 
under the impression that there were no border disputes between India and China; the 
Indian side assumed that the 1954 Treaty had recognised India’s position regarding 
the India-Tibet border. In other words, the Indian government was of the opinion that 
the. Sino-Indian,Agreement of 1954 had settled all outstanding issues between China 
and India, including the border problem. In his letter of reply to Nehru, however, 
Zhou pointed out that the border issue did exist, because the Sino-Indian boundary 
had never been formally delineated. Zhou admitted that the border question had not 
been raised in 1954 when negotiations were being held between the Chinese and 
Indian sides for agreement about Tibet; he explained that it was because “conditions 
were not yet ripe for its settlement and the Chinese side, on its part, had had no time 
to study the question.”8
Coinciding with the Dalai Lama’s exile to India, the border dispute increased tensions 
between China and India. From September 1959 to March 1960, around thirty notes, 
eight letters, and six memoranda were exchanged between New Delhi and Beijing 
over the boundary problem.9 As Sino-Indian relations further deteriorated on account 
of the territorial claims, minor skirmishes between Indian and Chinese troops began to
7 “Letter from the Prime Minister of India to the Prime Minister of China,” in Lawrance ed., China’s
Foreign Relations since 1949, pp.l 17-122.
8 “Letter from the Prime Minister of China to the Prime Minister of India,” in Lawrance ed., China’s
Foreign Relations since 1949, pp. 122-126.
9 Dawa Norbu, “Tibet in Sino-Indian Relations: The Centrality of Marginality,” Survey, vol.
XXXVII, no.l 1, November 1997, p. 1086.
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take place at Lonjiu in the eastern sector in August 1959 and at the Kongka Pass in the 
western sector in October of the same year. China tried to persuade India by linking 
the border dispute, particularly the McMahon Line, with the imperialist legacy. China 
claimed that British imperialism constituted the fundamental reason for the dispute 
over the non-settlement of the Sino-Indian boundary question, and asked India not to 
follow the imperialist policy.
In April 1960, Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai and Vice Premier Chen Yi visited India for 
border talks with Nehru. However, no substantial agreement was reached. At that time, 
China was still keen to secure India’s friendship, as the Chinese thought that China’s 
major threat came from America and its alliance in the East. China proposed that the 
two sides temporarily maintain the status quo, namely, each side would keep the 
border areas under its jurisdiction for the time being and not go beyond them.10 
However, India refused to accept the temporary maintenance of the status quo along 
the border.
Diplomatic efforts to reduce the tension gradually proved a failure as the dispute 
along the border remained and worsened. In 1961, New Delhi began to adopt a 
controversial “Forward Policy”, thereby establishing a military presence in the 
disputed areas as far as possible. A series of measures and statements made by the 
Indian side further alarmed China.11 China accused India of taking advantage of
^ “Letter from the Prime Minister of China to the Prime Minister of India,” in Lawrance ed., China’s 
Foreign Relations since 1949, pp. 124-125.
11 On October 5, 1962, the Defence Ministry o f India announced the establishment of a new army corps 
under the eastern command for the sole purpose of dealing with China. On October 12, Prime 
Minister Nehru declared personally that he had issued instructions to evacuate the Chinese frontier 
guards from the areas over which India had a claim. On October 14, the then Indian Minister of 
Defence, Krishna Menon, called for a fight “to the last man and the last gun against China.”, see “A 
Brief Account on the Sino-Indian Boundary Question, Vice-Premier Chen Yi’s Television Interview
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China’s unilateral cessation of patrol activities to change the status quo, and viewed 
India’s movements with misgivings. Meanwhile, Beijing had made the necessary 
preparations to conduct military operations.
The Chinese leader, Mao Zedong, was annoyed with India’s uncooperative approach 
toward solving the boundary question. A military staff officer who was in charge of 
the border situation reported to Mao that the reason for Indian government to adopt 
the “aggressive” policy, saying that the Indian side calculated that China would not 
dare to counterattack because of the pressure from America in the east. Mao seemed 
to agree with this analysis, and then considered that military action might be the only
19way to stabilise the border and bring India to the negotiating table.
In order to “teach India a lesson”, the Chinese troops launched their “counterattack” 
against India on the morning of October 20, 1962, inflicting a humiliating defeat on 
India’s ill-prepared and ill-equipped troops. As a former Indian diplomat put it, the 
People’s Liberation Army (PLA) went through the Indian Army “like a knife through
I 7butter.” After the military victory pushing back the Indian side, the Chinese 
Government on of November 21, 1962 surprisingly announced a ceasefire and 
voluntarily withdrew to positions 20 kilometres behind the line of control that had 
existed in 1959, and proposed that officials of the two sides hold meetings 
immediately. The Chinese made three proposals: to stop the border conflict, to reopen 
negotiations and to settle the Sino-Indian boundary question. In order to create a good
with Mr. Karlsson, Correspondent of the Swedish Broadcasting Corporation”, February 17 1963, 
Ibid., p. 130.
12 For details, see Lei Yinfeng, Zai zuigao tongshuai shenbian dang canmou: Lei Yinfeng jiangjun 
huiyilu (Being the staff officer to the highest command: memoir of General Lei Yinfeng) (Nanchang: 
Baihuazhou wenyi, 1997), pp.208-209.
13 V. V. Paranjpe, “Wanted: A China Policy,” The Hindu, June 12, 1998, p. 12
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atmosphere for reconciliation between the two countries, China released more than 
600 Indian personnel and returned the equipment that had been captured during the 
fighting. However, the Indian side considered the Chinese gestures as only 
propaganda.14 The Indian Parliament also passed a resolution urging the government 
to recover every inch of India’s territory lost in the war, which added to the political 
difficulty of the Indian leaders in securing a compromise border deal with Beijing.
The 1962 war proved Nehru’s friendly policy towards China, such as granting 
recognition, the Bandung conference and accepting China’s claims over Tibet, a 
failure. The Indians felt that they had been betrayed by the Chinese.15 On the other 
hand, the Chinese blamed India for the hostile developments. Some senior Chinese 
diplomats even complained that India’s high-level leaders, with their narrow 
nationalism, arrogance and egotism, were responsible for the worsening of China- 
India relations.16
As a point of diplomatic history, it seems likely that the border war will be symbolic 
of the tortuous nature of Sino-Indian relations. All the euphoria about the Sino-Indian 
brotherhood dissipated. Both sides’ inability to find a mutually acceptable proposal 
impeded the improvement of Sino-Indian relations. Haunted by the border war, Sino- 
Indian relations since 1962 have been characterised by mutual antagonism, rivalry, 
distrust and hostility.17
14 “New Delhi returns Evil for Good,” Peking Review, January 25, 1963, pp. 10-11.
15 See, for example, B. N. Mullik, The Chinese Betrayal: My Years with Nehru (Bombay: Allied 
Publisher, 1971)
16 Liu Zhaohua, “Zhong Yin bian jie wenti zuotanhui jishi(shang)”(Proceedings of Forum on China- 
India Border Issue ( I )), Nnya yanjiu (South Asian Studies), no. 1, 2007, p.47.
17 See J. Mohan Malik, “China-India Relations in the Post-Soviet Era: The Continuing Rivalry,” The 
China Quarterly, no. 142, June 1995, pp.317-318.
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Throughout the Cold War and in the post-Cold War era, the border dispute remained
an indelible mark in Sino-Indian relations and China and India continue to hold each
other responsible. The military clash is still deeply inscribed in the memory of
strategic decision-makers and analysts, if not in public memory, and has acted as an
aggravating factor whenever China and India prepare to engage each other. That is
why a Chinese scholar urged both sides to “clarify the facts” about the 1962 conflict
1 8in order to normalise their bilateral relations. The reason is simple: no one can make 
friends with an “aggressor” or a “betrayer”. .
In fact, the unsolved border dispute places much more pressure on the Indian side 
than on the Chinese side. For Indians, the border war has become a vivid example of 
the “China threat”, and the unsolved border dispute is a reminder of another possible 
surprise attack by China. The military defeat also undermined India’s national prestige 
and status in international society. India’s credit as a leader among the developing 
countries was undermined. The historical enmity caused by the 1962 border war then 
became a significant source of India’s threat perception.
Renewed Boundary Talks
While the border dispute became a serious issue between both China and India, 
Beijing was endeavouring to sign border agreements with Burma and Nepal in 1960, 
Mongolia in 1962, and Pakistan in 1963. China tried to build up an image of being 
keen to settle the boundary problem by peaceful negotiation, the implication being 
that if the boundary negotiation between China and India failed, China should not be
18 Chinese scholar Ye Zhengjia’s statement, in N. Ram, “Clarifying the facts about 1962 is a 
precondition,” Frontline, September 12-25, 1998, p. 18.
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blamed.
India’s suspicion of China deepened in the wake of China’s first nuclear test in 
October 1964, barely two years after the Sino-Indian war. Undoubtedly, it placed 
great pressure on the Indians. Tensions continued, as there were border skirmishes in 
1965 and 1967. India’s annexation of Sikkim during 1973-1975 raised another 
diplomatic confrontation between the two countries.19
Between June 1981 and November 1987, eight rounds of talks at vice-ministerial 
level were held to settle the boundary question, but little progress was made. During 
the meetings, Beijing tried to set up the general principles for solving the border 
dispute, i.e., the package proposal, advocating “mutual understanding and mutual 
accommodation”, for the negotiation of the rival claims. However, the Indian side was 
in no mood to accept it.
In order to promote the idea, Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping also suggested that China 
and India could adopt a “one package deal” (yilanzi jiejue) to solve the border dispute 
when Indian Foreign Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee visited Beijing in 1979. He then 
reiterated the position in an interview to an Indian journal, Vikrante. Deng Xiaoping 
said the package deal meant China would accept the border claimed by India in the 
eastern sector, namely, the McMahon Line, in return for Indian acceptance of the
*)C\status quo in the western sector. Since then, the package deal has become one of
19 The Indian government sent its army to quell the agitation against the Sikkim government in 1973. 
Sikkim became an associate state of India in September 1974, and became India’s twenty-second 
state in April, 1975. China refused to recognise India’s annexation, adding that it would support the 
Sikkimese people against Indian expansionism.
20 The Hindustan Tines, June 22, 1980. Cited from Shen Junzhuan, Zhonggongyu Yindu guanxi 
Zhengchanghu de guocheng yu zhangai (The process and obstacles in the normalisation ofSino-
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China’s basic principles to settle the longstanding border dispute between the two 
countries.
On the other hand, India refused to accept the package deal and supported a separate 
negotiation of each sector’s border, taking into account the specific aspects of each. 
The Indian side insisted on minor territorial adjustments in the eastern sector and
*y t
China’s unilateral concession in the western sector. India was more concerned with 
the effect of the border dispute on its security environment, insisted that a settlement 
of the. border issue was a necessary precondition for improving bilateral relations, and 
rejected the package proposal.
Since each side merely reiterated its well-known position on the border problem and 
then dispersed, the eight rounds of border talks between 1981 and 1987 did not lead to 
a  breakthrough or even substantial progress being made in the solution of the border 
question. The only achievement was that both sides agreed to maintain stability and
tranquillity along the frontier and that the border issue should be resolved through
00peaceful negotiations and friendly consultations. However, these talks did not 
prevent the two countries from engaging in border clashes in 1986-87.
The breakthrough visit by Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi to China in December 
1988 broke the impasse in Sino-Indian relations and led to the re-commencement of 
border negotiations. Regarding the boundary problem, the two sides decided to set up 
an India-China Joint Working Group (JWG) on the Boundary Question to work out a
Indian Relations) (Taipei: National Chengchi University International Relations Institute, 1987),
p.88.
21 Xuecheng Liu, The Sino-Indian Border Dispute and Sino-Indian Relations, p.2.
22 Ibid., p.3.
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mutually acceptable resolution. More importantly, India changed its position to admit 
that there was a boundary dispute between the two sides though it did not insist that 
solving the boundary problem was a precondition for the normalisation of Sino-Indian
'J'Xrelations.
From June 1989 until August 2001, fourteen sessions of the JWG meetings were held 
(see Table 3). During the visit by the Indian Prime Minister Narasimha Rao to China 
in September 1993, an India-China Diplomatic and Military Expert Group was 
created as a  subgroup of the JWG The Expert Group, which was designed to deal 
with technical details at the deputy director-general/undersecretary level, met fourteen 
times between February 1994 and June 2002. Although these talks made little 
progress in reaching affinal solution of the border disputes, they were instrumental in 
establishing a mechanism for regular discussions. More importantly, unlike the 
previous border talks held between 1981 and 1987, the JWG and Expert Group 
meetings proved successful in maintaining peace and tranquillity in troubled areas 
along the Sino-Indian border. That is, to some extent, the dialogue mechanism itself 
was a kind of CBMs (confidence building measures), which tied both sides to the 
negotiation table, to avoid the need to resort to extreme measures.
Besides, the establishment of various dialogue mechanisms on the border problem and 
the lack of any significant improvement indicates that both sides were willing to solve 
the problem, but not able to narrow their differences. Fortunately, there were signs 
that both sides promised to endeavour to maintain peace and tranquillity along the 
Line of Actual Control (LAC) and strengthen cooperation in other fields while
23 For details, see Fang Tien-sze, “The Sino-Indian Border Talks under the Joint Working Group,” 
Issues & Studies, vol. 38, no. 3, September 2002, pp.150-183.
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Table 3: India-China Joint Working Group Meetings
Date Event Place Major Development
1989 June 30-July 4 First
meeting
Beijing The two sides promised to make efforts to maintain 
peace and tranquillity along LAC.
1990 August 30-31 Second
meeting
New
Delhi
Military border personnel would meet from time to 
time at an appropriate level.
1991 May 12-14 Third
meeting
Beijing The two sides exchanged views on how to maintain 
peace and tranquillity along the LAC.
1992 February 20-21 Fourth
meeting
New
Delhi
The two sides agreed that military border personnel 
would hold regular meetings in the eastern and 
western sectors in June and October every year. 
They also agreed to establish telephone links and 
discussed the issue o f prior notification of military 
exercises.
October 27-29 Fifth
meeting
Beijing The two sides continued to discuss measures to 
maintain peace and tranquillity in the regions along 
the LAC, but no progress was made.
1993 June 24-27 Sixth
meeting
New
Delhi
The two sides initiated the 1993 CBMs Agreement.
1994 July 6-7 Seventh
meeting
Beijing The two sides agreed in principle to the setting up 
of more points for meetings between border 
personnel.
1995 August 18-20 Eighth
meeting
New
Delhi
The two sides agreed to pull back troops from four 
forward outposts.
1996 October 16-18 Ninth
meeting
Beijing The two sides agreed to establish two additional 
meeting sites along the eastern section of the 
border, and decided to hold a meeting along the 
middle section.
1997 August 4-5 Tenth
meeting
New
Delhi
The two sides exchanged the instruments of 
ratification o f the 1996 CBMs Agreement.
1999 April 26-27 Eleventh
meeting
Beijing The two sides claimed that there was considerable 
scope for developing and expanding bilateral 
relations in economic, commercial, and other 
fields, but no progress was made.
2000 April 28-29 Twelfth
meeting
New
Delhi
The two sides agreed to exchange maps as a further 
step toward working on the identification of the 
LAC.
2001 July 31-August 1 Thirteenth
meeting
Beijing The two sides defined their individual perceptions 
of the LAC along the middle sector and recorded 
the differences on the maps.
2002 November 21-22 Fourteen
meeting
New
Delhi
The two sides agreed to exchange the maps in the 
western sector in January 2003.
2005 March 30 Fifteen
meeting
Beijing Both sides reviewed the on-going process o f LAC 
and CBMs.
working to solve the boundary question. The trend also reflected both sides’ 
willingness to shelve the disputes until there was the possibility of an acceptable 
resolution.
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Confidence-Building Measures along the Border
According to the Sino-Indian Joint Press Communique issued on December 23, 1988, 
the aim of the JWG was to seek a mutually acceptable solution to the Sino-Indian 
boundary question. However, from the outset, the JWG focused most of its efforts on 
initiating CBMs that can maintain peace and tranquillity along the border, instead of 
discussing possible recommendations to settle the overlapping claims over border 
areas. This real focus was a clear sign that both sides acknowledged that the time was 
not yet ripe for reaching an ultimate resolution on territorial adjustment. Aware of the 
complexity of the border issue, both sides avoided rushing into a border agreement, 
but aimed at creating a favourable atmosphere conducive to an ultimate settlement of 
the dispute. The two countries agreed that CBMs were not only of vital importance to 
safeguarding peace and tranquillity along the disputed border, but would also 
contribute to the steady development of their bilateral relations.24
Some Chinese scholars have claimed that the early proposal to adopt the CBMs was 
initiated by the Chinese side in the late 1950s. They argued, in late 1959, that the 
Chinese had suggested both China and India should withdraw their military forces 
twenty kilometres from the LAC, and not send armed personnel into the disputed 
areas. In November 1962, the Chinese government issued a statement proposing a 
ceasefire and announced that the Chinese troops would withdraw twenty kilometres 
from the LAC on its own initiative, and asked that the Indian side not cross the 
LAC. Factually, however, it might be too simple to conclude that the Sino-Indian
24 “Border Talks with India Conclude; Accords Signed,” Xinhua, June 27, 1993, in Foreign Broadcast 
Information Service, Daily Report: China (hereafter cited as FBIS-CH1), June 28, 1993, p. 14.
25 For details, see Renmin chubanshe ed., Zhong Yin bianjie wenti (Sino-Indian boundary 
question)(Beijing: renmin chubanshe, 1962), pp. 1-4; 23-26.
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CBMs could be agreed in the early days. It was observed that Beijing began to 
embrace the concept and recognise the worth of CBMs only after the mid-1980s with 
the relaxation of the international situation, increasing economic interdependence and 
the launch of domestic economic reform. China’s economic development 
necessitates a stable and peaceful environment; this applies in equal measure to India. 
Thus, Sino-Indian CBMs are due to both countries seeking a peaceful environment to 
focus on the paramount task of national development.
Since the. early 1990s, some CBMs were proposed and followed by China and India to 
secure the peace along the disputed boundary areas. After Chinese Premier Li Peng’s 
visit to India in 1991, the two sides agreed to regularize the meetings between border 
personnel, which would be held at Bum La in the eastern sector and in the Spanaggur 
Gap area in the western sector in June and October every year.27 The two sides also 
agreed to establish telephone links to facilitate communication between border 
personnel. Transparency, communication, and constraint measures were on the agenda, 
and the discussions focused on the mutual transparency of the location of military 
positions, prior notification of military exercises, the prevention of air intrusion, and 
the redeployment of forces along the LAC.
The visit to China by Indian Prime Minister Narasimha Rao in September 1993,
26 For this point, see Rosemary Foot, “Chinese-Indian relations and the process of building confidence 
implications for the Asia-Pacific,” The Pacific Review, vol. 9, no.l, 1996, pp.58-76; Xia Liping,
‘The Evolution o f Chinese Views Toward CBMs,” in Michael Krepon ed., Chinese Perspectives on 
Confidence-building Measures, Report No. 23 (The Henry L. Stimson Center, May 1997), pp. 15-17.
27 “China-India Working Group Concludes Boundary Talks,” Xinhua, February 21, 1992, in FBIS-CHI, 
February 24, 1992, pp. 19-20.
28 “PRC and India Agree on Confidence-Building Steps,” Xinhua, June 28,1993, in FBIS-CHI, June 30, 
1993, p.6; “Foreign Secretary on the Outcome of PRC Border Talks,” All India Radio Network, June 
28, 1993, in FBIS, Daily Report: Near East and South Asia (hereafter cited as FBIS-NES), June 29, 
1993, p.58.
143
provided the setting for the codification of the work done by the JWG meetings. The 
two sides signed the Agreement on the Maintenance o f  Peace and Tranquillity along 
the LAC in the China-lndia Border Areas (hereafter the 1993 CBMs Agreement). 
The issues included in this agreement were troop reduction, conflict avoidance 
measures, notification measures, and the establishment of the Expert Group 
comprising diplomatic and military representatives from both sides to assist the JWG
Being the first CBMs agreement between China and India, the deal was described as a
on
“positive breakthrough” in Sino-Indian relations. In fact, due to the ground already 
covered at previous JWG meetings for the CBMs, many unforeseen outcomes that 
might have arisen from the agreement were avoided. The 1993 CBMs Agreement was 
a mere formalization of the principles to which Beijing and New Delhi had already 
subscribed. Moreover, the agreement was declaratory in nature and failed to cover 
details in any depth. Instead, the task of formulating the implementation measures was 
assigned to the newly established Expert Group.
A more credible explanation for the lack of implementation measures is that the two 
sides could not reach a consensus on detailed measures. For example, although 
discussions about a reduction in the number of troops continued, there was no 
convergence of views on the specific content of this issue. Up until 1993, it was 
estimated that Chinese troops in Tibet outnumbered Indian troops in the China-lndia
'y i
border areas by two to one. Given its numerical advantage, Beijing preferred a “one-
29 The text of the agreement is available at the official website of the PRC Foreign Ministry, at 
<http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjb/zzjg/yzs/gjlb/2711/2712/t 15915.htm>.
30 See “Rao Views Accord with China as Positive Breakthrough,” All India Radio Network, September 
14, 1993, in FBIS-NES, September 15, 1993, p, 38.
31 “Hands across the Himalayas,” The Economist, September 11, 1993, p.69.
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for-one cutback of troops” approach. Conversely, the Indian side argued that 
geographical factors needed to be considered. From the Indian point of view, the 
Chinese troops on the plateau could be quickly moved on the Chinese side of the 
border. For that reason, the Indian side argued, the troop reduction along the LAC 
should be based on the “adjusted ratio” approach to reflect the steep terrain and 
logistical difficulties on India’s side.32 At last, the “mutual and equal security” 
principle was accepted by both sides to cut their respective troop numbers, but no 
details were given on how to reach the goal. The significance of the 1993 CBMs 
Agreement,, therefore, lies not in the introduction of new measures, but in the political 
willingness to translate the progress made and the consensus reached by previous 
JWG meetings into a formal arrangement that would bind India and China more 
legally.
Although a final resolution on the border issue was not yet in sight, Beijing and New 
Delhi reiterated that the CBMs already in place were working well. At the eighth 
meeting of the JWQ which took place in New Delhi in August 1995, the two sides 
agreed to pull back troops from four forward outposts, two on each side, located in the 
Wangdun area near the Sumdorong Chu Valley in the eastern sector. The stations of 
the Chinese and Indian troops in this area had been located about 50-100 yards from 
each other, provoking the military clash of 1986-87. The decision to withdraw troops 
further back was calculated to prevent a recurrence of a similar incident.
After Indian Prime Minister Narasimha Rao’s visit to China, the JWG and the Expert
32 “All Quiet on the Eastern Front,” The Economist, December 7,1996, p.82; Lincoln Kaye, “Bordering 
on Peace: China and India Ease Tensions along Frontier,” Far Eastern Economic Review, September 
16, 1993, p. 13.
33 Renmin Ribao, August 21, 1995, p.6.
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Group worked toward the 1993 CBMs Agreement’s implementation. A further step in 
that direction was taken with the signing of the Agreement on the Confidence- 
Building Measures in the Military Field along the Line o f Actual Control in the India- 
China Border Areas (hereafter the 1996 CBMs Agreement) during Chinese President 
Jiang Zemin’s four-day state visit to India in November 1996, the first by a Chinese 
head of state since the two countries had established diplomatic relations in 1950.34
In this agreement, Beijing and New Delhi advanced beyond agreeing on declaratory 
principles and proposed more detailed implementation measures. For example, they 
set a ceiling on the scale of any military exercises and created a “no-fly zone” along 
the border areas. However, more work was needed. Despite agreeing to limit their 
respective military forces to “minimum levels compatible with the friendly and good- 
neighbourly relations between the two countries,” Beijing and New Delhi still could 
not reach an accord on the method of troop reductions. Furthermore, the 1996 CBMs 
Agreement was held up by a discussion over provisions for communication and
- i t
constraint measures, and the lack of any means to verify and monitor. Like the 1993 
CBMs Agreement, the 1996 CBMs Agreement functioned more as a conflict 
avoidance measure. However, there is no denying that the signing of the agreement 
was another new political initiative to help ease tensions along the Sino-Indian border.
The Chinese side attached a high degree of importance to the 1996 CBMs Agreement. 
For example, the Chinese President Jiang Zemin hailed the agreement as a factor that
34 The text of the agreement is available at the official website of China’s Foreign Ministry, at 
<http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjb/zzjg/yzs/gjlb/271112112/t 15914.htm>.
35 For a discussion on the monitoring measures, see Waheguru Pal Singh Sidhu and Jing-dong Yuan, 
“Resolving the Sino-Indian Border Dispute: Building Confidence through Cooperative Monitoring,” 
Asian Survey, vol. 41, no. 2, March/April 2001, pp.364-74.
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would further enhance peace and security in the border areas and create a sound 
climate for the eventual resolution of the boundary question. The senior Chinese 
specialist on Sino-Indian relations, Wang Hongwei, even considered the treaty as a 
“no-war pact” between the two sides, on the grounds that the 1996 CBMs Agreement 
removed the only dangerous or explosive element in the bilateral relationship. The 
reactions from the Indian side were also quite positive. Some Indian analysts deemed 
that the agreement had eased the security concerns of both countries.37 Thus, both 
sides expressed their appreciation of the 1996 CBMs Agreement.
In fact, the two sides were still unable to narrow their differences on troop reductions
■JO
along the border. Nevertheless, both sides expressed satisfaction with the results of 
the two CBMs agreements, and the border has since remained peaceful. Furthermore, 
both sides tried to marginalise the boundary dispute to make sure that the overall 
development of Sino-Indian friendship and cooperation would not be hijacked by the 
boundary issue.
4.2 Identifying the Line of Actual Control
India’s nuclear tests and the border talks
Although the CBMs have worked well to avoid any border conflict, the absence of a 
mutually accepted alignment of the LAC created problems for the CBMs. In fact, the 
significance of this is well acknowledged by the 1996 CBMs Agreement, as Article X
36 Wang Hongwei, Ximalayashan qingjie: Zhong-Yin guanxiyanjiu (The Himalayas sentiment: A study 
of Sino-Indian relations) (Beijing: Zhongguo zangxue chubanshe, 1998), p.376.
37 John Cherian, “Strengthening Relations: India and China, after Jiang Zemin’s Visit,” Frontline, 
December 27, 1996, p.38.
38 Swaran Singh, “Sino-Indian CBMs: Problems and Prospects,” Strategic Analysis, vol.XX, no. 4, July 
1997, pp. 543-59.
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noted that the full implementation of some of the provisions of the treaty would 
depend on the two sides arriving at a common understanding of the LAC. However, 
neither side advanced the identification of LAC after acknowledging this problem.
As codified in the 1993 CBMs Agreement, China and India agreed to “check and 
determine the segments of the Line of Actual Control where they [had] differing 
views as to its alignment.” Both sides also agreed that the Expert Group meetings 
would assist the JWG in the task of clarifying the LAC. Compared to the evolution of 
the CBMs, however, the pace of the talks on the delineation of the LAC has been slow. 
Issues related to the clarification of the LAC were addressed only intermittently in the 
early days of the JWG and Expert Group meetings. At the eighth meeting of the JWG 
in August 1995, the two sides identified certain parts of the LAC where there was a 
difference of opinion concerning the alignment, and agreed to resolve the questions 
one by one through consultation.39 At the ninth session of the JWG meetings in 
October 1996, both sides reiterated their wish to resolve the differences gradually 
through consultation.40 At the tenth meeting of the JWQ held in August 1997, the two 
sides agreed to speed up the clarification of the LAC. Despite these commitments, no 
concrete progress was made during the early border talks when the CBMs emerged as 
a high-priority issue.
Although the CBMs have proved helpful in avoiding further unnecessary conflicts 
along the border, they do not represent a final solution to the border issue because 
China’s and India’s competing irredentist claims remain unresolved. The two sides 
have yet to arrive at an agreement on where the LAC actually runs.
39 Renmin Ribao, August 21, 1995, p.6.
40 Xinhua, October 18, 1996.
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In addition, the conclusion of the CBMs has successfully created a somewhat 
complacent atmosphere that sometimes hides the fact that the unsettled boundary 
problem remains a graver concern to India than to China. Although the CBMs 
contributed to maintaining the status quo along the border, the JWG meetings were 
not able to frame any possible solution proposal for the border dispute. The CBMs did 
not generate enough confidence to satisfy New Delhi. Even the Chinese side 
gradually ignored India’s concerns and then was shocked by India’s determination to 
justify the. nuclear tests by citing the border problem as a concern. The Pokhran II 
nuclear tests and the harsh Chinese reaction to them strained relations between China 
and India despite the diplomatic efforts that were conducted in an attempt to avoid 
further conflict along the disputed border.
India’s “China threat” accusation seemed to be an embarrassment for those who had 
hailed the CBMs as a symbolic achievement for enhancing mutual trust. In a low 
profile gesture, the Chinese tried to play down the significance of the Sino-Indian 
CBMs. A comparison between China’s two white papers on national defence yields 
some indications of Beijing’s changed perception. In the white paper titled China s 
National Defence, which was issued in 1998, China cited the Sino-Indian CBMs as 
one example of its preference for CBMs. However, in a revised vision of the white 
paper, China s National Defence in 2000, no mention of the Sino-Indian CBMs was 
made, while most of the other examples in the previous version remained.41 The 
changes in the content of references to the Sino-Indian CBMs are worthy of attention. 
If nothing else, they reflected Beijing’s reservation over the CBMs with India.
41 For a comparison, see Information Office of the PRC State Council, China’s National Defense in 
2000 (October 2000) and China’s National Defense (July 1998).
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The boundary dispute has been seen as one of the most important issues between 
China and India. The progress of the border talks was viewed as an index of the 
normalization of China-lndia relations. Aware of the symbolic significance of the 
border talks, Beijing then used the border talks as an instrument to increase the 
pressure on New Delhi by suspending the JWG talks.
In fact, Beijing did not immediately sever all dialogue regarding the border problem 
in the wake of the Pokhran II tests, as the sixth meeting of the Expert Group went 
ahead as scheduled in Beijing on June 8-9, 1998. The meeting was held less than one 
month after India conducted the tests, and was the first contact at an institutionalized 
level. Amid the uneasy atmosphere created by the shock of the nuclear tests, the 
Chinese side tried to play down the significance of the meeting by describing the talks 
as routine. Moreover, the Chinese used the meeting to convey their deep 
dissatisfaction with India, instead of attempting further negotiations on the border 
question.42 Since nuclear tests dominated the agenda of the meeting, not surprisingly, 
unsurprisingly, no headway was made with regard to the border talks. For the first 
time, the Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman admitted that no progress had been 
made at the boundary meeting.43 Still angry at India’s accusation, the Chinese side 
then refused to fix a date for the eleventh round of JWG meetings, which had been 
scheduled for 1998. Meanwhile, China also hardened its position towards the border 
dispute in the wake of the nuclear tests by re-claiming sovereignty over the disputed 
area.
42 Agence France-Presse (AFP), June 11, 1998.
43 Ibid.
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Such a diplomatic manifestation of delaying the boundary talks reveals some 
messages. First, China thought the suspension of border talks would place more 
pressure on Delhi than on Beijing. Second, the Chinese sensed that India was more 
eager to solve the boundary problem than China was. As a result, Beijing adroitly 
made use of the border negotiations against India. This strategy further demonstrated 
that both sides’ concerns about the border problem are asymmetrical.
Only after deciding that New Delhi had showed renewed sincerity for developing 
Chinarlndia relations, did Beijing take note of India’s plea for the resumption of the 
JWG meeting. The JWG talks were then resumed in April 1999 when the eleventh 
meeting of the JWG was held in Beijing. Among the issues discussed were security 
concerns and nuclear disarmament. New Delhi spent much time at the meeting 
assuring its counterpart that India did not regard China as a security threat.44 While no 
agreement on the border issue was made at the meeting, the two sides turned their 
attention to expanding further ties in other fields, claiming that there was considerable 
scope for developing bilateral relations in economic, commercial, and other areas 45 A 
positive shift was seen at the seventh meeting of the Expert Group, held in November 
1999. Unlike the negative assessment of the previous round of the meeting, the 
Chinese considered the meeting as having made progress.46 Following the trend of 
restoring the pre-Pokhran-II relationship, at the twelfth JWG meeting in April 2000, 
Beijing and New Delhi agreed to resume high-level military interactions, which had 
been suspended after India’s nuclear tests in May 1998.47
44 See Bhartendu Kumar Singh, “Sino-Indian Ties: The 11th Round of Joint Working Group Meeting,” 
Institute o f  Peace and Conflict Studies (website), no. 195, June 7, 1999, at 
<http://www.ipcs.org/article_details.php?articleNo=195>.
45 Ibid.
46 The Hindu (internet edition), November 29, 1999.
47 Ibid., April 30, 2000.
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The early days of the 1990s witnessed an increasing imbalance between China and 
India in terms of economic growth and military strength. An assessment by India 
concluded that India’s negotiating clout with China might be weakened, as the power 
gap between the two countries was widening. After the nuclear tests, however, that 
perception has been partly reversed. As an Indian newspaper commented, a “confident
* Q
India” was ready for talks with China after the nuclear tests. Some Indians also 
believed that a credible deterrent would facilitate a breakthrough on the border talks 
with China.49
Thus, given India’s nuclear capability and rising status in international society, some 
Indians have come to feel that-they are in a stronger negotiating position than ever and 
should grasp the occasion. As a result, in the current circumstances, India is keen to 
resolve the issue in a timely manner, while China still emphasizes that “time” and 
“patience” are necessary to solve a problem left over from history.
Exchange o f Maps
In brief, the burdensome task of delineating the boundary consists of a two-step 
procedure. The first step is the clarification of the LAC, namely, translating a notional 
line into a real delineated one. After exchanging and comparing their delineations of 
the LAC, the two sides need to reconcile their differences over the alignment to arrive 
at an agreement on where the LAC really runs. The second task is to convert the de 
facto  LAC into a de jure international border, which might involve territorial 
adjustment.
48 The Indian Express (internet edition), April 24, 2000.
49 Ibid., May 25, 1998.
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Thus, early delineation of the LAC emerged as an option for stabilising the border 
regions and securing a working boundary that the military forces on both sides would 
respect.50 While the CBMs dominated the agenda of the early talks of the JWG, after 
1999, the focus was shifted to the clarification of the LAC.
After a long period of hesitancy, the task of clarifying of the LAC gained fresh 
momentum after the Indian External Affairs Minister, Jaswant Singh, visited Beijing 
in June-1999, the first visit by an Indian high-ranking official since the 1998 nuclear 
tests. During the trip, the two countries agreed to begin formal talks on the 
clarification of the LAC.51 At the twelfth JWG meeting, in April 2000, the two sides 
decided to conduct a “maps exercise,” i.e., exchanging and comparing their respective 
maps on the LAC . as a way of working toward the identification of the line. The two 
countries also decided to choose the middle sector as the first section to be determined, 
because it is smaller and less controversial than the other parts of the border.
In fact, the idea of exchanging the LAC maps had been proposed some time earlier, 
and had been included in the 1996 CBMs Agreement, but had not materialised. After a 
lengthy period, China and India finally increased their efforts toward this end. At the 
eighth meeting of the Expert Group in November 2000, the two countries for the first 
time officially exchanged their respective maps depicting the 545-kilometer middle 
sector of the LAC.52 At the ninth meeting of the Expert Group, held in New Delhi in 
June 2001, the delegations from both countries reviewed the other side’s maps and
50 Sujit Dutta, “Much Hype, Small Gains,” The Rediff.com, July 3,2001, at <http://www.rediff.com/ 
news/200 l/jul/03spec.htm>.
51 The Hindu (internet edition), June 15, 1999.
52 Ibid., November 25, 2000.
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exchanged views about the differences.53 The two sides then reviewed the work of the 
Expert Group on clarification of the LAC in the middle sector and recorded their 
individual perceptions on the maps at the thirteenth session of the JWG in July to 
August 2001. Reports said that there was a convergence of views on the LAC 
alignment along large portions in this sector.54
The Indian side made some moderate progress in keeping pressure on the Chinese to 
quicken the pace of the negotiations. According to Indian sources, the first-ever 
exchange of maps took place after Indian External Minister Jaswant Singh had written 
to his Chinese counterpart urging that the process of clarification and confirmation of 
the LAC be expedited.55 However, this did not imply any shift in China’s management 
of the border problem. In fact, the Indian officials involved in the maps exercise 
sensed that their Chinese counterparts were not interested in solving the LAC issue.56
China and India spent more than a year completing the exchanges of the less- 
controversial middle sector maps. Given the tempo of the talks, however, it did not 
seem that the clarification of the entire LAC would be a short-term process; it was 
unlikely that a quick settlement about the final alignment of the entire border would 
be found. Moreover, China’s reluctance to set a time frame to clarify and confirm the 
LAC would result in a delay of the border resolution.
A breakthrough seems to have occurred during Indian External Affairs Minister
53 Ibid., June 30, 2001.
54 Ibid., August 13,2001.
55 Ministry o f External Affairs, Government o f India, “Summary o f Press Briefing by the Official 
Spokesperson,” June 22,2001, available at <http://meadev.nic.in/news/20010622.htm>.
56 The Pioneer (internet edition), July 3 1, 2001.
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Jaswant Singh’s visit to China in March 2002. Singh announced that China and India 
had agreed to put a time frame on the exchange of maps, and added that the two sides 
would begin to exchange maps on the western in June 2002 with a view to concluding 
the process by the end of the year, while a similar exercise on the eastern sector would
cn
be conducted in early 2003. The Indian side was very optimistic about the 
development, with Jaswant Singh claiming that this step was “something India has not
r o
been able to achieve in the last 50 years.” Contrary to India’s optimism, however, 
the Chinese media’s silence on the matter reflected China’s cautiousness.
To the surprise of many, the two sides failed to keep the promise to exchange their 
own maps of the western sector as had been announced earlier. In fact, Chinese 
sources revealed that the two sides had been ready to exchange the maps in the 
boundary meeting. However, the Chinese side had suddenly found that the map of the 
western sector presented by the Indian side included the very western part of the 
disputed China-lndia border, covering Kashmir. The Chinese side considered this as 
going beyond the consensus and called off the process of exchanging maps.59
In fact, the Indian side acknowledges that the LAC established after the 1962 war 
remains more or less stable, but has not been demarcated. For example, the Indian 
side argued, between 1956, 1960 and 1962, Chinese maps showed three distinct and 
advancing LACs, especially in the Ladakh sector.60 The Indian side may have wanted 
to make use of the opportunity to clarify the differences over that section, and also
57 The Hindu (internet edition), March 30, 2002.
58 Ibid.
59 Liu Zhaohua, “Zhong Yin bian jie wenti zuotanhui jishi(shang)”(Proceedings of Forum on China- 
lndia Border Issue ( I )), p.58.
60 Sujit Dutta, “Much Hype, Small Gains.”
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make China stabilise its western part.
However, the Chinese suspected that India had tried to use the exchange to gain an 
extra advantage during the boundary talks. As a result, the Chinese refused to 
continue the exchange of maps. Again, the Chinese seemed quite unconcerned about 
the interruption of the border talk process. This development proved that China is not 
aiming for an early resolution unless it was favourable for the Chinese side. In 
addition, China does not think it necessary to solve the boundary dispute in a timely 
manner.
Gap in the Sense o f  Urgency
The Indian side has been aware of China’s reluctance to make any further 
compromise to quicken the boundary process. Just as the senior Indian analyst Sujit 
Dutta anticipated, China has stuck to its territorial claims and refused to budge from 
any part of the disputed territories, while showing little interest in an early settlement 
of territorial issues.61
On the other hand, the Chinese have defended their position by stressing that they 
have maintained a positive attitude in seeking solutions to the border issue, and blame 
India for the negligible progress in the Sino-Indian border talks. The Chinese side 
argues that India has been anxious to settle the boundary question on its own terms 
and was unwilling to settle the issue on the basis of mutual accommodation. Ye 
Zhengjia, a veteran Chinese diplomat specializing in Sino-Indian relations, 
complained that the Chinese were finding it very difficult to deal with the Indian side
61 Ibid.
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fsyin the JWG meetings. Chinese Assistant Foreign Minister Wang Yi also claimed 
that the Chinese side had been making specific proposals to India since 1996 to 
resolve the boundary issue, but that the Indian response had always been that it was 
too early to deal with issues such as the delineation of the border.
In fact, Beijing also desires an early solution for the Sino-Indian border problem, but 
it does not consider that there is any possibility of solving the issue completely in the 
near future. One basic contention embraced by the Chinese is that the border dispute 
is a complicated question left over from history; both sides are, therefore, required to 
show patience and allow ample time to solve the problem. The late Chinese leader, 
Deng Xiaoping, even suggested that if the Sino-Indian border dispute could not be 
resolved at an early date, both countries could agree to leave the issue to a later 
generation, while developing relations in other fields.64 Deng’s position was well 
explicated by Sha Zukang, China’s Director-General of Arms Control and 
Disarmament. Addressing a conference on the CBMs in the Asia-Pacific region, Sha 
said that some territory or border issues that could not be resolved immediately should 
be shelved and be negotiated only when conditions became favourable. Before the 
dispute could be resolved, he argued, the countries concerned should adopt security 
and confidence-building measures to maintain normal relations and economic 
cooperation.65 Concurring with this position, Cheng Ruisheng, former Chinese 
Ambassador to India, said that it was unrealistic to try to resolve the border dispute 
overnight and suggested that the two countries should hammer out relevant
62 See N. Ram, “Clarifying the Facts about 1962 is a Precondition,”p.l8.
63 The Hindu (internet edition), September 11, 2000.
64 See C.V. Ranganathan and Vinod C. Khanna, India and China: The Way Ahead After “Mao’s 
India’s War’’ (New Delhi: Har-Anand Publications, 2000), p. 166.
65 Renmin Ribao, February 3, 1993, p.6.
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agreements to ensure peace and stability along the LAC.66
New Delhi once also held the position that the border dispute could not be resolved in 
the short term. For example, when Indian President Ramaswamy Venkataraman 
visited China in May 1992, he admitted that “the boundary question was complex and
( \ 7was far from being resolved.” In 1995, Indian External Affairs Minister Pranab 
Mukheijee noted that the border dispute was a complex problem that required time
/■o
and patience. After the resumption of the JWG talks in 1999, however, the Indian 
side felt that progress had been too slow.
There are two plausible explanations for the change in India’s stance. First, the 
tension between China and India following Pokhran II reminded the Indian leadership 
that the Sino-Indian border dispute remains a security concern for India’s northern 
frontier. Despite the official-clarification that the border has remained peaceful, there 
have been repeated reports that Chinese troops at some places along the LAC have 
been conducting aggressive patrolling.69 Although New Delhi still identifies China as 
a potential enemy, the threat India faces from Pakistan is in fact more immediate. 
Moreover, the Indian side needs to allocate more resources to tackle Pakistan-related 
issues. For example, Indo-Tibetan Border Police Chief Gautam Kaul revealed that he
70was facing a shortage of troops due to militancy in Kashmir. Amid the India- 
Pakistan tensions following the terrorist attack on the Indian Parliament on December
66 Anil K. Joseph, “Jaswant Singh’s Visit to Rejuvenate Sino-Indian Relations,” Press Trust o f  India, 
March 27, 2002.
67 “Issues Statement,” Xinhua, May 24, 1992, in FBIS-CHI, May 26, 1992, pp. 18-19.
68 “China’s Qiao Shi Meets Leaders, Discusses Ties,” All India Radio Network, November 16, 1995, in 
FBIS-NES, November 17, 1995, p.36.
69 See, for example, The Pioneer, September 6, 2001, p.5; The Telegraph, December 27,2001, p. 12.
70 The Hindu (internet edition), December 26, 2000.
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13, 2001, India moved the part of its troops that faced China in the east toward the 
north in order to put pressure on Pakistan.71 As its security forces are stretched thin in 
the China-lndia border region, India has an added incentive to find a resolution to the 
Sino-Indian border dispute. Furthermore, an early resolution of the border issue could 
help reduce the possibility that China uses the unresolved border dispute as an excuse 
to take military action in order to ease India’s pressure on Pakistan.
In order to address the security needs, therefore, the Indian side is more enthusiastic 
about, clarifying the alignment of the LAC than China. Since the twelfth JWG meeting, 
the Indian side has increased its efforts to find an early resolution. In April 2000, 
Indian External Affairs Minister Jaswant Singh told the visiting Chinese delegation of 
the JWG that India attached importance to “result-oriented negotiations.”72 Singh’s 
statements came just days after Chinese Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan’s repetition 
that time and patience would be required. from both sides in order to arrive at a 
reasonable settlement, underlining India’s suspicion of China’s real intentions with 
regard to the border dispute negotiations. This kind of friction surfaced again when 
Indian President Kocheril Raman Narayanan visited China in May 2000. Rebutting 
the Chinese stance that the boundary question was a remnant of history, Narayanan 
retorted that inherited problems needed to be resolved and “must not be left over for 
history.”73
It is obvious that the Chinese leadership remains loyal to the “time and patience” 
principle despite the fact that they have promised to accelerate the negotiation process. 
For example, when Li Peng, Chairman of the Standing Committee of the National
71 Ibid., December 31,2001.
72 Ibid., April 30,2000.
73 Ibid., May 30,2000.
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People’s Congress, visited India in January 2001, he reiterated Beijing’s insistence on 
this position of “time and patience”.74
In fact, China’s approach towards the boundary problem has been more consistent 
than has India’s. The basic reason for this is that China does not consider the 
unresolved boundary problem as a serious security concern, and as a result, has the 
patience to wait for a more beneficial solution. China’s strategy remains to develop 
relations in other fields in order to create an atmosphere more conducive to solving 
the dispute. On the contrary,.the Indian side looks with misgivings at the disputed 
border and worries that China could use the unsolved border problem to bully India. 
In addition, India is keen to wipe out the displeasing history of the border dispute by 
concluding the border issue. Due to the asymmetrical concerns, an .early solution to 
the boundary problem is more important to India.
Revisiting China’s Package Proposal
China’s emphasis on “patience and time” during the Sino-Indian border talks, 
however, fails to explain why China has resolved other border disputes left over from 
history yet appears half-hearted about resolving the one with India. The underlying 
reason for China’s apathy toward an early border resolution is that China sees no 
indication that India is going to accept China’s package proposal.
China’s official report on its foreign relations argued that China had already proposed
n r
the “one package deal” (yilanzi jiejue) to solve the border dispute. The package
74 Ibid,. January 14, 2001.
75 Han Nianlong et al., eds., Dangdai Zhongguo waijiao (Contemporary Chinese foreign affairs) 
(Beijing: Zhongguo shehui kexue chubanshe, 1987), p.252.
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proposal was later renewed as an approach of “mutual understanding and mutual 
accommodation” (huliang hurang) by the Chinese. While “mutual understanding” 
calls for both sides to understand the other side’s position, “mutual accommodation” 
means there should be a “give-and-take” approach for settling the border dispute. 
Thus, “if one side hopes to get a piece of land from the other, it should offer a proper
7 f \piece of land to the other.” During his visit to India in January 2002, Chinese 
Premier Zhu Rongji still stressed that the historical issues between the two countries
77could be resolved gradually through mutual accommodation.
Through the package proposal, the Chinese said, they were willing to make some 
concessions in the eastern sector in exchange for India’s concessions in the western 
sector.78 In the western sector, China’s main aim is to secure the strategically 
important Aksai Chin, containing the Tibet-Xinjiang link road. As far as the eastern 
sector is concerned,, the Chinese demand territorial adjustments in order to hold the 
Tawang tract. The so-called package proposal seemed to be pragmatic and a mutually 
beneficial resolution of the border problem. For China, it could have secured Aksai 
Chin in the eastern sector. For its part, India could have legalised its possession of 
Arunachal Pradesh in the eastern sector. However, the proposal for the mutual ceding 
of territory was rejected by India.
The Indians were reluctant to endorse China’s mutual accommodation approach. C.V. 
Ranganathan, the former Indian Ambassador to China, has argued that it was unclear
76 Xuecheng Liu, The Sino-Indian Border Dispute and Sino-Indian Relations, p. 181.
77 Hindustan Times (internet edition), January 16, 2002.
78 Zhao Weiwen, Yin-Zhong guanxi fengyunlu (A record of the changes in India-China relations) 
(Beijing: Shishi chubanshe, 2000), p.242.
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70what the Chinese had in mind regarding the “mutual accommodation” proposal.
That might be true, as China’s claim on the western sector of the LAC has been
80changing; also, India was taken by surprise after China laid claims to Tawang. 
However, while some analysts in India realise that India’s flexibility over Tawang 
along the eastern sector is likely to mean China will accommodate India’s claims 
along the rest of the boundary, India shows no sign of conceding Tawang, as New 
Delhi has invested a considerable amount in building defence and administrative
01
architecture there.
The disagreement on the package deal has been identified as the main obstacle to the 
eight rounds of border talks in the 1980s. The Chinese seem to be confident that the 
“mutual accommodation” deal is the only possible approach to solving the border 
dispute. On this point, however, Beijing underestimates the pressure that a 
democratically elected government has to face in dealing with any territorial 
“concession.”
A study of China’s negotiating behaviour has concluded that the Chinese tend to 
postpone indefinitely negotiations that they consider unfavourable, and show steadfast
O'!
patience in maintaining their positions. Since the border dispute cannot be resolved 
on terms favourable to China, the Chinese have shown a tendency to freeze the issue
79 Ranganathan and Khanna, India and China, 167.
80 Liu Zhaohua, “Zhong Yin bian jie wenti zuotanhui jishi(shang)”(Proceedings of Forum on China- 
lndia Border Issue ( I )), p.49.
81 See The Hindu (internet edition), June 30, 2001.
82 Zhang Minqiu, “Zhong-Yin guanxi de gaishan han jinyibu fazhan de zhang’ai” (The obstacles to 
improvement and further development o f Sino-Indian relations), Guoji zhengzhi yanjiu (Studies of 
International Politics) (Beijing), no.l, 2000, p.28.
83 Jaw-ling Joanne Chang, “Zhonggong guoji tanpan celue fenxi” (Analysis of China’s international 
negotiating style), Zhongguo dalu yanjiu (Mainland China Studies) (Taipei) vol. 44, no. 6, June 2001, 
pp. 13-17.
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in order to protect their own interests. As Ranganathan and Khanna have pointed out, 
“Where it has not been possible to resolve an issue peacefully, China has been willing 
to shelve it, because the Chinese are not willing to surrender or compromise on what 
they consider to be their legitimate interests and entitlement.” Particularly, 
considering that the Sino-Indian border has generally remained peaceful, there is no 
urgency for China to resolve the problem if Beijing cannot bring New Delhi to agree 
to its terms.
4 3  Finding a Mutually Acceptable Solution
Special Representative Mechanism
The JWG mechanism has helped to build a CBMs regime along the disputed China- 
lndia border, and to stabilise the LAC, but the difficulty of delineating the LAC made 
the Indian side believe that the boundary problem should be solved from a political 
perspective, rather than in a historical, technical or legal manner.
Again, it was India that proposed the new initiative to find an earlier final solution for 
the boundary problem. During the visit of Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee to China 
from June 22 to 27, 2003, a new mechanism for border talks was set up. China and 
India agreed to raise the level of negotiators to a higher political status by appointing 
their respective Special Representatives as the key negotiators to explore the 
framework of a boundary settlement from the political perspective of the overall 
bilateral relationship.
84 Ranganathan and Khanna, India and China, p. 158.
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To show its emphasis on the initiative, New Delhi then appointed its National Security 
Adviser as the Special Representative of the China-lndia boundary problem. As it was 
New Delhi that had taken the decision to upgrade the level of talks, however, Beijing 
accepted the overture reluctantly. China initially desired to appoint a secretary-level 
official as its special envoy, but India had no intention of making the special 
representative a sequel to the JWG meetings, and favoured a more senior leader with 
sufficient political clout.85 Then, China’s Executive Vice Foreign Minister, Dai 
Bingguo, became China’s special representative. Apparently, the political level of 
Vice Foreign Minister is below that of National Security Advisor, but India believed 
the change of formalities for the boundary talks would help resolve the problem.
The first meeting of the Special Representatives took place in Delhi from October 23 
to 24, 2003. By August 2009, thirteen rounds of special representative meetings had 
taken place on the basis of their mandate to evolve a framework for a boundary 
settlement and address the problem from the political perspective of the overall 
bilateral relationship. That is, China and India decided to stop the process of focusing 
on technical problems, and prioritised the identification of common principles as the 
first task for solving the boundary problem.
In general, there were two stages for meetings. During the first phase, the aim of the 
meetings was to hammer out a methodology to resolve the boundary dispute. The 
second phase then focused on devising a framework agreement for resolving the 
dispute on the basis of the “political parameters and guiding principles”. The special 
representative mechanism was compatible with China’s strategy towards the boundary 
dispute. According to Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao, it was important that the two sides
85 Prabhu Chawla, “Dancing with The Dragon,” India Today (internet edition), July 7, 2003.
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Table 4: Special Representative Meetings
Date Event Place Major Developments
2003 October 23-24 First
meeting
New Delhi The two sides formulated guiding principles.
2004 January 12-13 Second
meeting
Beijing The two sides formulated guiding principles.
2004 July 26-27 Third
meeting
New Delhi The two sides reviewed the guiding principles 
for the talks.
2004 November 18- 
19
Fourth
meeting
Beijing The two sides exchanged views on the 
principles that could form the framework o f a 
possible boundary agreement.
2005 April 9-12 Fifth
meeting
New Delhi The two sides finalised the documents on 
guiding principles.
2005 September 26- 
28
Sixth
meeting
Beijing The two sides worked out an agreed frame 
work for a boundary settlement on the basis of 
the “Agreement on Political Parameters and 
Guiding Principles for the Settlement of the 
India-China Boundary Question.
2006 March 11-13 Seventh
meeting
New Delhi 
and
Kumarakom
The two sides devised an agreed framework for 
the basic framework for settlement.
2006 June 25-27 Eighth
meeting
Xi’an and 
Beijing on
The two sides continued their discussions on 
an agreed framework for a boundary 
settlement.
2007 January 16-18 Ninth
meeting
New Delhi The two sides continued their discussions on ... 
an agreed framework for a boundary 
settlement.
2007 April 20-22 Tenth
meeting
New Delhi 
and
Coonoor
The two sides continued their discussions on a 
framework for a boundary settlement.
2007 September 24- 
26
Eleventh
meeting
Beijing The two sides exchanged views on the 
boundary issue.
2008 September 19 Twelfth
meeting
Beijing The two sides exchanged views on a 
framework to solve the boundary issue.
2009 August 7-8 Thirteenth
meeting
New Delhi The two sides exchanged views on the 
boundary issue.
“bear in mind the larger picture, expand exchanges and cooperation in all areas and
QiT
properly settle questions left over from history.”
The two sides have maintained the confidentiality of the Special Representatives 
discussions, and have not revealed many details of the deliberations that have taken 
place between the Special Representatives. A brief statement has usually been issued 
at the end of each round of talks. Regarding the tone and tenor of the meetings, the
86 The Hindu (internet edition), April 11,2005.
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official statements have repeatedly said that the meetings have been held “in a cordial, 
constructive and cooperative atmosphere.”
After five rounds of talks, the Special Representative Meetings led to the conclusion 
of the Agreement on Political Parameters and Guiding Principles fo r  the Settlement 
o f the China-lndia Boundary Question (hereafter the Guiding Principles Agreement), 
which was signed on April 11, 2005 during Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao’s visit to 
New Delhi. The Guiding Principles Agreement shows that the two sides have reduced 
the differences in perception on the approach to the boundary problem. For example, 
India had earlier insisted on a sector-by-sector approach for solving the border dispute 
while China wanted a package deal. The Chinese stated that Rajiv Gandhi in 1988 had 
. agreed that the border problem could be solved by mutual accommodation, but the 
Vajpayee administration refused to make a similar commitment during his visit to 
China in 2003.87
The Indian side has now agreed to discuss the problem on a sector-by-sector basis, but 
to announce the agreement once the differences on all the sectors are sorted out. 
Article 3 of the Guiding Principles Agreement states,
Both sides should, in the spirit o f  mutual respect and mutual understanding, 
make meaningful and mutually acceptable adjustments to their respective 
positions on the boundary question, so as to arrive at a package settlement to 
the boundary question. The boundary settlement must be final, covering all 
sectors o f  the China-lndia boundary.
87 Tang Lu, “Zhong Yin zai bianjie wenti shang huzuo tiaozheng” (China and India seek mutual 
accommodation on the border problem), Guoji Xianqu Daobao (International Herald Leader), April 
15,2005.
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Undoubtedly, the conclusion of the Guiding Principles Agreement was an 
achievement of the Special Representative meetings. However, this positive 
development did not mean that all obstacles had been removed and that a mutually 
acceptable solution could be reached any sooner. The conception behind the Special 
Representative meetings was that both sides first identified the principles and terms of 
reference on the basis of which the settlement of the boundary issue could be 
established. Then, both sides would apply such principles to construct a framework, 
which would be used to delineate the actual boundary on the ground. That is, the 
conclusion of the agreement on Guiding Principles in fact marked the beginning of 
the second phase of negotiations under the mechanism of Special Representatives. 
Moreover, the task might be more difficult than the initial task, as it involves devising 
an agreed framework for the boundary settlement.
The Sikkim Issue
For India, a more symbolic achievement on the boundary talks in the post-Pokhran era 
was the Sikkim issue. Previously, Beijing had steadfastly questioned the legality of 
Sikkim’s merger with India in 1975. However, in July 1994, the Chinese Vice Premier 
and Foreign Minister, Qian Qichen, stated that Beijing was dropping its opposition to 
Sikkim’s accession to India.88 China’s decision at the third Expert Group meeting in 
March 1995 to hold border personnel meetings with India at Nathu La in the Sikkim 
sector implied its acquiescence that Sikkim was under India’s rule. Cheng Ruisheng, 
the former Chinese ambassador to India, also revealed that Beijing was considering
OQ 0
recognizing India’s merger with Sikkim. Despite these signals, however, Beijing did
88 “Comments on Bilateral Issues,” All India Radio Network, July 18, 1994, in FBIS-NES, July 19, 
1994, p.62.
89 The Hindu (internet edition), April 26, 1999.
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not formally recognise Sikkim as a state of India’s Union. China’s inflexibility on the 
Sikkim issue was because that Beijing saw the Sikkim issue as a bargaining chip to be 
used in the boundary problem. As one Chinese scholar argued, the Sikkim issue could 
be settled only within the framework of a package deal.90
However, during Prime Minister A. B. Vajpayee’s visit to Beijing in 2003, India 
successfully persuaded China to change its position and to accept the reality that 
Sikkim has become part of India. India and China signed a bilateral agreement about 
opening a point in Sikkim for border trade. India has recognised China’s take-over of 
Tibet by signing the 1954 agreement, so it was expected that China would recognise 
Sikkim by signing the border trade agreement. In return for recognition, India agreed 
to China’s terms on the status of Tibet as being an equivalent concession.
Although the Indian spokespersons quickly claimed China’s recognition of Sikkim 
was a tenuous advance, India’s expectations were soon struck a blow by Beijing. 
China rejected any suggestion that it had recognized India’s sovereignty over Sikkim, 
without even waiting until Vajpayee and his party were in China.91 The spokesperson 
of the Chinese Foreign Ministry said that the political status of Sikkim was historical 
baggage and would still require to be “solved in a gradual manner.” China’s 
reluctance to recognise India’s annexation of Sikkim was seen as a surprise and 
embarrassment to the Indian side. Critics in India felt that China had decided not to 
reciprocate India’s good-will again following India’s new statement on Tibet.
China saw the Sikkim issue as part of the broader border negotiations, and as a means
90 Xuecheng Liu, The Sino-Indian Border Dispute and Sino-lndian Relations, p. 176.
91 The Times o f  India (internet edition), June 26, 2003.
92 The Hindu (internet edition), June 27,2003.
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to deny India the possibility of taking advantage of the Tibet issue. However, Beijing 
was also worried that India might withdraw its endorsement of the new discourse on 
Tibet if Beijing were to continue to reject India’s claims over Sikkim. As a result, 
Beijing assured the Indian side in a low profile way that the Sikkim issue would cease 
to be an irritant in Sino-Indian relations and that Beijing wanted to build a “long­
standing, stable and healthy” relationship with India amid the fast-changing global 
scenario.93 The Chinese Foreign Ministry then deleted a webpage from its official 
website, which had showed Sikkim as a separate country in Asia, ahead of Chinese 
Premier Wen Jiabao's meeting with his Indian counterpart, A. B. Vajpayee, on the 
sidelines of the ASEAN summit in Bali, Indonesia.94
The change in China’s position towards Sikkim appeared clearer as the Chinese 
Consul General in Kolkata Mao Siwei later admitted. Beijing has already recognised 
Sikkim as part of India during Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee’s visit to Beijing in 
2003. However, Beijing was reluctant to openly assert that it had already recognised 
Sikkim as part of India. When Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao visited India in 2005, the 
Chinese side finally presented to India a newly printed official map that showed 
Sikkim as being part of India.95 The Joint Statement issued by two sides clearly 
speaks of “the Sikkim State of the Republic of India”. Despite China’s reluctance to 
publicly announce its policy change, such developments had already helped eliminate 
China’s ambiguity on Sikkim’s status.
93 The assurance on Sikkim was given by Wu Guanzheng, the member of the standing committee o f the 
political bureau of the CPC central committee, while meeting members of the political bureau of 
Communist party of India (Marxist). See “Press Trust o f India, July 24, 2003.
94 Press Trust o f  India, October 14,2003.
95 The Hindu (internet edition), April 11, 2005.
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Following this positive development, in July 2006 the two sides reopened border trade 
across the 15,000-feet Nathu La Pass in addition to the Shipkilah pass, opened in 1993 
and the Lipu Lake pass, opened in 1992. Border trade between the two countries in 
fact does not contribute much to the overall volume of trade between the two 
countries, partly due to restrictions in tradable items, but in this instance, it was an 
indication of a broader rapprochement.96
The boundary along Sikkim was considered a less difficult issue compared to other 
sectors. As far as India was concerned, Sikkim was a settled matter. However, the 
Tibet-Sikkim border was to play a further role in the boundary controversy and 
became a new point of contention. The Indian media from 2007 began to report 
Chinese intrusions into Indian territory in Sikkim. Close to four hundred such
07incidents occurred during 2005-2008. This time, the Indians were tormented with 
anxiety by China’s claims over the so-called 2.1 sq km “Finger Area” in northern 
Sikkim. China further surprised India by threatening to demolish existing stone 
structures there. India strongly rebutted these claims, lodged an official protest, and 
barred the Chinese troops from entering the area. This was after China had protested 
against other troop deployments in Sikkim resulting from the relocation of Indian 
troops from the western border. As a result of this diplomatic discord, road
QO
construction near the area was halted. During Indian External Affairs Minister 
Pranab Mukheijee’s visit to Beijing in June 2008, the Chinese reportedly tried to 
comer India by raising the issue of the Finger Area.99
96 Fang Tien-sze, “Zhong Yin kaifang naiduila shankou bian jing maoyi zhi pingshi” (An analysis of 
when China and India opened the border trade across the Nathu La Pass), Zhanglue anquanyanxi 
(Strategic and Security Analysis), no. 16, August 2006, pp.47-50.
97 Saurabh Shukla, “Beijing games,” India Today (internet edition), June 13, 2008.
98 The Indian Express, May 18, 2008, p. 1.
99 Press Trust o f  India, June 10, 2008.
170
The Indian side accused China of treading on India’s toes in Sikkim as the increase in 
the number of incursions into Sikkim was a relatively new feature. China had been 
indulging in border patrols to strengthen its claim over the disputed areas as well as 
hardening its posture in the problematical border talks to delineate the LAC. In 2007 
alone, India recorded well over 150 intrusions by Chinese troops in all three 
sectors —  western (Ladakh), middle (Uttarakhand, Himachal) and eastern (Sikkim, 
Arunachal).100 The total number of Chinese “incursions” into Sikkim increased to 
over 70 during the first half of 2008.101 Again, Indian officials had to respond with a 
clear statement. The Indian Minister of State for Defence, M. M. Pallam Raju, said 
that India would not “yield an inch” of territory and would “ stand its ground” on 
Sikkim. India, incidentally, also launched a fresh survey of the northern plateau in
109Sikkim to counter territorial claims by China.
In response to India’s argument that the Sikkim issue was a settled one and should not 
re-enter the agenda of border talks, the Chinese diplomats agreed that the issue of 
Sikkim sovereignty was a closed chapter, but that that was not the case of the Tibet- 
Sikkim border. According to the Chinese Consul General in Kolkata, Mao Siwei, the 
Sikkim-Tibet border had been settled in 1890 after Sikkim had been brought under 
British protection, but the border had been demarcated only on paper at that time; no 
demarcation on ground had taken place and, a result, there were differences of
i rnperception over where the border lay.
100 Ibid.
101 Editorial, “On the Hop,” The Times o f  India, June 23, 2008, p.20.
102 The Times o f  India, June 20, 2008, p. 16.
103 Ibid.
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The Indian side viewed China’s patrols along the disputed area with misgivings. This 
action was considered to be part of China’s overall strategy to increase psychological 
pressure on India, and keep India guessing regarding its agenda during the border 
talks. Indian Minister of State for Defence Raju also argued that it was China’s way of 
putting pressure on India to resolve the boundary disputes.104 It could also be argued 
that the Chinese intrusion was a type of misconduct against the diplomatic mechanism 
that had been set up precisely to avoid such boundary confrontations.
In fact, both India and China had been indulging in regular cross-border activities 
along the Sino-India border. India’s Army Chief, General Deepak Kapoor, had clearly 
pointed out the basic reason for the incursions, saying that China had a differing 
perception of the LAC and that “when we come up to their perception, we call it 
incursion, and likewise, they do.”105 It was inevitable that before clearly identifying 
the LAC, China and India would insist on terming each other’s presence in disputed 
areas such as Tawang as an “incursion”. Sometimes, troops would cross each other’s 
territory merely for practical reasons like taking the shorter and more easily route.106 
Not surprisingly, as a result, the Chinese also charged Indian military personnel with 
crossing the LAC into the Chinese side.107
In the present atmosphere, it is unlikely the LAC transgressions will develop into a 
major row since the two neighbours have a lot at stake, and because both sides are 
aware of the importance of maintaining border tranquillity and making sure there are 
no minor clashes in the border area. Even so, this kind of events has created a certain
104 The Times o f  India, June 20,2008, p. 16.
105 Ibid., March 7, 2008, p. 15.
106 The Indian Express, May 18, 2008, p. 1.
107 The Hindu (internet edition), August 6, 2003.
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amount o f tension. Repeated incursions into Sikkim along with other disputed areas 
by the Chinese have been a cause of particular concern to the Indian military 
establishment. From India’s point of view, China’s act was provocative and irritating. 
In some cases, the intrusions were extremely provocative. In April 2008, for example,
10RChinese troops came 12 kilometres inside Maja in Arunachal Pradesh. According to 
an Indian report, an incursion event along the LAC in the western sector of the India- 
China boundary at Demchok, northeast of Ladakh, nearly led to a major confrontation 
between the patrol teams of the two sides, but conflict was averted by the timely 
intervention of senior officers from an Indian patrol team.109
On the other hand, the Chinese side did not share India’s security concerns or take the 
this border skirmish as seriously. Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Wu Dawei suggested 
that not too much should be read into the intrusions taking place on the Sino-Indian 
border.110 Hu Shisheng, a researcher at the China Institute of Contemporary 
International Relations, also argued that it would be difficult for anyone to claim that 
there had been incursions when the border issue had not been settled.111
China has showed its ability to make use of the ill-defined LAC to disturb India. The 
absence of a mutually accepted LAC being physically demarcated on the ground and 
on military maps means China will continue to make use of these lacunae. In response, 
Indian officials were compelled to announce in public the plan to upgrade the 
strategically located helipads in Arunachal Pradesh, including the eight of these
108 Saurabh Shukla, “Beijing games "India Today (internet edition), June 13, 2008.
m lbid.
1,0 The Times o f  India, June 20, 2008, p. 16.
111 The Times o f  India (internet edition), September 19, 2008.
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110located in the Tawang district. The Indian side also sensed the need to reinforce its 
positions and construct pathways in the area.113 With no demarcation of the border, 
over three lakhs of Indian soldiers remain tied down in the disputed India-China 
border areas, which is a heavy drain on India’s economy.
Ownership o f  Tawang
Despite the conclusion of the Guidance Principles Agreement, China and India still 
found it difficult to reconcile the contradictory claims over the disputed areas. For 
example, not much headway was made in the talks over China’s claim to Tawang in 
Arunachal Pradesh. Securing Tawang forms part of China’s package proposal, 
although Tawang is lodged well to the south of the Indian side of the LAC. It is 
believed that China would recognise India’s sovereignty over Arunachal Pradesh 
while it would insist on taking over Tawang. However, the Chinese proposal is 
strategically unacceptable to India, as Tawang is close to the northeastern states and 
Bhutan.114
According to the Chinese, Tibet had traditionally exercised administrative control 
over the region. Moreover, Tawang was the capital of the Monyul district, which is 
the birthplace of the Sixth Dalai Lama. The Chinese argue that ceding the area to 
foreigners would “hurt the feelings of the Tibetans.” 115 Some analysts have also 
warned that China’s central government would fail to conciliate Tibetans if it were not 
able to repossess Tawang116
112 The Indian Express, April 10, 2008, p.9.
1,3 Ibid., May 18, 2008, p. 1.
114 The Times o f  India, June 4, 2008, p. 11.
115 Interview with a senior Chinese South Asian specialist, Beijing, March 26, 2001.
1,6 Liu Zhaohua, “Zhong Yin bian jie wenti zuotanhui jishi(shang)”(Proceedings of Forum on China-
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The other reason behind China’s intention to take over Tawang is more morally high- 
sounding. The Chinese side still argues that the McMahon Line was a product of 
British imperialism and, as such, is unacceptable; China should take over Tawang as a 
means to negate the McMahon line. Chinese scholars argue that, since neither the 
Qing Dynasty nor the Nationalist government recognised the McMahon Line, the
117present Chinese government cannot accept the legality of McMahon. In addition, 
the controversy about the McMahon line contributed to the 1962 border war. If the 
Chinese agrees to accept it as a de jure border, the question would be raised is why 
Beijing could not have done so before both sides slid down the slippery slope to war 
in the 1960s.
China’s frequent claims over the Tawang region of Arunachal Pradesh are an irritant 
to India. China has indicated that India should be prepared for “substantial 
adjustments” on the LAC, which refers to Beijing’s claim on Tawang as well as other 
adjustments in the disputed areas.118 To deal with the issue, in the Guiding Principles 
Agreement, India successfully secured the following significant clause: “In reaching a 
boundary settlement, the two sides shall safeguard the due interests of their settled 
populations in the border areas.” For India, the formulation implied that the status quo 
of the disputed populated areas, like Tawang or even the whole of Arunachal Pradesh, 
would be maintained. In other words, the Indian side considered that its concern has 
been addressed by these principles. 119 In return, the Indian side gave up its 
longstanding objection to the “package deal” approach.
India Border Issue ( I )), p.48.
Ibid., p.47.
118 The Indian Express, November 24, 2007, p.3.
119 The Hindu (internet edition), April 11, 2005.
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However, to India’s surprise, China showed little interest in sharing the same idea. 
Just days before Chinese President Hu Jintao’s state visit to India in November 2006, 
the Chinese Ambassador to India, Sun Yuxi, publicly declared that the whole 
Arunachal Pradesh, including Tawang, is China’s territory. India felt compelled to 
react promptly. Indian External Affairs Minister Pranab Mukheijee asserted that 
“Arunachal is an integral part of India” and it was made clear that “there could be no
190discussion on the issue.”
Although Sun Yuxi tried to undo the damage later by stating that the boundary 
question was open to negotiation, China’s subtle but firm attempts to bring back the 
issue of Arunachal Pradesh into public discourse ahead of Chinese President Hu 
Jintao’s visit to India created an uneasy atmosphere. Chinese Ambassador Sun Yuxi’s 
remark is, in fact, hardly surprising, as China had consistently refused to issue visas to 
the Arunachalese, including the denial of a visa to an IAS officer from that state, on
191the grounds that they did not need such documentation to visit “their own country”.
As a result, although Hu was the first Chinese president to have visited India in ten 
years, in the light of the controversy raised by the Chinese Ambassador, the two sides 
chose to skirt around the vexed border issue and focused on expanding bilateral 
relations in other areas, such as trade.
Again, these attempts were interpreted by India as part of China’s pressure tactics to 
push India for concessions on the border issue. The well-known Indian strategic
120 Saurabh Shukla, “Return of The Dragon,” India Today (internet edition), November 27, 2006.
121 Financial Times (internet edition), June 6, 2007; The Times o f  India, March 7, 2008, p. 15.
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analyst, Brahma Chellany, argued, “By putting forward its outrageous claim to 
Arunachal and more specifically to Tawang, Beijing has sought to place the onus on
19?India for achieving progress in the border talks.” Meanwhile, it was suggested that 
India should raise the Tibet issue to balance China’s manoeuvre of continuing to raise 
the issue of Arunachal. The contention was that “with the Western community 
backing the Tibetan cause, the issue will help India turn the tables on China, whose 
aggressive territorial demands have been nurtured by India’s acceptance of Tibet as a 
part of China.”123
In fact, some Chinese experts on Sino-Indian relations had already suggested that the 
Chinese side should avoid reiterating the previous tougher stand that Arunachal 
Pradesh is one part of China. Instead, they suggested, it is better to identify Arunachal 
Pradesh as a “disputed area” rather than emphasising it as part of China.124 This kind 
of thinking indicated that some Chinese were ready to take a more moderate approach 
to deal with the problem. That is, although Sun Yuxi’s statement on the ownership 
over Arunachal Pradesh did not differ from China’s official position, it was still seen 
as a step backward in the process of solving the border problem by the Indian side.
In addition to Sun Yuxi’s statement, there seemed to be a gradual hardening of China’s 
position on Arunachal Pradesh. The Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi conveyed 
to his Indian counterpart Pranab Mukheijee in Hamburg that the “mere presence” of 
populated areas would not affect Chinese claims on the boundary. Yang’s remarks
122 Saurabh Shukla, “Return of The Dragon”.
123 Ibid.
124 For example, see Chinese scholar Zhang Minqiu’s statement, in Liu Zhaohua, “Zhong Yin bian jie 
wenti zuotanhui jishi(shang)”(Proceedings of Forum on China-India Border Issue (II)), Nnyayanjiu 
(South Asian Studies), no.2,2007, p.39.
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surprised New Delhi, as the latter considered that the Guiding Principles Agreement 
clearly indicated the contrary.
China’s uncooperative posture pushed India to take some countermeasures. Days after 
his visit to China, Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh paid a rare visit to 
Arunachal Pradesh in January-February 2008. It was the first visit to the region by an 
Indian Prime Minister in nearly two decades. In addition to announcing various 
projects to develop the state, Manmohan Singh declared that Arunachal Pradesh was 
“our land of the rising sun”. The move was a clear political signal that India would 
not compromise on its claims in the area. Although the Prime Minister did not visit 
Tawang during his trip to Arunachal Pradesh, China in return protested about 
Manmohan Singh’s visit. Beijing communicated to New Delhi that it was not proper 
to make such comments at a time when the two countries were engaged in talks over 
the boundary question. New Delhi did not comply with Beijing’s demand. Indian 
President Pratibha Patil visited Tawang directly in April 2009 to show that Tawang is 
now part of India’s territory.
Although Arunachal Pradesh has remained a stumbling block to better ties between 
the two countries, the controversy is merely a seeming dispute. In fact, China’s main 
target on the eastern sector is less ambitious than in the 1960s. The main goal is to 
secure Tawang, rather than the whole of Arunachal Pradesh. Since China has abjured 
using Sikkim as a bargaining chip, it needs to accentuate the Arunachal Pradesh issue 
more. However, such tactics, leading to distmst, could spoil even the incremental 
gains of the border talks.
125 Financial Times (internet edition), June 6,2007.
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4.4 Conclusion
China and India paid a high price for the unresolved border dispute, which 
significantly undermined relations between the two countries through most of the 
Cold War era and even sparked a war in 1962. The event has become a major source 
of the “China threat” perceived by India.
Thanks to the dialogue meetings and CBMs along the border, the aim of avoiding 
unexpected conflicts and military clashes along the disputed areas has so far proved 
achievable. However, the task of clarifying the alignment of the LAC seems to be 
more difficult than initiating the CBMs. After Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee’s visit 
to China in 2003, the special representative meetings have emerged as the most 
important instrument by which China and India intend to address their border dispute.
After two decades of border talks, it could be supposed that both sides have 
acknowledged each other’s positions and concerns. However, in practice, the two 
sides do not give due consideration to each other’s interests and concerns. China and 
India have not reached a shared knowledge and understanding about the solution of 
the border problem. On the contrary, both sides view each other’s position on the 
border dispute with misgivings. That is, effect of Sino-Indian CBMs along the border 
is limited. The China-India CBMs has help maintain the peace and tranquillity along 
the border, but failed to alter the asymmetry of threat perceptions between the two 
countries.
As the two countries engage in talks to resolve the boundary question, the above 
account of the development of the Sino-Indian border talks shows that the border
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dispute, even if  far from being resolved, can be properly managed. While 
normalization remains a goal to be pursued by China and India, the border dispute is 
not the main sticking point. Unlike during the Cold War years, the boundary problem 
is less explosive in China-India relations. That is, the history enmity caused by border 
disputes is less influential now although it remains as a source of threat perceptions. 
Since China and India are still far from being “friendly partners,” this achievement 
deserves applause.
On the other handr although the special representative mechanism has generated 
remarkable results in initiating the Guidance Principles Agreement, its achievement 
on the alignment of the LAC and the framework of the boundary problem is still 
limited. The two sides need to expend a considerable effort in narrowing the 
differences in their own perception of territorial adjustment. The most basic issue 
remains that of whether the principles can help fashion a useful framework to solve 
the differences such as those regarding Tawang. Until this issue is effectively 
addressed, a final settlement of the disputed border will not be in sight.
Despite the fact that the border has remained peaceful and tranquil, this chapter has 
provided an alternative perspective on the China-India border problem by 
demonstrating that China’s and India’s concerns regarding the boundary issues are 
quite asymmetrical. Although both China and India are committed to the Special 
Representative process and desire an early solution, the two countries deal with the 
border problem with different levels of enthusiasm.
China feels more confident even though the boundary problem is far from being 
solved. Remarkably, unlike India, China has not considered the boundary problem as
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a serious challenge to its security. Therefore, China is content to wait for India to 
make a concession. China is sticking to the stance enunciated by the late Premier 
Zhou Enlai and the late leader Deng Xiaoping. China maintains its plea for a 
settlement based on mutual understanding and compromise and to shelve disputes for 
the time being if  they cannot be resolved in the short term. China actually wants the 
border situation stabilised, but is not eager to settle the boundary questions with India 
if both sides cannot come to terms. Hence, Beijing had no hesitation in cancelling the 
JWG meeting peremptorily as a response to India's nuclear tests in 1998.
India, on the other hand, is still haunted by the miserable memory of the 1962 border 
war, which has ever since been a source of its perception of China as a threat. Prime 
Minister Vajpayee’s letter to justify India’s nuclear tests clearly highlighted its 
concerns about the unsolved boundary problem. Since the border problem has given 
rise to concerns about .the threat posed by China, India is eager to solve the problem 
within a specific timetable in order to bring out an early completion to the process of 
clarification of the LAC. Compared to India’s eagerness to reach a border settlement, 
Beijing’s attitude is more conservative. The Chinese Assistant Foreign Minister, He 
Yafei, reiterated that “it takes time and strenuous efforts to reach the final
176agreement.” China does not anticipate any possibility of an early resolution and 
insists that “time and patience” are needed to reach a mutually acceptable resolution. 
There is no sign that India is ready to accept the “mutual accommodation” approach 
proposed by the Chinese. Both China and India still haggle over the gains in the 
disputed territory and continue to be insensitive to each other’s concerns. As the 
identification of the LAC becomes the priority of Sino-Indian border talks, the rift 
between China and India on the matter can hardly be ignored.
126 The Asian Age, May 23, 2008. p.5.
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China and India will both try to avoid confrontation along the border to the maximum 
extern possible; but the non-conffontationist approach is not enough to change the 
asymmetric threat perceptions of China and India. China could easily increase 
pressure on the Indian side by raising the issue of border disputes, while there is little 
left for India to use in any bargaining with China. As a result, the boundary problem 
has further exaggerated India’s “China threat” perception. An unsolved border 
problem would continue to drain India’s attention and resources. Without further 
momentum or compulsion, maintaining the status quo along the border seems to be 
the best that can be hoped for in the foreseeable future.
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Chapter 5: Regional Competition and Cooperation
Regional rivalry has been a feature of bilateral relations between China and India, 
both of which are regional powers. Continued hostility between India and Pakistan, 
China’s involvement in the India-Pakistan conflicts and competition between the 
superpowers had turned South Asia into a significant area for rivalry between China 
and India. In the wake of the 1962 border war and the Sino-Soviet split, China chose 
to ally itself with Pakistan to counter India, as well as to retain its influence in South 
Asia. Beijing thus became involved in India’s conflict with Pakistan. For example, in 
the 1965 Indo-Pakistani war, China threatened to open a second front against India by 
sending India a 72-hour ultimatum demanding that New Delhi demolish its military 
structures on China’s side of the border in the Tibet-Sikkim area.
As the competition for regional leadership remains a significant element in post-Cold 
War Sino-Indian relations, this chapter seeks to illustrate that the regional competition 
has contributed a culture of rivalry between China and India. Again, China-India 
interaction on regional issues also reveals India’s and China’s asymmetrical 
perceptions of threat. India tends to be mired in the traditional security concept that 
China is seeking to enclose India in a South Asian straitjacket by engaging other 
South Asian states. On the other hand, China appears comparatively confident about 
threats from India although it is mindful of India’s relations with ASEAN states and 
Japan.
Although their bilateral relations have largely improved over the decades, China and 
India still have misgivings about each other’s engagement with their neighbours. New 
Delhi keeps a wary eye on China’s ties with its South Asian neighbours, especially
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Pakistan. Both India and Pakistan saw threats emanating from each other as being 
major threats to their security. China and Pakistan still see each other as reliable 
partners whenever Indo-Pakistani relations sour. As a result, the China-Pakistan 
relationship, especially the Sino-Pakistani arms nexus, has been a cause of grave 
concern for India.
Beijing also encouraged other smaller South Asian states such as Nepal and 
Bangladesh to stand up to India’s aspiration to dominate South Asia. India’s 
longstanding conflicts or tensions with other South Asian states would drain and 
weaken India, and thus serve China’s strategic interests. From the Indian point of view, 
however, China had consistently sought to constrain Indian power and confine it 
essentially to the region of South Asia.
On the other hand, Beijing is greatly concerned that India is increasing its efforts to 
extend its influence eastward, and is acutely conscious of the ongoing deep 
engagement between India and other Asian states. While Beijing has quarrels with 
some of its marine neighbours over the South China Sea, New Delhi has embarked on 
a “Look East” policy to engage the ASEAN states of Japan, South Korea and Taiwan. 
In addition to the traditional antagonism in South Asia, Southeast Asia emerges as a 
new area of China-India competition.
In contrast to studies focusing on the competitive dimension of China-India relations, 
this chapter also studies the linkage between the perception of threat and cooperation. 
In fact, China and India have found reasons to cooperate even over regional issues. In 
addition to geopolitical competition, sub-regional economic cooperation and anti­
terrorism campaigns have been added to the agenda of Sino-Indian relations in recent
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years. These developments, along with China’s cautious neutrality towards the India- 
Pakistan conflict, have suggested that India and China are willing to scale down their 
enmity. Therefore, from a regional perspective, China and India are not always bound 
to clash in their journey from regional power to global power. They could act as both 
competitors and partners in regional affairs. Sino-Indian relations are a mixture of 
competition and cooperation, although the latter might be somewhat less noticeable.
5.1 The Pakistan Factor in China-India Relations
China’s Balanced Policy towards the India-Pakistan Conflict
Despite the improvement in Sino-Indian relations, note should be taken of India’s 
concern over the Chinese presence in other small South Asian states. Particularly, 
India has projected the China-Pakistan relationship as a strategic convergence against 
India, where Pakistan is acting as the proxy of China to counter Indian influence in 
the region.
The Sino-Pakistani strategic relationship has been in the making for the past several 
decades. China has characterised its ties with Pakistan as an “all-weather friendship”, 
'implying that the two countries have developed a strong partnership that has indeed 
weathered the changes that have taken place in the domestic and international 
scenario. In fact, China and Pakistan do not share a common political system, history, 
language, culture or religion. The two countries have even followed diametrically 
opposed foreign and security policies, as they joined opposite camps during the Cold 
War: Pakistan was a member of the US-led Southeast Asia Treaty Organization
1 See, for example, “Sino-Pak friendship flourishes in all weather,” Beijing Review, October 1-7,1990,
p. 10.
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(SEATO) in 1954 and the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) in 1955 while China 
showed support for the Soviet Union. These differences did not prevent China and 
Pakistan from forming a close relationship during the Cold War. This bilateral 
strategic partnership developed from the support shown to each other’s cause in the 
international community regarding military transfers and strategic cooperation. Since 
the two countries had overcome many differences to forge a close relationship, the 
Chinese side used to hail the Sino-Pakistani friendship as the epitome of the Five 
Principles of Peaceful Coexistence.
However, the Sino-Pakistan friendship during much of the past several decades could 
have best reflected the saying that “an enemy’s enemy is a friend”. That is, the Sino- 
Pakistan bonhomie was based upon their common bitter relationship with India. 
Compared to the increasingly warm Sino-Pakistani ties, Sino-Indian relations have 
often deteriorated due to the disputes over Tibet, the boundary problem, and so on. On 
the other hand, India and Pakistan have fought three wars and routinely exchanged 
fire across the Line of Control (LOC) since independence. Just as the Indian side has 
affirmed, the raison d’etre for the Sino-Pakistan friendship is their perception of India 
as a common enemy. Being Pakistan’s close ally, China has long been involved in a 
triangular relationship with Pakistan and India. Given the animosity between India 
and Pakistan, close ties between China and Pakistan have added to tensions between 
China and India.
With the end of the Cold War era, the Chinese used to insist that “while the world is
2 Anil Joseph Chandy, “India, China and Pakistan,” in Kanti Bajpai and Amitabh Mattoo eds., The 
Peacock and the Dragon: India-China Relations in the 21st Century (New Delhi: Har-Anand 
Publications Pvt Ltd., 2000), p.300.
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moving toward detente, regional conflicts are flaring up here and there.” South Asia 
is one such case. Particularly, there has been the palpable hostility between India and 
Pakistan in the region. The Chinese acknowledge that the Indo-Pakistani conflict is 
the major source of South Asian insecurity, and management of the India-Pakistan 
relationship has been treated as a key question for Chinese geo-strategic analysts.
Cold War architecture in South Asia was gradually rendered obsolete by the rapidly 
changing environment in the wake of the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan. The 
US and the. Soviet Union did not place the same emphasis on South Asian affairs as 
they had earlier. Other major powers also changed their attitude towards the regional 
conflicts in the post-CoId War era, as they tried to distance themselves somewhat 
from the India-Pakistan conflict and encourage India and Pakistan to solve the 
disputes in a peaceful manner.
The Chinese approach towards India-Pakistan conflicts in the post-Cold War era was 
determined by its motivation to launch economic development at home and supported 
by the change in the security environment in South Asia. China favours a stable 
peripheral environment conducive to domestic economic development. In a shift from 
unequivocal support to Pakistan, China no longer thinks India-Pakistan conflicts are 
in its interest and is now reluctant to side with either country in any dispute between 
them. Under the good neighbourly policy, China has sought to establish a more 
balanced relationship with India and Pakistan than the complicated equation in the 
past. As a result, Beijing has shifted from a focus on exploiting the India-Pakistan 
conflict to a policy designed to help stabilise the region. The Indian side has also
3 See, for example, Ren Xin, “1996: A Year o f Diplomatic Feats for China,” Beijing Review, January 6- 
12, 1997, p.9.
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observed that China has shown no inclination to meddle in India-Nepal relations 
while developing its relations with Nepal.4
The Chinese assessment of post-Cold War South Asia’s situation has further increased 
Beijing’s confidence to adopt such a balanced policy. During the Cold War, the US 
and the Soviet Union played out an intense rivalry as they backed opposing forces in 
South Asia. China had to keep a wary eye on the super powers’ activities in South 
Asia in terms of an encirclement of China. The Sino-Soviet rapprochement since the 
late 1980s and the collapse of the Soviet Union denoted that Beijing did not need to 
equip Pakistan to provide support against the Soviet-Indian alliance. With the advent 
o f the post-Cold War era, neither the US nor Russia considered South Asia as a 
strategically important area.5 The major powers all preferred a stable South Asia and 
were all unwilling to become involved in the conflicts between the South Asian states. 
Therefore, the rivalry between superpowers in South Asia and the Pakistan-American 
partnership against the Indo-Russian alliance ceased to exist. As a result, although the 
Chinese thought that India’s dominance in South Asia was further strengthened after 
the end of Cold War, they also considered that the new setting created an ambience for 
the improvement of Sino-Indian relations.6
There has been evidence of China’s desire to adopt a more balanced policy towards 
the India-Pakistan conflict. China concluded that it had more policy choices than 
siding Pakistan without reservation. For the first time, China publicly explicated its
4 A.G. Noorani, “On Sino-Indian relations,” Frontline (internet edition), January 5-18, 2002.
5 Ye Zicheng and others, Diyuan zhengzhi yu  Zhongguo waijiao (Geopolitics and China’s diplomacy)
(Beijing: Beijing chubanshe, 1997), p.437.
6 Yang Pingxue,“Leng Zhan hou de Nanya zhanlue xingshi” (“South Asian Strategic Posture in Post-
Cold War”), Nanyayanjiu jikan  (South Asian Studies Quarterly), no.l, 1996, p.3.
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South Asia policy in the post-Cold War era when Chinese President Jiang Zemin paid 
a state visit to South Asia in 1996. During his stay in Pakistan, Jiang delivered a 
speech to the Pakistani Senate, titled “Carrying Forward Generations of Friendly and 
Good-Neighbourly Relations and Working towards a Better Tomorrow for All”, 
proposing five principles for developing “long-term, stable and friendly ties” with 
South Asian states. China clearly conveyed the message that it hoped that the existing
o
disputes between neighbouring states could be solved by peaceful means. That is, 
China tried to make it clear that it would like to maintain and develop good- 
neighbourly relations with all countries in South Asia and preferred to see peace and 
stability in the region.
Despite admitting that there was strategic cooperation between China and Pakistan 
during the Cold War, in an attempt to relieve India’s concerns, Beijing now stresses 
that the Sino-Pakistani friendship has no animus against any third country. Beijing has 
emphasised that its relationship with Pakistan is “normal” and not directed towards 
India. This is a far cry from Beijing’s past stance when Chinese Foreign Ministry 
officials said that China’s military relationship with Pakistan was one of the closest 
China had with another country,9 or when Deng Xiaoping termed Pakistan as “a 
special friend” and identified China-Pakistani relations as being “unusual”.10
7 The principles are (1) expanding contacts and deepening traditional friendship, (2) respecting each
other and fostering friendship for generations to come, (3) pursuing mutual benefit and promoting 
common development, (4) seeking common ground and minimising differences, and (5) seeking 
unity and cooperation and working together for a better future. See Renmin Ribao, December 3,
1996, p.l.
8 Wang Taiping and others, eds., Xin Zhongguo waijiao wushi nian (50 years of new China’s
diplomacy) (Beijing: Beijing chubanshe, 1999), p.351.
9 Mary Lee, “Two-way street for arms: Pakistan buys from China but also sells what China cannot get,”
Far Eastern Economic Review, December 12, 1985, p.25.
10 Wang Taiping and others, Xin Zhongguo waijiao wushi nian, p.342.
189
This more balanced policy also indicated that China seemed to think it possible to 
develop a parallel close relationship with both India and Pakistan. In order not to 
irritate Pakistan, China meanwhile also stressed that the improvement of Sino-Indian 
relations would not be to the detriment of a third party, nor would it affect China’s 
existing friendly relations with other countries.11 The then Chinese Foreign Minister 
Tang Jiaxuan asserted that the Sino-Indian rapprochement would not come in the way 
of strengthening the time-tested relations with Pakistan. He argued, “Sino-India 
relations are Sino-India relations and Sino-Pakistan relations are Sino-Pakistan 
relations. Between China and Pakistan, we enjoy a profound and traditional 
friendship.”12 It was clear that China wanted to engage with India without disturbing 
the friendly ties between China and Pakistan.
The subsequent high level visits by Chinese leaders to the region indicated the
continuation of Beijing’s strategy of maintaining a diplomatic balance in its dealings
1 ^with South Asian countries. China has since repeated its desire to enhance the scope 
of a “constructive cooperative partnership” with India. At the same time, China has 
also signalled its intention of remaining engaged with Pakistan.
China’s Shift on the Kashmir Dispute
Despite the South Asia policy proclamation, China’s position towards the Kashmir 
issue probably best exemplifies the change of its stance towards the India-Pakistan 
conflict. Both India and Pakistan claim sovereignty over the whole of Kashmir, and
11 Sino-Indian Joint Communique, December 16, 1991.
12 The Hindu (internet edition), July 25, 2000, p. 13.
13 See for example, Fang Tien-sze, “China aims to balance relations in South Asia,” Taipei Times, April 
27, 2005, p.8.
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have fought two wars for the region since independence. For most of the time, 
Pakistan has insisted that the future of Kashmir should be decided by plebiscite. 
Aware of its weakness vis-a-vis India, Pakistan has also endeavoured to 
internationalise the Kashmir issue. In contrast, India has opposed holding a plebiscite 
in Kashmir mostly because it is worried the Muslim-majority region might not favour 
staying within the Hindu-majority Indian Union. India’s position has been that the 
Kashmir issue should be resolved in the spirit of the Simla Agreement of 1972, under 
which India and Pakistan agreed to resolve outstanding issues through bilateral talks.
China has had a role to play in the Kashmir issue because of its alliance relationship 
with Pakistan, and also because it secured a piece of Kashmir under the 1963 Sino- 
Pakistan border treaty. Being the close ally of Pakistan, China openly backed 
Pakistan’s claim to all of Kashmir after Sino-Indian relations deteriorated. However, 
contrary to the traditional impression, China has not always supported Pakistan’s 
stance over Kashmir. Even Chinese scholars have admitted that China’s position over 
the Kashmir dispute has varied over the years.14
Ever since the late 1980s, Beijing has hoped to be able to approach the Kashmir issue 
on its own merits. In addition, in recent years, it has appeared to avoid taking sides in 
tune with increasingly warm relations with India. After the end of the Cold War, in 
1994, China even pressured Pakistan to withdraw a resolution, tabled at the UN 
Human Rights Commission in Geneva, condemning India for human rights violations 
in Kashmir.
14 Yuan Di, “Zhongguo dui Nanya anquan de yingxiang ji qi zhiyue yinsu — yi Yin Ba Kajier chongtu 
weili” (China’s influence on the security of South Asia and factors restricting China’s influence—  a 
study of the case o f the Kargil Conflict between India and Pakistan), Nanya yanjiu jikan, no.3, 2001, 
pp-8-9.
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Serious nationalist unrest in Xinjiang has also contributed to alter China’s attitude 
towards the Kashmir issue. Since 1980, China has distanced itself from its support for 
Pakistan’s position to hold a plebiscite to decide the future of Kashmir. Beijing also 
declines to intervene in the Kashmir issue by emphasizing the need for New Delhi and 
Islamabad to resolve the problem through dialogue. China’s fear is that an 
independent state of Kashmir would inspire Muslim separatists in Xinjiang to seek 
independence.15
Regarding the Kashmir issue, China’s argument is that the question is a legacy from 
the British Empire, and it involves conflicting territorial claims, religion, ethnicity and 
other complex factors. China has echoed Pakistan’s stand that the sovereignty of 
Kashmir has not been defined and that it is the “core issue” in India-Pakistan 
relations,16 in contrast to the Indian position that Kashmir has always been a part of 
India. However, Beijing has also agreed that the dispute is steeped in history and India 
and Pakistan should seek an effective solution to the Kashmir problem through 
peaceful dialogue, implying the issue should be decided by India and Pakistan 
bilaterally. This position is against Pakistan’s hope to internationalise the Kashmir 
issue, and meets India’s demands. The Chinese referred to the UN Resolution on
17Kashmir in the context of solving the problem after India’s nuclear tests of 1998, but 
then went back to insisting that a peaceful negotiated settlement between India and 
Pakistan is needed.
15 Rosemary Foot, “Chinese-Indian relations and the process o f building confidence implications for 
the Asia-Pacific,” The Pacific Review, vol.9, no.l, 1996, p.67.
16 Zhao Bole, Dangdai Nanya guoji guanxi (Contemporary international relations in South Asia) 
(Beijing: Zhongguo shehui kexue chubanshe, 2003), p.85.
17 Subramanian Swamy, India's China Perspective (Delhi: Konark Publishers Pvt. Ltd., 2001), p.l 19.
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Clearly, Beijing is determined to insulate itself from the ups and downs of Indo- 
Pakistani ties, such as the Kashmir dispute, while improving its relations with both 
New Delhi and Islamabad. However, Indo-Pakistan tension became a serious concern 
for China’s strategic analysts, who acknowledged that dealing with India-Pakistan 
conflicts would be a key question regarding China’s western geo-political strategy and 
frontier security.18 The Kargil crisis of 1999, the worst military encounter between 
India and Pakistan since the third Indo-Pakistani war, put China’s balanced approach 
to the test.19
Although Pakistani leaders approached Beijing for support, China appeared to have 
taken a position of cautious neutrality and did not give any special diplomatic favours 
to Pakistan.20 The Chinese repeatedly stated the need for restraint by both India and 
Pakistan, and the importance of resolving the problem through peaceful negotiations. 
In the view of the Indians, although China was unwilling to identify Pakistan as the 
aggressor, it did not lend any significant diplomatic support to Pakistan in the Kargil 
crisis.21 This balanced posture was due to China’s mounting concern about a major 
military conflict between India and Pakistan. The former Chinese Ambassador to 
India, Cheng Ruisheng, even claimed that the Chinese “have a traditional friendship
18 Ye Zicheng and others, Diyuan zhengzhiyu Zhongguo waijiao, p.442.
19 The Kargil crisis erupted in early May 1999 when the Indian Army discovered the infiltration of 
Islamic militants into the northern parts of Indian Kashmir. The event caused serious concern for 
India, as the militants had occupied certain strategic positions, from which these Pakistani forces 
were able to disconnect India’s national highway to the northern regions. The Indian side accused 
Pakistan of sponsoring the militant infiltrators. The fighting broke out as the Indian government was 
determined to evict the infiltrators by force. The Kargil conflict soon attracted international attention 
as both India and Pakistan had been recently equipped with nuclear weapons after the overt nuclear 
tests in 1998.
20 See Jasjit Singh, “Pakistan’s Fourth War,” Strategic Analysis, vol.23, no.5, August 1999, p.694;
Yuan Di, “Zhongguo dui Nanya anquan de yingxiang ji qi zhiyue yinsu,” pp.9-10.
21 C. Raja Mohan, “China sticking to cautious neutrality?” The Hindu, July 1, 1999, p.l 1.
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99with Pakistan, but China’s policy is not to side with Pakistan on the Kashmir issue.” 
That is, China refused to give Pakistan “carte blanche”. Needless to say, India 
appreciated the way Beijing handled the Kashmir issue.
Beijing’s position in the Kargil crisis confirmed the trend that Beijing was determined 
to follow, specifically, a calibrated balanced policy in navigating the turbulence 
arising from Indo-Pakistani relations. China’s moderate posture towards the India- 
Pakistan conflict altered the traditional impression of Chinese support for Pakistan 
and. gave. New Delhi some relief in its dealings with Islamabad. In fact, it was widely 
thought that Beijing showed a tendency to support New Delhi when it urged India and 
Pakistan to respect the sanctity of the Line of Control (LOC) in Kashmir. While 
cherishing the traditional China-Pakistan friendship, it seemed China had no intention 
of being dragged into a war in its doorstep.
India-Pakistan tension flared up again after India’s Parliament was attacked by 
terrorists in December 2001, an action that India said Pakistan had masterminded. 
India urged Pakistan to take the responsibility for reining in the extreme Islamic 
groups that planned the transgression. Both sides then deployed hundreds of 
thousands of troops along the border. Despite Pakistan’s claim of having secured 
China’s support, Beijing still adopted an even-handed policy and called upon India 
and Pakistan to exercise restraint.
In addition to the demonstrated neutrality in the latest India-Pakistan confrontation, 
another significant development has been Beijing’s demonstration of its desire to play 
a more positive role to damp down the India-Pakistan conflict, rather than keeping the
22 Agence France Presse, June 16, 1999.
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India-Pakistan tension at a distance. In fact, Pakistan has long appealed to China to 
play an “active role” in South Asia to maintain a regional strategic balance and to 
settle the Kashmir issue.23 During Chinese Premier Zhu Rongji’s visit to India in 
January 2002, however, Beijing assured New Delhi that China had neither any 
intention of mediating between India and Pakistan nor would it play any mediatory 
role between them.24
Nonetheless, as the tension between India and Pakistan came to a high point and the 
international community was. concerned that the India-Pakistan conflict might escalate 
into a nuclear confrontation, China donned the unfamiliar mantle of peace-maker. 
Along with major powers, such as the US and Russia, China pursued its own 
diplomacy to defuse the tension, trying to leverage its alliance with Pakistan and a 
burgeoning relationship with India to lessen the possibilities of a potential escalation. 
Chinese Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan held telephone conversations with both his 
Indian and Pakistani counterparts to express China’s concerns over the tensions. Tang
also urged the two countries to show restraint and resolve their disputes through
*)(\dialogue in a bid to ease tensions in South Asia as quickly as possible. Later, 
Chinese President Jiang Zemin held separate meetings with Indian Prime Minister 
Atal Bihari Vajpayee and Pakistani leader General Pervez Musharraf in Almaty, 
Kazakhstan, on the sidelines of the summit meeting of the Conference on Interaction
97and Confidence-Building Measures in Asia (CICA) to ease the tense stand-off. The
23 See, for example, The Hindu (internet edition), May 21, 2001; The Hindu (internet edition), 
December 22,2001.
24 The Hindu (internet edition), January 14, 2002.
25 Charles Hutzler, “In Kashmir, China Tries Its Hand at Peacemaking,” Wall Street Journal (Eastern 
edition), June 7, 2002, p.A8.
26 See Renmin Ribao, January 1, 2002, p.2; May 25,2002, p.4.
27 Renmin Ribao, June 7, 2002, p.4.
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Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesmen also repeatedly emphasised that China was 
playing a positive role to contribute to peace between India and Pakistan.
Again, China tried to defuse India-Pakistan tensions following the 2008 Mumbai 
terrorist attack by asking India to share the evidence and to resume its dialogue with 
Pakistan. China sent its Vice Foreign Minister, He Yafei, as special envoy to Pakistan 
on December 29, 2008. He Yafei wanted to visit New Delhi from Islamabad directly, 
but the offer was rejected by New Delhi although it was agreed that he could visit 
New Delhi later on January 5, 2009. Pakistani Foreign Minister Shah Mahmood 
Qureshi even publicly claimed that Pakistan had given China a “blank cheque” to 
negotiate with India.
The fresh attempts by Beijing to help India and Pakistan resolve the crisis underscore 
China’s growing concerns that Beijing might be being drawn unwillingly into an 
Indian-Pakistani war although it does not want to take sides in the India-Pakistan 
confrontation. China has acknowledged that its security interests lie in maintaining a 
peaceful environment and to achieve that end it will take an active role. Just as the 
Chinese South Asia analyst Shen Dingli said, “China needs to send a message: For 
my own security I will intervene.”29 Chinese Assistant Foreign Minister Wang Yi has 
also been quoted as saying that the Kashmir problem has long been at a stalemate, and 
“the only way out is the peaceful settlement with help from the international 
community.”30
China’s gradual shift from neutrality in the Kashmir dispute to the encouragement of
28 The Times o f  India, January 23, 2009, p.9.
29 J. Mohan Malik, “Dragon's shadow,” The Pioneer (internet edition), July 23, 2002.
30 Cited from Swamy, India’s China Perspective (Delhi: Konark Publishers Pvt. Ltd., 2001), p. 120.
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an Indo-Pakistani dialogue has met with resistance from India, mainly because the 
Indian side regards China as part of the problem rather than part of the solution.31 
Although New Delhi welcomes pressure by the international community on 
Islamabad to stop Pakistan abetting “cross-border” terrorism, it has firmly ruled out 
any third-party mediation in Indo-Pakistani affairs, let alone mediation by China. 
Considering the enduring and traditional friendship between China and Pakistan, it is 
also difficult for India to believe that China will be an objective mediator. It is no 
secret that China still shows a preference for Pakistan. For example, the Chinese side 
interpreted India’s nuclear tests of 1998 as an expansionist and hegemonic policy, but 
expressed sympathy for Pakistan, agreeing that it was compelled to conduct the 
nuclear tests and missile tests.32 Thus, India would prefer Beijing to keep its distance 
from India-Pakistan tensions. In an indication of India’s unhappiness with China’s 
public involvement in the India-Pakistan conflict, India dismissed Chinese calls for 
restraint and termed them “ inadequate’, arguing that they should be directed at 
Pakistan.33 New Delhi has reiterated that the international community should urge 
Pakistan to stop engaging in “cross-border” terrorism and a proxy war in Indian- 
administered Kashmir, instead of asking India to hold a dialogue with Pakistan.
From the Indian perspective, any comment that falls short of actual Chinese support 
for Pakistan’s posture is a positive development and to be welcomed. However, 
China’s neutrality is not enough to please India, and will incur criticism from Pakistan. 
It is considered that China’s efforts to adopt a more balanced position with respect to
31 Waheguru Pal Singh Sidhu and Jing-dong Yuan, China and India: Cooperation or Conflict? (New 
Delhi: India Research Press, 2003), p.65.
32 See Li Ping’s interview with the Chinese press, in Renmin Ribao, April 19, 1999, p.6.
33 The Times o f  India (internet edition), December 27, 2001.
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the India-Pakistan conflict are an exhibition of “absolute flexibility” (<quart biari)?4 
Contrary to China’s expectations, the Indian side still distrusts China’s role, 
considering the latter ready to intervene in any India-Pakistan conflicts. As a result, 
China’s nuanced stance towards the India-Pakistan dispute has not resulted in any 
improvement in Sino-Indian relations.
Sino-Pakistani Military Ties
Although the Indian side acknowledged China’s changing policy towards the India- 
Pakistan conflict, the Pakistan factor in the Sino-Indian interactions has not been 
erased completely as a result of China’s even-handed approach to India-Pakistan 
conflicts. Thus, India is still very concerned with China’s intention of forging 
strategic ties with Pakistan and other South Asian states. From the Indian perspective, 
the Sino-Pakistani arms nexus is one of the main unresolved problems between India 
and Pakistan. The basic question that needs to be answered is why China is risking the 
burgeoning Sino-Indian friendship by arming Pakistan whilst still claiming to adopt a 
more balanced South Asia policy.
Although China has been trying to further relations with Pakistan in other fields, such 
as more cooperation in the economic field,35 the military tie remains an important 
element of China-Pakistan relations. The military establishment in China has claimed 
that China’s military sales to Pakistan are based on the profit motive and are not a 
move against India. The Chinese have even argued that China would sell military
34 Anil Joseph Chandy, “India, China and Pakistan,” in Kanti Bajpai and Amitabh Mattoo eds., The 
Peacock and the Dragon: India-China Relations in the 21st Century (New Delhi: Har-Anand 
Publications Pvt Ltd. 2000), pp.330-331.
35 Zhao Bole, Dangdai Nanya guoji guanxi (Contemporary international relations in South Asia), p.340.
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equipment to India were India to request it.
In fact, even though China has offered Pakistan military assistance, India traditionally 
enjoys better access to conventional weaponry from Russia. The US, since the Bush 
administration, has also given New Delhi access to America’s military transfer, which 
was denied for most of the Cold War. That is, the military balance is still in favour 
of India.
However,, whether China’s military equipment could significantly exacerbate the 
military imbalance is irrelevant; the key factor is how the Indian side interprets 
China’s intention. India’s view is that Beijing has consciously sought to develop 
military links with countries in its neighbourhood so as to deny India dominance in 
the sub-continent. The Indian side argues that the most obvious rationale for China to 
arm Pakistan is to imbue Pakistan with strategic parity with India.38 Given the tension 
between India and Pakistan, the Indian side naturally sees the military transfer as a 
serious concern and as having a direct and negative bearing on India’s national 
security environment. Particularly, Sino-Pakistani military cooperation in the fields of 
nuclear and conventional missiles has caused grave concern for India’s security.
In order to address these concerns, India has continually raised the issue of missile 
transfers from China to Pakistan during its interactions with China. For example, 
Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee has expressed concern over the military nexus 
between China and Pakistan, arguing that “all weapons and missiles it (Pakistan)
36 Zhongguo shibao (China Times) (internet edition), December 1, 1999.
37 Andrew C. Winner and Toshi Yoshihara, “India and Pakistan at the Edge,” Survival, vol.44, no.3, 
Autumn 2002, p.71.
38 Chandy, “India, China and Pakistan,” p.327.
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receive[s] are aimed at India.” He added that “wherever our neighbour Pakistan gets 
its arms from, we keep telling those (supplier) nations that whatever be your intention, 
these weapons, experience has shown, have been used against us.”40 Indian External 
Affairs Minister Yaswant Sinha said, regarding China’s military transfer to Pakistan, 
that India expected China to show greater sensitivity to India’s security concerns.41 It 
even urged China to reconsider its support for Pakistan’s nuclear and missile 
programmes to reciprocate New Delhi’s moves to back Beijing’s position on Taiwan 
or Tibet issues.
However, it appears that Beijing did not take India’s anxiety seriously. Maintaining 
that the military supply programme and cooperation between China and Pakistan was 
routine in nature and well within international norms and international treaty 
obligations, Beijing does not agree that its military transfer to Pakistan would break 
regional balances, or undermine peace and tranquillity in the region. Furthermore, 
Beijing justified its arms transfer to Pakistan on the basis that military relations are 
part of the normal gamut of state-state relations and that, as far as the Chinese are 
concerned, every sovereign, independent country has the right to acquire those 
materials it deems necessary for its defence, and China as a sovereign country also 
has the right to sell such material. Defending Beijing’s stance on China-Pakistan 
military cooperation, the Chairman of the Standing Committee of the National 
People’s Congress, Li Peng, said, “Normal military trade is undoubtedly part of the 
normal state-to-state relations. India enjoys similar cooperation with other countries 
as well.”42 The then Chinese Foreign Minister, Tang Jiaxuan, also said that the Sino-
39 The Hindu (internet edition), June 14, 1998.
40 The Hindu (internet edition), January 16,2001.
41 Hindustan Times (internet edition), November 23, 2003.
42 See Li Peng’s interview, in The Hindu (internet edition), January 14, 2001.
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Pakistani military cooperation was a normal military cooperation based on normal 
state-to-state relations, and was not directed against any third party or country.43 
Despite protests from India, China argued that “it is inappropriate and unnecessary to 
exaggerate or worry about China-Pakistan military relations.”44 China plays down the 
significance of China-Pakistan defence cooperation and pledges its commitment to 
continuing such exchanges with Pakistan.
As a result, while making efforts to improve relations with India, China did not scale 
down, its military cooperation with Pakistan to meet India’s demands. The Indian side 
observed, for example, that within two years of the mould-breaking visit of Rajiv 
Gandhi to China in December 1988, China supplied short-range M -ll missiles to 
Pakistan. Likewise, the Chinese moved ahead with the supply of medium-range M-9 
missiles and ring magnets for Pakistan’s nuclear weapons programme after Indian 
Prime Minister Narasimha Rao’s visit to China in 1993.45 CIA reports also made the 
point that continued contact between China and Pakistan enabled Pakistan to build up 
its nuclear and missile arsenal while China was strengthening relations with India. 
Chinese entity assistance has helped Pakistan to have moved toward serial production 
of solid-propellant short-range ballistic missile (SRBMS), such as the Shaheen-I and 
Haider-I, and has supported Pakistan’s MRBMs46 That is why Indian Defence 
Minister George Fernandes accused China of being the “mother” of Ghauri, 
Pakistan’s Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile (IRBM).47 In mid-January 2002, 
China transferred the first 10 of 40 Chinese-made F-7PG fighter aircraft to Pakistan
43 Renmin Ribao (internet edition), July 22, 2000.
44 Chinese leader Li Peng’s statement, in “China will improve ties with India: Li Peng,” The Hindu 
(internet edition), January 14,2001.
45 G. Parthasarathy, “The growing Sino-Pakistan nexus,” The Pioneer (internet edition), May 24, 2001.
46 The Hindu (internet edition), September 9, 2001; The Pioneer (internet edition), January 10, 2003.
47 Associated Press, April 9, 1998.
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during the period of the India-Pakistan military stand-off, though Beijing 
diplomatically conducted a balanced policy towards India and Pakistan.
Despite India’s concerns and dissatisfaction, China is not ready to cut its military 
transfer and cooperation with Pakistan to court India. While trying to improve 
relations with India, China is very reluctant to share India’s apprehension regarding 
China-Pakistan relations and insists that there is nothing wrong with it consistently 
providing Pakistan with wide-ranging assistance regarding arms. Chinese Defence 
Minister General Chi Haotian expounded, “China and Pakistan are good neighbours, 
friends and partners sharing weal and woe, and the relations between the two armed
* * . / I f iforces are the manifestation of a bilateral all-weather friendship.’ To India, China’s 
military tie with Pakistan is far more significant than the “normal” .military ties 
between other countries. Despite China’s protestations of innocence, China’s transfer 
of arms and military expertise to Pakistan has been perceived as hostile by India and 
perhaps has encouraged India to revise its security agenda towards China. Since it is 
impossible for India to accept China’s claim that China’s military transfer to Pakistan 
is normal and has nothing to with regional balance, these different perceptions 
constitute a difficulty in Sino-Indian relations.
Renewed China-Pakistan Strategic Relations
Beijing does not treat India as an immediate enemy and it has tried to broaden the 
bilateral cooperation; as a result, Pakistan might lose some of its strategic value as a 
pawn to be used in the game of strategy against India; the nature of Sino-Pakistani 
relations is certainly not of the same strategic genre as it was in the Cold War.
48 The Times o f  India (internet edition), July 25, 2001.
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However, it would be too naive to conclude that India and China are becoming friends 
and that China no longer needs Pakistan. Chinese scholars still consider that China 
has more common interests with Pakistan than with India.49 Pakistan remains a loyal 
friend in the region to counterbalance a potential Indian challenge to Chinese 
preponderance in Asia. China will not neglect its traditional friendship with Islamabad 
while trying to improve relations with India.
In addition to military transfers, there is no difficulty finding examples to illustrate the 
strategic bonhomie between China and Pakistan even in recent years. For example, 
while India was working hard in the international community to isolate General 
Pervez Musharraf’s military regime after he took over the reins of power following a 
coup on October 12r 1999, China became the first non-Islamic country to roll out the 
red carpet for the controversial general. Ignoring international suspicion about the 
legitimacy of the military regime, Beijing offered - support to Islamabad on the 
grounds that “the internal affairs of a country should and must be handled by its own 
people, which is not only the core of the Five Principles of Coexistence, but also a 
basic policy China has steadfastly pursued and carried out in handling relations 
between different countries.”50 It also reminded the world that Chinese Premier Li 
Peng visited Pakistan in November 1989, the first visit abroad by a senior Chinese 
leader after the 1989 Tiananmen incident. Beijing assured the Pakistan leader that “no 
matter what changes occur internationally or domestically, the Chinese government 
will continue to foster its comprehensive partnership with Pakistan.”51
49 Yan Xuetong, “Zhongguo jueqi de guoji anquan huanjing” (The international security environment 
for China’s rise) in Yan Xuetong, Wang Zaibang, Li Zhongcheng, Hou Ruoshi, Zhongguo jueqi: 
Guoji huanjingpinggu (China Rises: an assessment o f international environment )(Tianjin: Tianjin 
renmin chubanshe, 1998), pp.235-236.
50 Renmin Ribao, January 18, 2000, p. 1.
51 See Chinese Premier Zhu Rongji’s and Chinese President Jiang Zemin’s statements, in Renmin
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As China-India relations deteriorated, Pakistan soon regained its significance vis-a-vis 
India. For example, in order to deal with the new strategic situation, India used the 
“China threat” as the justification for conducting tests on its nuclear devices. In 
response, some Chinese scholars bluntly suggested that China should strengthen the 
all-round cooperation with Pakistan in the fields of political, economic and military
c j  ^
affairs. From the point of view of the Chinese, India is a power with hegemonic 
ambition while Pakistan is a reliable foothold in South Asia. Given the convergence 
of views between China and Pakistan regarding opposition to India’s ‘hegemonism’, 
there are strong reasons on both sides for maintaining a durable and practical 
relationship. In other words, Sino-Pakistani relations could be a counterweight to 
India’s supremacy in the region.
In fact, even though China might not need the Sino-Pakistani friendship as a bulwark 
against India as it did in the Cold War era, Beijing can find other reasons to maintain 
its special relationship with Pakistan, a link that includes the transfer of arms. For 
example, a close relationship with Pakistan would give Beijing more diplomatic and 
strategic angles to bring into play in South Asia. During Chinese Premier Zhu 
Rongji’s visit to Pakistan in May 2001, China agreed to support Pakistan in its 
decision to build the strategically located Gwadar port and coastal highway projects 
leading to the Iranian border. As a deliberate gesture of support, China held the first 
ever joint marine exercise with Pakistan, code-named Dolphin 0310, on October 23, 
2003, just three weeks before the first China-India marine exercise. In fact, the 
decision to hold the China-India joint exercise had been made much earlier, during
Ribao, January18, 2000, p .l, and January 19, 2000, p .l.
52 Liu Xuecheng, “shiji zhi jiao de da guo Nanya zhengce” (“Great Nations' Policies Towards South
Asia at the Turn of Centuries”), Nanya yanjiu (South Asian Studies), no.2, 1999, p.28.
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Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee’s visit to China in June 2003. The sequence of the 
joint exercises reflected China’s desire to acknowledge friendship with Pakistan as a 
strategic priority instead of friendship with India, and to underscore China’s strategic 
bonhomie with Pakistan on the South Asian scene. Pakistan is also an important 
friend in the Islamic world for China,53 and has influence on the Xinjiang problem.54 
Relations with India cannot offer China the same benefits.
Beijing also has to reassess its strategic proximity to Pakistan in the context of the US 
presence in the wake of the war against terror. The war against terrorism in 
Afghanistan has brought US troops right to China’s western doorstep. The US had 
requested that Pakistan allow it to establish a military base and a no-fly zone in south­
western Pakistan for a ten-year period.55 The Chinese appeared to be uncomfortable 
with the US military presence in Central Asian states and Pakistan. China was 
reported to have threatened to pull out of the project to develop the Gwadar port as a 
fully fledged military base if Islamabad allowed the US to access the airports at 
Jacobabad and Pasni and to set up some listening posts in the Northern Areas to 
monitor any nuclear or military activities in the region.56 As early as the late 1950s, 
the Chinese had feared that the US might use Pakistan as a base for operations against
cn
Tibet and Xinjiang. China definitely does not want Pakistan becoming a pawn to be 
used against China. Feeling threatened by the emergence of closer strategic bonds 
between Washington and the region, China is attempting to avoid the formation of an 
anti-China stronghold in the region by the US and its coalition partners. It is logical
53 Zhao Bole, Dangdai Nanya guoji guanxi, p.340.
54 Yan Xuetong, “Zhongguo jueqi de guoji anquan huanjing,” p.220.
55 “India to Stomach US Base in Pakistan,” Stratfor, 24 January 2002, at <www.stratfor.com/premium/ 
<www.stratfor.com/premium/analysis view.php?ID5 202923>.
56 The Times o f  India (internet edition), January 8,2002.
57 Dawa Norbu, “Tibet in Sino-Indian Relations: The Centrality of Marginality,” Asian Survey, vol. 
XXXVII, no. 11, November 1997, p. 1086.
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that Beijing should embrace Pakistan even more tightly despite its new relationship 
with India.
The Indian side has sensed that China is making special efforts to reach out to
CO
Pakistan on account o f the US presence in the region. However, for India, even 
though China claims the renewed Sino-Pakistan strategic relations are not directed 
against India, a close relationship between two unfriendly neighbours can only bring 
trouble. India feels that it has been being hemmed in by China and Pakistan. For the 
sake of its own security, the Indian side has sensed the need to separate China and 
Pakistan to prevent a joint China-Pakistan attack. Contrary to China’s unilateral 
expectations and understanding, India is still very concerned by China-Pakistan 
relations, and treats the issue of Sino-Pakistan military cooperation as the “litmus 
test” of China’s sincerity.59
China’s position of neutrality towards India-Pakistan conflicts has been in evidence 
since the late 1980s, as it has expressed its hopes that India and Pakistan will maintain 
stable relations in the interests of regional security. Indeed, China’s more balanced 
policy towards India and Pakistan and its moderate position over the Kashmir dispute 
has been much to India’s relief. However, these two examples of non-partisanship are 
not enough to dispel India’s concerns. The mutual distrust generated by China’s 
special relationship with Pakistan has not ceased to be a factor just because of the 
dismantling of the Cold War structure or China’s more balanced policy towards South 
Asia.
58 The Hindu (internet edition), January 5, 2002.
59 Sidhu and Yuan, China and India: Cooperation or Conflict?, p. 63.
206
China has been self-righteous in assessing the impact of Sino-Pakistani military 
cooperation upon India’s security. China even concludes that it has already done much 
to remove the Pakistan factor from the normalisation of Sino-Indian relations.60 
However, the Chinese see India’s uneasiness about Sino-Pakistan relations as India’s 
“haunted mind”.61 Although Beijing does not want to see its relations with Pakistan 
derail the process of engaging India, it is not ready to give up an “all weather” 
friendship to please India.
In order to stabilise its peripheral environment, China has been trying to contribute to 
the establishment of peaceful relations between India and Pakistan, but the Indian side 
expected China to use its influence to persuade Islamabad to abandon adventurism 
rather than asking both sides to show restraint. It has also been made clear that 
differences remain unresolved with regard to India’s suspicions about China’s alleged 
contributions to Pakistan’s nuclear weapon and ballistic missile programmes. 
Although China has denied it transferred to Pakistan nuclear weapons technology and 
long-range missiles, to a large extent, the Indian side holds China responsible for the 
nuclear proliferation and arms race in South Asia. The balance between the desire to 
see a stable environment in South Asia and to maintain strategic ties with Pakistan is a 
delicate situation for Beijing. China tends to attribute significance to these two 
potentially competing goals depending on its view of the strategic situation in the 
region. It is likely that China will continue to transfer arms to Pakistan despite India’s 
protests.
It also appears that China has failed to convince India of the benevolent nature of
m Ibid., p.340.
61 Zhang Minqiu, Zhongyin guanxiyanjiu (1947-2003) (Sino-Indian Relations: 1947-2003) (Beijing: 
Peking University Press, 2004), p.334.
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Sino-Pakistan ties and has failed to marginalize the Pakistan factor in Sino-Indian 
relations as it had hoped. New Delhi still perceives an encirclement due to the 
collaboration between China and Pakistan to confine its strategic sphere to South Asia. 
Although China does not take India’s concerns seriously, New Delhi cannot resist 
putting a strong emphasis on the Sino-Pakistan relationship. China’s actions may, in 
turn, lead India to adopt some countermeasures, such as developing “normal” military 
ties with China’s troublesome neighbours.
5.2 India’s Look East Policy
Although India feels pressure from China’s engagement with South Asian states, it is 
not always on the defensive regarding China; it could also able to take some balancing 
initiatives to counter its perceived encirclement by China. For example, it could 
strengthen its engagement with China’s neighbouring states, such as the countries in 
East Asia, to put pressure on China’s security environment, thus distracting China.
In fact, during the Cold War, India’s conflicts with China, its connection with the 
Soviet Union, its support for Vietnam’s invasion of Cambodia, and its renewed 
hostility with Muslim Pakistan alienated it from most states in East Asia. Furthermore, 
“India’s stubborn insistence on an inward-looking economy” was seen as one of many 
diplomatic mistakes, which made it increasingly irrelevant to a dynamic Asia. In the 
early 1990s, when India began to undertake economic reforms, there was an appraisal 
of India’s policy towards the countries in East Asia. The steady economic
62 Satu P. Limaye, “Message to India: Come back to Asia, The Asian Wall Street Journal, December 20, 
1993, p.8.
63 Tien-sze Fang, “Yindu shishi jingji gaige yilai de waijiao zou xiang (India’s Foreign Policy since 
Economic Reform)”, Wentiyu yanjiu (Issues and studies), vol.40, no.4, June-July 2001, pp.81-96.
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development of the region, especially before the financial crisis, attracted much of 
India’s attention. Against this backdrop, the P. V. Narasimha Rao administration 
unveiled the “Look East policy” to revive India’s relations with East Asia, particularly 
ASEAN states.
During the initial phase, the Look East policy had gained favourable results on the 
economic and trade fronts. In 1992, India became a Sectoral Dialogue Partner of 
ASEAN. The two sides identified four broad sectors for cooperation -  trade, 
investment, science and technology and tourism - that had the aim of contributing to a 
closer economic link between India and ASEAN states.64 Japan, Korea and ASEAN 
states also emerged as a lucrative export market and source of foreign investments for 
India.
A s it embarked on the “Look East” policy to reach out to states in East Asia, India 
showed its ambition to extend its influence beyond the sub-continent. Apparently, 
India identifies Southeast Asia as its “extended neighbourhood” with strategic 
implications for India, and wishes to maintain the momentum of the Look East policy 
to forge a closer partnership with ASEAN states. Indian External Minister I. K. Gujral 
argued, geography inevitably predetermines India as having close and cooperative 
relations with countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and 
the Asia-Pacific region.65 The policy could be seen as one of India’s successful geo­
strategies because India’s relations with the countries in the region have since 
improved significantly. On the other hand, the Look East Policy provides a possible
64 For details, see Sujit Dutta, “India and ASEAN: A Framework for Comprehensive Engagement,” 
Strategic Analysis, vol.XX, no. 3, pp.357-372.
65 “Continuity and Change within the Global Scenario,” Address by I. K. Gujral, Minister of External 
Affairs, Government of India, at the Council for Foreign Relations, New York, 3 October 1996.
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approach for India to challenge China’s status in the region. China is closely 
monitoring India-ASEAN ties to prevent the formation of an anti-China collaboration 
in the region.
Security Dimension o f  the Look East Policy
The economic interactions between India and ASEAN might have later slowed down 
with the South-East Asian economic meltdown, but the Indian side changed its 
previous perceptions of ASEAN states and so tended to attribute more significance to 
India-ASEAN relations. As a result, India continued to show its willingness to engage 
ASEAN. In October 2003, India joined the Treaty o f  Amity and Cooperation in 
Southeast Asia. In November 2004, India and ASEAN further concluded the “India- 
ASEAN Partnership for Peace, Progress and Shared Prosperity”. This signified India’s 
commitment to work with ASEAN countries in maintaining regional peace and 
stability. In 2005, India was allowed to take part in the East Asia Summit.
Meanwhile, the economic and trade fronts remain as important elements of the 
relations between India and ASEAN states. In 2003, India and ASEAN signed the 
Framework Agreement on Comprehensive Economic Cooperation, which aimed to 
establish a free trade area by 2011. An India-ASEAN Free Trade Agreement (FTA) in 
goods was signed in August 2009. In addition, India has been actively conducting 
bilateral FTA negotiations with the states in the region. India signed a bilateral FTA 
agreement with Thailand in July 2003, and the Comprehensive Economic 
Cooperation Agreement with Singapore in June 2005. Furthermore, India has 
concluded trade-related institutional arrangements with the Philippines, Vietnam, 
Malaysia, Myanmar and Lao.
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With the conclusion of such arrangements, India is poised for greater economic 
integration with ASEAN states and the region. While justifying economic logic as the 
building block of India’s Look East Policy, the expanded and intense economic 
engagements are symptomatic of emerging trends in the respective economies of 
India and ASEAN countries.66
The Look East Policy was premised on trade and economic interaction with Southeast 
Asian nations, but subsequently expanded to other areas of common interest. Despite 
the economic engagement, during India’s search for an association with new friends 
in the region, security ties and military cooperation have been identified as being 
among the areas of Indo-ASEAN cooperation.
Although the motivation for the Look East policy was primarily economical, the 
political relations and security ties between India and the ASEAN states have also 
gradually progressed. On the security and political front, India joined the ASEAN 
Regional Forum (ARF) 1996, an organisation aimed at fostering dialogue and 
consultation on political and security issues of common interest and concern, and at 
making significant contributions to efforts towards confidence-building and 
preventative diplomacy in the Asia-Pacific region. In 1996, New Delhi was accepted 
as a full Dialogue Partner of ASEAN, and participated for the first time in the Post 
Ministerial Conference (PMC) of ASEAN in Jakarta. The climax of India’s relations 
with Southeast Asia came in 2002 when the first India-ASEAN summit was held. 
India became the fourth state, after China, Japan and South Korea, to establish the
66 Vibhanshu Shekhar, “Trends in India-ASEAN Economic Relations,” Article no. 2433, Institute o f  
Peace and Conflict Studies (website), November 30, 2007, <http://www.ipcs.org/article_details.php? 
articleNo=2433 >.
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summit mechanism with ASEAN.
More remarkably, the Indian side has shown interest in strengthening military 
cooperation with ASEAN states by offering training slots to ASEAN states and 
holding joint military exercises with them, which have over the years increased in 
scope and content while enhancing interoperability. Conducting the exercises has 
been institutionalised between India and Singapore, and joint patrols continue with 
Indonesia and Thailand.67
lu  addition, India’s military relations with Vietnam and Myanmar attract much 
attention. India and Vietnam have been keen to expand their military ties, which have 
revolved round the supply, of spare parts, the training of personnel and the repair of 
equipment of Soviet-origin.68 To cite some examples, during the Indian Defence 
Minister’s  visit to Vietnam in March 2000, the two sides signed a wide-ranging 
agreement paving the way for greater military cooperation, which included the sale of 
advanced military light helicopters, assisting in the repair and overhaul of Vietnam’s 
mainstay MiG fighters and raising the level of military contacts.69 The third Indo- 
Vietnam Security Dialogue was held at New Delhi during November 28-29, 2007.
Bordering China and India, Myanmar has traditionally sought to maintain a balance 
between its two giant neighbours. On the other hand, both China and India would like 
to have Myanmar as their ally against the other state. The Indian side has seen China’s 
aid to Myanmar as China’s intention to infiltrate its military strength as far as the 
Indian Ocean. For example, Myanmar is expanding, with Chinese support, its naval
67 Ministry o f Defence, Government of India, Annual Report 2006-2007, pp.31-32.
68 The Hindu, November 30,1999, p. 14.
m Ibid., p. 13.
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facilities in Great Coco Island, the site of a major signals intelligence facility situated 
near India’s Andaman and Nicobar Islands. In order to counterbalance China’s 
strategic link, India has also increased its cooperation with the Myanmar military 
junta. Particularly, there has recently been a substantial increase in bilateral defence 
cooperation between the Indian Army and the Myanmar Army in training and other 
fields. Recent years have witnessed exchanges of high-level visits, such as that of the 
Indian Chief of the Army Staff to Myanmar and the Commander in Chief of the 
Myanmar Navy to India in 2005. Indian External Affairs Minister Pranab Mukheijee 
claimed that India was willing to expand the ambit of military cooperation between 
the two countries, including military transfers, and promised to give a “favourable 
response” to the Myanmar Government’s request for military equipment.70 In addition, 
in April 2007 it was reported that the Indian and Myanmar security forces were 
conducting joint military operations along the 1,643-km India-Myanmar border to
71neutralise insurgent groups. Apparently, New Delhi’s impulses to continue “Look 
East” are not only dictated by the economic engagement, but also are grounded in the 
consideration of geopolitics.
This expansion of India’s profile in the defence sector is mirrored by the interest of 
regional powers in partnering India. In the view of the Chinese, ASEAN states 
welcomes India’s military presence in this region because it considers India could
79contribute to maintain the balance of power. This is why ASEAN states did not
70 Bruce Loudon, “India to snub US on Burma arms embargo,” The Australian (internet edition),
January 23, 2007; “also The Hindu (internet edition), January 22, 2007.
71 Mukul Sharma, “Myanmar: India must suspend military support,” The Hindu (internet edition), 
October 6,2007.
72 Zhao Gancheng, “Yindu Dong Xiang zhengce de fazhan ji yiyi” (“India’s Look-East policy: 
development and significance”), Dangdai Yatai (Contemporary Asia-Pacific Studies), no. 8, 2007, 
p. 15.
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follow the US or Japan’s example in criticising India’s nuclear tests of 1998. China 
interpreted the mild response by ASEAN states as their acknowledgement of India as 
a rising political power that has near-parity with China, and can be seen as a balance 
against China’s influence.
The burgeoning India-ASEAN military engagement reflects the success of India’s 
Look East policy. India has gradually revealed its potential as an economic power and 
now it is ASEAN states that are turning to India. The region sees India as one of its 
growing, partners in trade and as a major source for future investments. The ASEAN 
states will keep playing an increasingly significant role in India’s foreign policy and 
security policy as well. The question is how China sees India’s move to engage states 
in  China’s neighbourhood.
Chinese Assessment o f  India’s Look East Policy
The Chinese are aware that India sees China as a competitor in the South Asia region, 
and ASEAN states also welcome such a development. For example, India began 
seeking the FTA agreement with ASEAN after China had proposed it. However, the 
Chinese side seems not to give too much significance to the India-ASEAN economic 
engagement. For example, the India-Singapore FTA is seen as being symbolic only. 
On the other hand, the Chinese side acknowledged that India has achieved some 
results from its military engagement with ASEAN states. Yet, India’s repeated and 
well-broadcast military engagement with the region has cast a new layer of mistrust, 
rekindling doubts in Chinese minds about India’s intentions. The Chinese side has 
questioned the real strategic motivation behind India’s Look Easy policy by arguing 
that the Indian side is always vague on what kind of interests they should defend in
214
n*\this region.
In the Chinese view, there are two major drives behind India’s Look East policy. First, 
the essence of the Look East policy is the recognition that India’s aspirations for a 
larger global role cannot be realised while its foreign policy and national security 
preoccupations are limited to the subcontinent. It is a necessary step if  India wishes to 
achieve the goal of being a world power.74 In addition, India has to establish closer 
contacts with the relevant region in order to prevent marginalization in the context of
the. trend towards regionalism. In other words,, the Look East policy is part of India’s
7S
grand strategy for securing global-power status. Soon after India conducted the 
nuclear tests in 1998, the then Indian President, K. R. Narayanan, said that the Indian 
government “will strive for Asian solidarity and enhanced regional cooperation”. The 
reference to the notion of “Asian solidarity” was seen as a commitment to deepen and
7 f twiden India’s foreign policy interaction with the major Asian powers. Meanwhile, 
some states in the region began to recognise that India has a role to play at a global 
level. For example, the Malaysian Foreign Minister, Syed Hamid Albar, said that 
ASEAN countries would like their relationship (with India) to be mutually beneficial
77to ASEAN with India playing its role in the international sphere.
Second, the Look East policy became one of India’s ploys to counter China’s “omni-
73 Zhao Gancheng, “Yindu dong xiang zhengce de fazhan ji yiyi” (“India's Look-East Policy: 
Development and Significance”), Dangdai Yatai (Contemporary Asia-Pacific Studies), No. 8,2007, 
pp. 13-14.
™ Ibid., p. 13.
75 Liu Xiaojuan and Zhang Jian, “Yindu ‘dong xiang zhengce’ xingcheng zhong de fei-jingji yinsu” 
(“An Analysis o f Non economic Factors of India’s ‘Look to the East’ Policy), Nanya yanjiu jikan, no. 
4, 2006, pp.98-101.
76 C. Raja Mohan, “BJP, China and ‘Asian solidarity’,” The Hindu, March 27,1998, p. 13.
77 The Hindu, October 9, 2000, p. 14.
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no
directional pressure” pressure. The presence of India’s navy in the South China Sea 
was seen as a particular source of concern to China. The Chinese media questioned 
why India’s navy stayed in the South China Sea even after concluding a joint military 
exercise with Singapore, Vietnam and so on. Given the territorial disputes between 
China and some ASEAN states, the report argued that India’s attempt to maintain a 
substantial military presence in the South China Sea had profound and long-term
70implications for China’s polices towards the region.
The. Chinese, side, is concerned about where the impetus for these initiatives lies. Since 
the PLA Navy is yet to acquire blue water capability, China and India have had no 
direct clash o f  national interest in the Indian Ocean. Nonetheless, the Chinese side is 
acutely conscious of the on-going deep engagement between India and other 
Southeast powers. The Chinese have concluded that one aim of the present Indian 
naval build-up is to ensure its capability to operate outside South Asia. India’s 
acquisition of Russia’s 40,000 tonne aircraft carrier, Admiral Gorshkov. along with
OA
other defence deals has attracted the attention of the PLA. The Chinese concerns of 
an India thrust eastward in the South China Sea increased when India proclaimed its 
intention to build a new carrier, which would be the country’s third. Professor Hu 
Siyuan of the Chinese Defence University argued that the regional balance of power 
would be changed once the Indian Navy owned three aircraft carriers. He suggested
01
the Indian Navy would then enter the South China Sea.
7g Zhao Hong, “Zhongguo shijiao zhong de Yindu yu Dongmeng guanxi” (India’s changing relations 
with ASEAN from China’s perspectives), Nanyang wenti yanjiu (Southeast Asian Affairs), no. 1,
2007, p.30.
79Huanqiaoshibao (Global Times), March 13, 2001, p .l.
80 See, for example, Guofang bao (Defence Times), July 12, 2000, p .l; Jiefang Jun Bao (PLA Daily), 
August 28, 2000, p. 12.
81 Shao Zhiyong and Xu Xiangjun, “Yindu junli pengzhang wei na ban—fan guofan daxue Hu Siyun 
jiao shou”(“The reason for India's build-up: interview with Professor Hu Siyuan of National Defence
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China has some misgivings about India’s initiative in forging close security 
relationship with Vietnam on the security front. Both Vietnam and India were part of 
the Soviet plot to encircle China in the Cold War. Vietnam chose not to condemn on 
India’s nuclear tests and has now recognised New Delhi’s security concerns. It is also 
seeking to obtain nuclear and satellite technology from India. Vietnam agrees that 
India should become a permanent member of an expanded United Nations Security 
Council. Vietnam is emerging as India’s key strategic partner for countering piracy 
from the Indian waters to the South China Sea; as the Indian Defence Minister
Q -n
indicated* India and Vietnam are partners in safeguarding commercial sea lanes. The 
Indian Navy’s decision to hold joint military exercises with Vietnam in the South 
China Sea appeared certain to antagonise China. The high-profile posture was 
interpreted as India’s signal of its ability to enter China’s traditional strategic region.83
An Indian Navy official in December 1999 indicated that India was commanding the 
geo-strategic location at the heart of the world’s vital commercial shipping lanes in 
the Indian Ocean and could play a significant role in the safety of the “new silk 
route,” which extends from the Persian Gulf and straddles the Indian Ocean till it
04
enters the Strait of Malacca, the gateway to South-East Asia. The Defence Minister 
George Fernandes claimed that given the high stakes involved in the uninterrupted 
flow of commercial shipping, India’s area of interest therefore extends from north of
Of
the Arabian Sea to the South China Sea. A similar proclamation was issued by
University”), Guangming ribao (Guanming daily)(intemet edition), November 15,2000.
82 The Hindu, April 15,2000, p. 15.
83 Sidhu and Yuan, China and India : Cooperation or Conflict, p.58.
84 The Hindu, December 4, 1999, p. 12.
85 Ibid, April 15, 2000, p. 15.
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Indian Foreign Minister Jaswant Singh. During his visit to Singapore in June 2000, he
o x
suggested that India’s security environment and concerns involved Southeast Asia.
o n
He also claimed, “India is a factor for stability” in the East Asian region.
The overlapping claims over the sovereignty of the oil-rich Spratlys in the South 
China Sea have placed additional pressure on China’s security. The Chinese do not 
want to see states in the region working together with outside powers against China 
over the South China Sea issue; Beijing has a deep concern about the propensity of 
India to extend its areas of operation and interests eastward to the South China Sea. 
China, looking on the South China Sea as its special domain, does not welcome 
India’s presence in the area. The improvement in India-ASEAN relations and the 
establishment of a cooperative partnership would make China’s security environment 
more complicated, putting pressure upon China’s western and southern regions, 
challenging China’s.maritime security, and increasing its difficulty in solving the 
boundary problem and the territorial claims in the South China Sea. Thus, Chinese 
scholars have bluntly asserted that it is not in China’s interests to see close relations 
between India and ASEAN states.88
Despite China’s apprehension, the Indian side has repeated that its determination to 
engage with ASEAN states is natural, just as China has argued that its relations with 
South Asian states are part of normal conduct among states. It may be that “containing
86 Guofang bao, July 12, 2000, p . l .
87 The Hindu, June 3, 2000, p. 14.
88 See Liu Shanguo, “Yindu yu Dongmeng jiangli huoban guanxi dui wo guo anquan de yinxiang” 
(“Prospects for India’s partnership with ASEAN and its influence upon China’s security”), Nanya 
yanjiu, no.2, 1999, pp.30-34; Liu Shanguo, “Yindu yu Dongmeng jianli huoban guanxi de fazhan 
qianjing ji qi dui wo guo anquan de yiing xiang” (“Prospects of the efforts to establish a partnership 
between India and ASEAN and its influence on the security of China”), Nanya yanjiu jikan, no.3, 
1999, pp.43-51.
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China” is not India’s only consideration to engage ASEAN states. In fact, neither 
India nor ASEAN states will want to confront China because they still need China for 
trade and investment. However, the flourishing partnership between India and 
ASEAN states and India’s active involvement and presence in the region have raised 
concerns in China, as India’s growing presence will inevitably dilute China’s 
influence in this region. As New Delhi and Beijing vie for influence in the region, 
India could be an instrument to counterbalance and neutralise China’s predominance.
On the other hand, the Chinese have deemed that it is unlikely India’s relations with 
this region will change the prevailing balance of power or dilute China’s influence in 
the region, even though India is trying to establish a free trade regime with ASEAN,
QQ
because they think India’s power is and influence very limited in this, region. That is, 
China deems that there is an asymmetrical power structure between China and India, 
and thus enjoys a sense of psychological superiority against India.
Evolving Indo-Japanese Relations
A significant change can be found in India’s relations with Taiwan (the Republic of 
China). After India recognised the communist regime in Beijing, the two sides had no 
official contact for more than four decades. In order to promote economic ties 
between the two sides, New Delhi adopted a more friendly policy towards Taiwan 
while formally sticking to the so-called “One China” policy. After two years of 
negotiations, India and Taiwan agreed to set up quasi-official liaison offices in each 
other’s capitals.90 Even Chinese scholars have opined that there was a “breakthrough”
89 Zhao Gancheng, “Yindu Dong Xiang zhengce de fazhan ji yiyi” (“India’s Look-East Policy: 
development and significance”), pp. 10-16, 64.
90 Taiwan set up “Taipei Economic and Cultural Center” in New Delhi and India set up “India—Taipei
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in Indo-Taiwanese economic relations in the wake of India’s economic reforms.91
For China, another major concern regarding India’s “Look East” policy is the 
evolving Indo-Japanese partnership. Japan had suspended all Official Development 
Assistance (ODA) to India after Pokhran-II in May 1998, but the frequent exchanges 
of high level visits signalled both sides’ willingness to seek a closer relationship. 
Japan and India agreed to establish the “Japan-India Global Partnership in the 21st 
Century” when Japanese Prime Minister Yoshiro Mori visited India in August 2000. 
Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee visited Japan in December 2001, and the two sides 
issued the Japan-India Joint Declaration to promote high-level dialogue, exchanges 
in the information-communication technology (ICT) field, and joint counter-action 
against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and terrorism.
It was also agreed, when the then Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi visited 
India in April 2005, that the two countries would further strengthen their cooperation 
and pursue an all-round and comprehensive development of bilateral relations, and 
reinforce the strategic focus of the global partnership between the two countries. On 
that occasion, the two sides jointly announced the “Japan-India Partnership in the 
New Asian Era: Strategic Orientation of Japan-India Global Partnership”. During 
Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s visit to Japan in December 2006, the two 
Prime Ministers decided to establish a bilateral “Strategic and Global Partnership” 
between the two countries and signed the Joint Statement towards a Japan-India 
Strategic and Global Partnership. Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe then visited 
India in August 2007, and the two sides then signed the Joint Statement on the
Association” in Taipei.
91 Ma Jiali, “Hou lengzhan shidai Yindu de waijiao zhengce” (“India’s foreign policy in post-Cold War 
times”), Nanya yanjiu jikan, no.4, 1994, p.49.
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Roadmap fo r  New Dimensions to the Strategic and Global Partnership between Japan 
and India.
India’s defence ties with Japan have also been evolving in recent years and an 
exchange of high level visits has been the highlight of India-Japan military ties. The 
Indian Defence Minister, George Fernandes, travelled to Tokyo in January 2000, and 
the two sides agreed to initiate a new dialogue on security and defence. During the 
visit of Indian Defence Minister Pranab Mukheijee to Japan in May 2006, the two 
countries signed a joint statement, the first such document to be signed by the defence 
chiefs of the two countries, vowing to aim to maintain and promote peace and 
stability in Asia and the world. The statement calls for regular meetings of the defence 
chiefs, exchanges on other levels, exchanging information on international terrorism 
and strengthening cooperation via drills, security research and technologies. The coast 
guards of the two countries conducted their seventh round of exercises in November 
2006 off the Mumbai Coast. A Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between the 
coast guards of the two countries was also signed in November 2006. The Indian 
Defence Secretary led a high-level delegation to Japan during April 10-14, 2007 for 
the first India-Japan Defence Policy Dialogue. The visit also coincided with the first 
goodwill naval exercises between the Indian and Japanese navies off the Japanese 
coast. The Chief of Army Staff also visited Japan in April 2007. Japanese Senior Vice 
Minister of Defence Takahide Kiwara visited India in August 2007.
The significance of the above is that, in the past, both India and Japan have fought 
wars with China and, currently, both India and Japan have territorial disputes with 
China. For both India and Japan, China remains an unarticulated threat. The Chinese 
side tends to conclude that the India-Japan partnership is built on the basis of the
221
strategic consideration of containing China. They argue that the impact of the Indo- 
Japanese partnership upon Asian politics deserve attention. It has also been pointed 
out that the Japanese media reported a suggestion by the former Taiwan President, 
Lee Teng-hui, that the Japanese should work together with Taiwan and India to 
contain China. From the Chinese perspective, all the signs indicate that India, with its
Q 'l
growing economic and military power, has set its sights on the Asia-Pacific region.
The report on US-India-Japan “trilateral” military exercises recommends a scenario 
about which China would have significant reservations. The Malabar exercise of April 
2007 by India and the US, held in the western Pacific, first took Japan into their fold 
and then, in September 2007, was further expanded in scope and participation to 
include Australia and Singapore as well. Although bilateral military exercises are not 
new for the four countries, there seems to have been a new momentum for these 
countries to conduct multi-national naval exercises.
China did not remain unaware of the development. Beijing expressed annoyance 
during the India-US-Japan naval exercise off the Japanese coast in April 2007. When 
the four powers set up the initiative (informally named the Quad) in Manila in May 
2006, Beijing further issued demarches to all the four countries on the purpose of the 
exercise. Chinese President Hu Jintao also sought clarification from Indian Prime 
Minister Manmohan Singh on the issue at the G8 summit held in German in 2008. 
Although the Quad members reassured China that their “strategic partnership” was 
aimed only at maintaining regional security, and was not targeting any particular 
power, Beijing was not convinced and has since seemed to be increasingly worried.
92 Huanqiao shibao, September 1, 2000, p.2.
93 Guofang bao, July 12, 2000, p.l
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Many analysts still see the manoeuvres as efforts by a democratic coalition to 
“contain” rising Chinese power. China believes that the Quadrilateral Initiative is an 
Asian version of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and is an alliance to 
contain a rising China.94
China later successfully persuaded Australia to pull out of the Quadrilateral Initiative, 
but it should be remembered that the US-Japan-Australia-India quadrilateral dialogue 
was enthusiastically proposed by former Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and 
was embraced by Delhi. As both Japan and India have described China as a potential 
threat, it is likely that India and Japan see each other as a military counterbalance 
against China. After all, apart from the “ASEAN plus” initiatives, there are hardly any 
other groupings that carry weight in the region, but the launch of the Quad suggests a 
pattern o f alliance-building activities that China cannot ignore.95 Indian strategists 
have already proposed inviting other countries in this region, such as Indonesia, to 
form a new quadrilateral initiative after Australia’s departure.96 India is keen to 
maintain the momentum to bring more pressure to bear on China. Given the nature of 
the strategic partnership with ASEAN states, and India’s competition with China for 
strategic space in Asia and Africa, India should welcome any new regional framework 
in the Asia-Pacific that aims at containing China’s influence. China, in its turn, will 
hinder the formation of any anti-China Asia-Pacific framework.
94 Sudha Ramachandran, “India promotes 'goodwill' naval exercises,” Asia Times (internet edition), 
August 14, 2007.
95 Mahmud Ali, “New ‘strategic partnership’ against China,” BBC News (internet edition), September 3, 
2007.
96 Bhartendu Kumar Singh, “China, India and Australian politics of ‘Quad’,” Institute o f Peace and 
Conflict Studies (website), Article no. 2496, February 18, 2008, at < 
http://www.ipcs.org/article_details.php?articleNo=2496>
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5-3 Regional Cooperation between China and India
Optimists about Sino-Indian relations take the view that common interests between 
China and India far outweigh their differences, so both sides could focus on 
expanding cooperation rather than quarrelling over differences in order to improve 
bilateral relations. As far as the geographic proximity is concerned, it not only 
generates competition between China and India, but also presents an opportunity for 
cooperation in some areas. As Chinese President Jiang Zemin pointed out, geographic 
proximity could be an advantage for China-India cooperation, along with the vast land
07masses, rich natural resources, large populations and huge markets. Unfortunately, 
in the past, border disputes have prevented both sides from exploring the possibility of 
benefiting more from their geographic proximity.
In order to move Sino-Indian relations away from the notion of competition and 
towards cooperation, both sides are seeking opportunities to make use of the 
geographical advantages, rather than focusing on the disputes. In a development likely 
to forge more benign interactions, China and India are working to place the issues 
regarding regional cooperation on their agenda, with the expectation of imparting 
additional momentum to improve the bilateral relations.
Anti-Terrorism Cooperation
From a geographical perspective, another area of interest to China and India is their 
common concerns over malignant cross-border activities. As an initial step to 
cooperate in the fight against cross-border crimes, during Chinese President Jiang
97 “Headway made in improving ties with India,” Xinhua, November 29, 1996, in Foreign Broadcast 
Information Service, Daily Report: China (hereafter cited as FBIS-CHT), December 3, 1996.
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Zemin’s visit to India in 1996, China and India signed an agreement on combating 
drug trafficking. Despite this, the common willingness to combat Islamic militancy 
and fundamentalists emanating from Central Asia and Afghanistan is also likely to 
provide a fillip to the Sino-Indian relationship.
From Beijing’s point of view, with the collapse of the Soviet Union and the 
disintegration of the communist ideological system, the Central Asian region has 
witnessed the rise of Islamist forces that have appealed to religious enthusiasts,
QO
calling for the establishment of “pure Islamic countries.” There is also concern that 
China’s Xinjiang is being beleaguered by Muslim Uighur extremists who aim to split 
the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region from China to establish the independent 
state of “East Turkistan”. The Uighur separatist’s activities have emerged as a serious 
cause of insecurity for China because some of them have resorted to terrorism to 
promote the cause. According Chinese official sources, from 1990 to 2001 alone, the 
“East Turkistan” terrorist forces were responsible for over 200 terrorist incidents in 
Xinjiang, including explosions, assassinations, arsons, poisonings, and assaults."
Where India is concerned, the Indian authorities have been laboriously battling the 
jihads since the late 1980s. Indian official sources show that Jammu and Kashmir, the 
only Muslim-majority region of India, has suffered more than 45,000 terrorist 
incidents.100 However, the Muslim militant organisations have not only created 
disturbances in Kashmir, but also caused damage in other parts of India. The Indian
98 Gao Qiufu, “Combating the three evil forces,” Beijing Review, July 5, 2001, p.8.
99 Information Office of the State Council, ‘“East Turkistan’s terrorist forces cannot get away with
impunity,” in Beijing Review, January 31, 2002, pp. 14-19; 22-23.
100 Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, “War against terror: background,” 
<http://meaindia.nic.in/warterror/background/background.htm>.
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Parliament, foreign embassies in India, the Red Fort, Indian Airlines aircraft, and the 
renowned Taj Hotel in Mumbai have all been targeted by Muslim terrorists in recent 
years.
Although both China and India have worked hard to repress these terrorist activities, 
the internal-external linkage has created difficulties. External sympathetic groups in 
Central Asian states, Afghanistan, and Pakistan have provided sanctuary, support, and 
training for the Muslim terrorists. Therefore, seeking international cooperation to 
block extremist movements inside their own territories and cut the links across the 
border is a fundamental aspect of China’s and India’s policies to combat cross-border 
terrorism.
The changing international context and the common cause of the fight against 
terrorism in the wake of the September 11 terrorist attacks opened a new area of 
cooperation between China and India. China and India have benefited to some extent 
from the US war against Osama Bin Laden’s Al-Qaeda, which was believed to been 
helping train “East Turkistan” advocates, Kashmiri militant organisations and other 
terrorists outside Afghanistan. While the campaign against international terrorism has 
gained great momentum, both China and India have used the occasion to justify their 
respective actions against the Uighur separatists in Xinjiang and the Islamist militants 
in Kashmir. By branding the Uighur separatists as terrorists, China could destroy them 
with less protest from the US and the West.
However, the war against terrorism has not gone entirely China’s and India’s way. 
With more troops from the US-led coalition marching into Central and South Asia, the 
war against terrorism has begun to realign the political balance of power in the region
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in ways that Beijing and New Delhi may not welcome. Beijing is carefully monitoring 
US moves to develop closer ties with the Central and South Asian states. American 
forces were stationed in Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan. Although Washington said it had 
no intention of building permanent bases in the region, its military presence could last 
as long as the campaign against terrorism. A Chinese scholar from the National 
Defence University of China has expressed the worry that the US has seldom 
withdrawn troops from its overseas military bases, so its complete withdrawal from 
the region is unlikely.101 Given the uneasy Sino-American relations, Beijing needs to 
deal with the far-reaching implications of the American military presence close to its 
backdoor.
The growing profile of the US in Central and South Asia has persuaded China to be 
more inclined to engage with states in the region. In the face of the new international 
situation, China was not so reluctant to accept India’s overture to contain international 
terrorism jointly than it would otherwise have been. When Chinese Premier Zhu 
Rongji visited New Delhi in January 2002, China and India agreed to initiate a
109dialogue mechanism on counter-terrorism. China also expressed its willingness to
share intelligence with India on terrorism in Kashmir and unrest in India’s northeast in
10^exchange for India’s intelligence on the Uighur separatists.
The development was a positive sign, with Indian External Affairs Minister Jaswant 
Singh pointing out that only the US and Russia’s broad-based dialogue architecture is
101 Ge Lide, “Will the united States withdraw from the Central and South Asia,” Beijing Review, 
January 17, 2002, pp.8-9.
102 Renmin Ribao, January 15, 2002,1.
103 The Hindu (internet edition), January 25,2002.
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comparable to that of India and China.104 The first Sino-Indian counter-terrorism 
dialogue took place in April 2002 and the second was held in June 2003. However, the 
extent to which the dialogue mechanism can bring India and China closer remains 
debatable. The key to further cooperation on counter-terrorism will lie in whether the 
two countries can reconcile their differences over the definition of terrorism.
It is also worth noting that China tends to equate religious extremists and national 
separatists with international terrorists. According to the Chinese definition, therefore, 
there is no difference between Uighur and Tibetan separatists and both should be 
crushed without mercy. Apparently, it is difficult for New Delhi to accept this sort of 
concept in view of fact that India still provides sanctuary to the Dalai Lama and his 
govemment-in-exile.
On the other hand, although Beijing has claimed that it opposes “all forms of 
terrorism”, “no matter when, where or in what form terrorism strikes, and no matter 
against whom it is directed”105, it also finds it difficult to assent to India’s definition 
regarding international terrorism, particularly its accusations about Pakistan. China 
has dismissed the charge that Pakistan has rendered training to the Uighur 
terrorists,106 and will not agree to expand the war on terrorism to include Pakistan. 
Chinese sensitivity to the issue is evident from the fact that the Chinese officials play 
down the significance of this dialogue mechanism on countering terrorism. Chinese 
Vice Foreign Minister Wang Yi said that China had already held such a dialogue with
104 See Indian External Affairs Minister Jaswant Singh’s comment, in The Hindu, March 31, 2002.
105 See, for example, Chinese Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan’s speech delivered at the general debate of 
the 56th UN General Assembly, in Renmin Ribao, November 13,2001, p.7.
106 See Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Zhu Bangzao’s remarks at Foreign Ministry press, 
November 13, 2001.
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many countries.107 A Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman also said China fully 
supported the anti-terrorism measures taken by Pakistan and said that Beijing and
1 ORIslamabad could set up a similar mechanism if necessary.
Such differences could exacerbate divisions between Beijing and New Delhi and limit 
the scope of cooperation. Since both India and China insist that there should be no 
double standards in addressing the issue of terrorism, they have to forge a consensus 
on the definition of terrorism. Thus, it may be a while before India and China take 
concrete, steps towards countering terrorism.
However, the common course of anti-terrorism has provided a platform for the two 
countries. The armies of two countries conducted the first-ever China-India Joint 
Anti-terrorism Training Code named “Hand-in-Hand 2007” in December 2007 in 
Kunming, China's Yunnan province. It was followed by the “Hand-in-Hand 2008” 
joint military training and exercise at Belgaum of Karnataka, India. It seems that the 
two armies will continue the exchanges and joint exercises in the name of 
“counterterrorism”; just as some Indian officials have argued, the fact that China and 
India are now sitting together to talk about counter-terrorism and other related 
security issues is a significant development in China-India relations.109
SCOandSAARC
The Chinese take the view that the “East Turkistan terrorist force” has links and
107 Renmin Ribao, January 19, 2002, p.3.
108 Press Trust o f  India, April 25, 2002.
109 Ibid., April 22,2002.
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collaborates with overseas terrorist groups.110 In order to curb the penetration of 
external extremists from the neighbouring areas, in 1996, China used a coordinated 
mechanism, the Shanghai Five, with Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, 
to address the concern. In fact, the original agenda of the grouping was set up to 
resolve border issues and promote CBMs along China’s frontiers with the former 
Soviet republics. From 1998 onward, due to the activism of the so-called “three evil 
forces” (terrorism, separatism and extremism) in the region, the focus of the 
mechanism has shifted from boosting border security and reducing troop levels to 
curbing terrorism, separatism and extremism.111
Between 1998 and 2000, the leaders of the five member-states met annually in Almaty 
(Kazakhstan), Bishkek (Kyrgyzstan) and Dushanbe (Tajikistan) to discuss how to 
deepen cooperation in issues of concerns. They agreed to fight jointly against national 
separatism, international terrorism, and religious extremism, as well combating the 
cross-border criminal activities of arms smuggling, drug trafficking and illegal 
immigration. The five states also made a commitment not to allow any attempt to use 
their territories to engage in activities harmful to the sovereignty, security and social 
order of the other member states. To strengthen security cooperation, they called for 
the formulation of a multilateral cooperation guideline, the conclusion of necessary 
multilateral treaties and accords, and the holding regular meetings of officers from the 
law enforcement, border patrol, customs and security departments of the five 
countries. Furthermore, they agreed to hold anti-terrorism and anti-violence 
manoeuvres within the five-nation framework if necessary, and supported
110 Information Office of the State Council, “East Turkistan’s terrorist forces cannot get away with 
impunity,” pp. 18-19; 22-23.
1,1 Gao Qiufu, “Combating the three evil forces,” pp.8-10.
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119Kyrgyzstan’s proposal to establish a regional anti-terrorism centre in Bishkek.
In June 2001, the mechanism was converted to a more institutionalised Shanghai 
Cooperation Organization (SCO) and incorporated Uzbekistan as the sixth member. 
The six states then signed the Shanghai Convention on Combating Terrorism, 
Separatism and Extremism, which provided the definition of terrorism, separatism and 
extremism and laid a legal foundation for jointly cracking down on the “three
i
forces”. That is, the Chinese would like to use the SCO as one of a series of 
platforms to address its concerns about the cross-border terrorist activities emanating 
from Central Asia.
Although India does not border Central Asia, it was keen to join this regional 
group.114 The main reason for India wishing to associate itself with this forum is 
because it has. been plagued by terrorists emerging from that region, especially 
Taliban-held Afghanistan. To cite an example, in December 1999, an Indian Airlines 
aircraft (IC-814) from Nepal to Kandahar in Afghanistan was hijacked. The Indian 
Government was forced to release three jailed terrorists in exchange for the freedom 
of the 155 hostages.
112 For the details of the summits, see Editorial, “Jiaqing mulin youhao, cujin heping fazhan: relie 
zhuhe jiangzemin zhuxi Alamutu zhixing yuanman chenggong” (“Enhance neighbourly friendship, 
promote peace and development: warm congratulations on President Jiang Zemin’s successful trip 
to Almaty”), Renmin Ribao, July 5, 1998, p.l; also Renmin Ribao, August 26, 1999, p. 1; Renmin 
Ribao, July 6, 2000, p.l.
113 Editorial, “Mulin youhao, guang hui dien fang: relie zhuhe “Shanghai hezuo zuzhi” xuan gao cheng 
li”(“Neighbourly friendship, splendid paragon-warm congratulations on the announcement of 
setting up of “Shanghai Cooperation Organisation”), Renmin Ribao, June 16, 2001, p.2; The text o f 
this convention is available at <http://english.scosummit2006.org/en_bjzl/2006- 
04/20/content_87.htm>.
1,4 See, for example, The Hindu, July 6, 2000, p.13; M.K. Dhar, “A Shanghai forum with India?” The 
Pioneer (internet edition), July 19, 2000.
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India’s case for joining the grouping has been supported by Russia. General Leonid 
Ivashov, head of Russian Defence Ministry’s International Cooperation Department, 
said in public that India could join the Shanghai Five forum if it wished to.115 The 
then Russian President Vladimir Putin, also said that the Shanghai Five was not “a 
closed club” and was open for other countries to join.116 Being another major sponsor 
of the organisation, China also agreed to recruit India to the SCO, with the proviso 
that it would be necessary to wait for <4when conditions are ripe and on the basis of 
consultative consensus.” 117 Thus, it seemed possible that China and India could 
jointly address their concerns over terrorism through the regional framework.
However, the membership issue became more complicated and complex when 
Pakistan also made a formal bid to join the group. Pakistan applied for membership 
on the grounds that it, too, was facing a similar threat of terrorism and could make a 
contribution to the mechanism. Pakistan’s case met with strong opposition from 
Russia because of its record of involvement with Islamic insurgent groups. In addition, 
Russia was not happy about Pakistan sponsoring the Taliban regime, and did not 
believe Pakistan’s involvement would contribute to the curbing of terrorism. Contrary 
to Russia’s position, it is possible that China saw its support for Pakistan’s affiliation 
into the group as a favour in view of the close relationship between Beijing and 
Islamabad. Therefore, Beijing offered its approval of India’s membership in exchange 
for Russia’s acquiescence on Pakistan’s accession. Since membership of the SCO 
should be approved unanimously by the members, China’s efforts to induct Pakistan 
and Russia’s plan to induct India in the SCO were delayed due to the lack of
115 The Hindu, July 15, 2000, p. 14.
116 See, for example The Hindu, July 6, 2000, p. 13.
117 See Jiang Zemin’s remarks at the opening of the SCO summit meeting in See Renmin Ribao, June 
16, 2001, p.l.
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consensus among the member states.
The SCO then decided not to admit new members, but agreed to recruit observers. 
Thus, India finally joined the regional group together with Pakistan and Iran in 2005, 
as the group sought to enhance its security role in Central Asia. The decision to co-opt 
the three countries was a compromise between different interests within and outside 
the group. China insisted on the simultaneous admission of India and Pakistan, even 
though Delhi and Moscow were unhappy with this linkage.118
India was disappointed about securing the observer status, as it was only a spectator at 
plenary meetings. However, the SCO decided in 2008 that the observer nations could 
participate in all the organisation’s deliberations. The Indian Prime Minister, 
Manmohan Singh, then decided to attend the 2009 SCO summit, held in 
Yekaterinburg, Russia, to highlight India’s full involvement in SCO activities. 
Furthermore, participation by India and Pakistan in the SCO could help reduce the 
leverage the US has on South Asia. On the other hand, India’s presence in the SCO 
will allow it to deepen security and economic ties with the entire resource-rich Central 
Asian region as well as reinforce its ties individually with each of the countries. In the 
short term, although India is unlikely to be able to challenge China’s dominant role in 
the SCO, it still could extend its influence, as the other members may approve of 
India’s presence as a means of undermining the growing Chinese influence in the 
region.
Interestingly, soon after India gained observer status in the SCO, China was accepted 
in 2005 as an observer at the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation
1,8 The Hindu (internet edition), June 5, 2005.
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(SAARC), a grouping established in 1985 as a vehicle for political and economic 
cooperation among the South Asian countries.119 It was the first time the regional 
organisation had accorded observer status to a country. In contrast to China’s 
confidence in including India in the SCO, New Delhi was reluctant to see China’s 
presence at the SAARC. Though India had been aware of China’s intentions to 
participate in the grouping, the move to include China in SAARC as an observer came 
as a shock to India. It was Nepal that threatened to veto Afghanistan’s membership 
unless China was simultaneously granted observer status.
Clearly, India had misgivings about China’s formal presence at SAARC. The Indian 
side argued that China is not a South Asian state and has no role to play in the region. 
However, the observer status highlighted Chinese foreign policy imperatives and its 
bid to claim global-power status; it also indicated the success of China’s multilateral 
efforts.120 Obviously, the other member states in South Asia had no reason to share 
India’s distress. For India, this was a cause of some concern, but for the smaller 
countries it was a matter of satisfaction. Just like India’s presence in Southeast Asia 
and the SCO, for the smaller countries, China was to be welcomed as a potential 
countervailing force within an India-dominated South Asia, though China’s 
association was couched in the more appealing language of economics rather than 
politics.
Again, despite its growing concern, New Delhi was trying to play down the potential
119 The SAARC members are Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, the Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan 
and Sri Lanka, while China, Japan, South Korea, the United States and the European Union are 
observers.
120 Abanti Bhattacharya, “China’s ‘Observer’ Status: Implications for SAARC,” Institute o f  Peace and
Conflict Studies (website), Article no. 1891, November 21,2005.
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competition with Beijing and decided not to block China's entry as an observer 
country to avoid creating more distrust between India and China. As a result, New 
Delhi could respond only by insisting that Japan should also be invited as an observer, 
as it would indirectly counterbalance China’s role in SAARC.
Undoubtedly, China is determined to use its observer status to expand its clout in the 
South Asian region. The official China Daily in an editorial on the SAARC Summit 
noted that China’s association with the grouping would help Beijing forge diplomatic 
ties with land-locked Bhutan, the only country in South Asia with which China does
191not have diplomatic relations. Irrespective of whether or not this represented 
another triumph for China and Pakistan vis-a-vis India, SAARC has changed 
forever.122 China’s formal entry to the SAARC demonstrates China’s rising diplomatic 
and economic clout in the region, and exposes the limits of India’s regional influence.
The space that China has now gained within the region is likely to expand because 
China’s formal presence in South Asia gives Beijing a say in South Asian affairs. At 
its debut at SAARC, China enunciated a comprehensive five-point proposal for 
enhanced engagement with SAARC. For example, China proposed to institutionalise 
the China-South Asia Business Forum so that it can serve as a platform for 
discussions on economic cooperation and trade. China’s action plan at SAARC is seen 
as rather ambitious for a country that has just been admitted as an observer at the
19^regional grouping. The distrust between India and China has begun to mar SAARC. 
India is totally opposed the observer members’ contribution to the development fund
121 Editorial, “South Asian progress an achievable goal,” China Daily, November 15, 2005, p.4.
122 Kripa Sridharan, “Beijing’s role in Saarc expansion unsettles Delhi,” The Straits Times (internet 
edition), November 23,2005.
123 lndo-Asian News Service, April 4, 2007.
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to prevent China from using its economic clout to strengthen its position in the 
organisation.
Apparently, China and India take very different views of each other’s involvement in 
related regional organisations. The asymmetrical concerns explain the differences. 
Beijing’s enthusiasm for SAARC is being watched cautiously in New Delhi. On the 
other hand, China see India’s joining as an expansion of SCO’s influence; China has 
shown confidence in dealing with the rivalry between China and India.
The Kunming Initiative
The potential of both China’s and India’s economic power has been recognised. The 
generally improved relations between China and India since the late 1980s and the 
introduction of India’s economic reform have provided a new setting for stronger 
economic engagement. The prospects of economic and trade cooperation between 
them are also vast. Various proposals involving two sub-regions: China’s Southwest 
and India’s Northeast have also been suggested, although the continued political 
differences and low national priorities attached to these areas have not allowed for 
much progress to be made on the ground.
By focusing on economic development, the Chinese side has been keen to promote 
sub-regional economic cooperation. It was thought that the time was ripe for 
Southwest China to adopt an opening-up policy towards its neighbouring countries.124
124 For more analysis, see Yu Tian, “Sichuan han Nanya guojia de maoyi qianjing”(“A prospect for the 
trade between Sichuan of China and South Asian countries”), Nanya yanjiu jikan, no.3, 1992, 
pp.25-31; Wang Yiqian, “Zhongguo xinan diqu xiang Nanya kaifang wenti tantao” (“Southwest 
China’s opening to South Asia: an analytical study”), Nanya yanjiu jikan , no.2, 1994,pp.32-36; 
Song Tianyou, “Yunnan sheng tong Yindu keji hezuo jiaoliu de keneng xing”(“On the possibility
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Back in 1991, Sichuan’s officials had publicly demanded that the entire region of 
Southwest China should open up to India, along with Myanmar, Bangladesh, Pakistan, 
Thailand and Malaysia.125 Similarly, Yunnan’s officials said they wanted to make the 
province an “international hub” for transport through Southeast Asia and the South 
Asian subcontinent.126
Like Southwest China, India’s Northeast region is interested in engaging with 
contiguous regions. This section of India, comprising the seven states of Assam, 
Arunachal Pradesh, Manipur,. Meghalaya* Mizoram, Nagaland and Tripura, shares 
borders with Bangladesh, Myanmar, Bhutan and Tibet. Economic backwardness in 
northeast India has contributed to the development of various insurgencies and other 
riot activities, making it one.of the most volatile and sensitive regions of India. The 
fact that this area shares less than two percent of its borders with the rest of India 
reflects the importance of opening it up to its neighbouring countries.
It seemed natural to increase exchanges between the two land-locked sub-regions, 
Southwest China and Northeast India, to boost the economy. In order to transform 
geographic proximity into an economic advantage, some initiatives have been taken. 
However, since there is no common border between the two sub-regions, it was 
decided the engagement had to be carried out in a multilateral framework, involving a 
third party, such as Myanmar. The proposals centred round the theme of transportation 
infrastructure links and the development of a sub-regional economic integration forum. 
It was evident that the lack of transportation links was chiefly responsible for the
of the cooperation and exchange between Yunnan and India”), Nanya yanjiu jikan, no.2, 1994, 
pp.37-41.
125 Central News Agency, July 10, 1991.
126 Renmin Ribao, June 5, 2000, p.4; Renmin Ribao, August 28, 2000, p. 12.
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sluggish growth of foreign trade between Southwest China and India. Thus, the key to 
increasing the exchange among the sub-regions was the construction of transport links.
Chinese scholars are keen to revive the concept of the “Southern Silk Route”, an 
ancient passageway starting from China’s Sichuan, and progressing to India’s 
northeast region via Myanmar and China’s Yunnan, by constructing a China- 
Myanmar-India railway as a land bridge to link Southwest China and Northeast India. 
In their opinion, the railroad could integrate with their respective domestic rail 
systems and facilitate the movement of goods and people from Shanghai to 
Mumbai.127
The renovation and reopening of the “Sino-Indian Road”r also known as Stilwell 
Road or Ledo Road, is another, proposed under discussion. The 1,079-mile (1,726-km) 
long road, linking Ledo in Assam to Kunming in Yunnan, was an important route by 
which beleaguered China could obtain external supplies during World War II. 
Authorities in India’s north-eastern states have repeatedly called for the reopening the 
old link to boost trade and the economy. For example, Assam’s Chief Minister 
Prafulla Kumar Mahanta argued, “This is the road that can bring drastic economic
1 “78change for good to the north-eastern region.” Similar statements have been made 
by other officials from that region.
Both Southwest China and Northeast India are backward regions where foreign trade 
is limited. Thus, it seems natural for both sides to become the gateway to international
127 Chen Jidong, “Zhongguo-Miandain-Yindu lu shang maoyi tongdao jianshe chutan” (“An initial 
study of the building of a land passage o f trade from China via Burma to India”), Nanya yanjiu 
jikan, no.2, 1998, pp. 1-7.
128 The Indian Express (internet edition), January 10, 2001.
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commerce rather than remain as an isolated comer. The political relations between 
China and India have generally improved over the last decade, laying a sound basis 
for economic cooperation; thus, the atmosphere is more conducive to cooperation than 
ever before. The proposal for the sub-regional quadrangle cooperation and the 
transport links has received broad support from the academic communities of China 
and India.
As for the sub-regional economic integration, there is a major initiative that involves 
China’s Sichuan and Yunnan provinces, and India’s north-eastern states, Myanmar 
and Bangladesh. This track-II Kunming Initiative, named after the capital of China’s 
Yunnan province, came out of an academic symposium called the “Conference on 
Regional Cooperation and Development among China, India, Myanmar and 
Bangladesh”. The symposium, which took place in Kunming in August 1999, was 
jointly organised, by the Yunnan Academy of Social Science and the Yunnan 
Provincial Economic and Technological Research Center. As a consequence of the 
conference, the “Kunming Initiative” was discussed and signed by the leaders of the 
four delegations. The main thrust of the exercise was to exhort the governments 
concerned to establish a forum for sub-regional economic cooperation comprising 
China, India, Myanmar, and Bangladesh. They believed that the economies in the sub- 
region can be strengthened significantly through increased cooperation by the
190quadrangle.
Formal approval of the four governments is necessary for the success of the initiative. 
During his visit to China in May-June 2000, Indian President K. R. Narayanan
129 See “Kunming changyi” (“Kunming Initiative”), Nanya yanjiu (South Asian Studies), no.2, 1999, 
p.94; also P.V. Indiresan, “The Kunming Initiative,” The Frontline, April 1-14,2000, pp.98-100.
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welcomed the initiatives, saying that there was a “real opportunity now to inject
i i neconomic and technical content” into Sino-Indian relations. During his visit to India
in January 2002, Chinese Premier Zhu Rongji talked about the necessity to promote
111further regional economic cooperation. However, the response from New Delhi 
about the regional economic cooperation was still lukewarm. As a result, the 
implementation of the Kunming Initiative has not taken place due to a lack of official 
approval and participation. In particular, Indian policymakers seem to have a deep 
anxiety about being part of a sub-regional grouping with China.
The most frequently cited argument against India-China economic integration paints 
the two countries as natural competitors in labour-intensive exports where the success 
ofrone would reduce opportunities for the other. There is a fear in India that the 
land bridge might benefit the Chinese side only, and would not bring greater 
prosperity to India’s northeast, because after gaining cheaper Chinese imports may 
dominate Indian domestic markets after gaining direct access those markets. The 
Indian side was accused of placing obstacles in the way of economic engagement due 
to the consideration that some of the Chinese activities may damage Indian security. 
For example, the Indian government has been considering imposing curbs on foreign 
direct investment (FDI) from China along with other suspicious neighbours, such as 
Pakistan and Bangladesh, on national security grounds.133 The Chinese also finds 
difficult to get or extend their Indian working visas.
130 The Hindu, June 3, 2000, p. 1.
131 Renmin Ribao, January 15, 2002, p .l.
132 Swaran Singh, “China-India: expanding economic engagement,” Strategic Analysis, vol. XXIV, no. 
10, January 2001, pp. 1813-1831.
133 The Economic Times (internet edition), September 27, 2002.
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Another reason for India’s concern is the long-term consequences in the troubled 
Northeast after an increase in exchanges across the border.134 For India, there is 
reason to worry that the openness will increase the links between border communities, 
such as the Nagas, with their cousin communities living across the border, as well as 
strengthening rebellious elements among such tribes. Given that the Chinese have 
sponsored rebellion in the past, the Indian government believes that the best option is 
to maintain the status quo and keep the borders closed to the Chinese side to prevent
1 'y e
any external influence over disaffected people in the region.
Therefore, India, disapproving of the quadrangle proposal, has appeared to feel more 
comfortable in boosting sub-regional cooperation by bypassing and excluding China. 
For example, after setting up a sub-regional grouping called the Bangladesh, India, 
Myanmar, Sri Lanka, Thailand Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC) in June 1997, 
India, in November 2000, launched the Mekong Ganga Cooperation (MGC) project 
with five ASEAN and Mekong river basin countries - Myanmar, Laos, Cambodia, 
Thailand and Vietnam.
The establishment of the forum gave rise to some speculation. The MGC was 
preceded by initiatives similar to the Mekong Basin Project, set up in early 1996 and 
involving Myanmar, Cambodia, China, Laos, Thailand and Vietnam. The Mekong 
River runs through China, bearing the name Lancang Jiang, and China has fully 
engaged in the Mekong Basin projects. China also promoted the Lancang-Mekong 
River navigation programme with Myanmar, Laos and Thailand in April 2000, in a 
bid to improve the conditions of navigation and make heavy-duty ships operational on
134 C. Raja Mohan, “India & its extended neighbourhood,” The Hindu, June 8,2000, p. 12.
135 Indiresan, “The Kunming Initiative,”p.98.
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the river. However, China has not been invited to join the new grouping, even though
some commentators have already pointed out that BIMST-EC’s effectiveness has been
1reduced by the exclusion of China.
Indian External Affairs Minister Jaswant Singh tried to dispel the doubts about 
China’s absence, saying the project is not against any country and does aim to replace 
anyone in any grouping.137 However, the grouping still had no desire to expand the 
membership, although China informally expressed to India its interest in associating 
itself with the MGC.138 The message is clear that India does not feel comfortable in 
engaging China in a sub-regional cooperation framework.
A development that is similarly in contrast to the enthusiasm of the Kunming 
Initiative was seen in the transport links project. Neither China nor India has made 
any coordinated efforts to build any links between the contiguous regions, choosing 
instead to construct links with other neighbouring countries. For its part, China is 
helping Myanmar build and improve roads from the China-Myanmar border. The
1TQroads are seen both as a new trade route and military corridor to the Indian Ocean. 
Meanwhile, an 1850-km Kunming-Bangkok Road via Laos is expected to be fully 
operational by 2012 with the parts in China having been completed already.
On the other hand, the Indian Ministry of External Affairs donated a 160-km Tamu- 
Kalewa-Kalemyo road, inaugurated in February 2001 and known as the India- 
Myanmar Friendship Road, to Myanmar. The road is an improvement of a World War
136 Salman Haidar, “Sub-Regional Initiatives,” The Statesman (internet edition), August 10,2004.
137 Hindustan Times (internet edition), November 10, 2000.
138 The Hindu, July 29, 2001, p.9.
139 “Danger: road works ahead,” Far Eastern Economic Review, December 21, 2000, pp.26-27.
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II road, connecting the Indian town of Moreh in Manipur to central Myanmar.140 A 
road linking India, Myanmar and Thailand has also been under discussion.141 As 
China and India exercise their own options to foster sub-regional cooperation without 
the involvement of the other side, scepticism will continue to affect Sino-Indian 
economic interactions. For example, the Chinese considered the construction of the 
India-Myanmar Friendship Road as “conspicuous”. 142 No matter what their real 
intention is, both India and China will view any project engaging a third party as an 
attempt to undermine the other’s strategic influence; this will thereby impair the 
bilateral relationship. On the other hand, while advances are made by China and other 
neighbouring countries, the Indian side still hesitates to embrace sub-regional 
cooperation because it fears seeing China reinforce its position in the region.
5.4 Conclusion
On issues relating to regional competition and cooperation, this thesis has pointed out 
Chinese and Indian security concerns about each other’s behaviour in the context of 
regional issues. Since independence, India has regarded the South Asian sub-continent 
as a strategic entity and has been attempting to take advantage of its geographical 
advantages, large territory and rich resources to capture the leadership in South 
Asia.143 However, China’s relations with other South Asian states have worried New 
Delhi and contributed to the Indian threat perception regarding China. China’s 
engagement with other South Asian states has been seen in New Delhi as a long-term 
strategy to challenge India’s dominance in South Asia. On the other hand, the smaller
140 The Hindu, February 14, 2001, p. 1
141 Renmin Ribao, April 8, 2002, p.7.
142 Qian Feng, “Yin Mian gong zhu hezuo lu” (“India and Myanmar cooperate to construct road”), 
Renmin Ribao, February 20, 2001, p.3.
143 Shao Zhiyong, “India’s Big Power Dream,” Beijing Review, April 12, 2001, p. 10.
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South Asian states have used their relations with China to counterbalance India’s 
influence.144 China, for its part, also welcomes the attempts of the South Asian states 
to maintain an equal distance between India and China. India’s worries that it is being 
surrounded by hostile nations that are friendly with China have grown. India’s arch­
enemy in the west, Pakistan, has long been a close ally of China, India’s rival for 
influence in the region.
As previously mentioned, in the post-Cold War era, China changed its past thinking 
and began a trend of not exploiting India’s conflict with other South Asian states. 
Although China would still like to keep its influence in the region, it does not want to 
see its peripheral region unstable and is no longer eager for the fray as it was in the 
Mao era. Insteady China expresses support for regional stability and cooperation 
among the South Asian states. In addition to displaying cautious neutrality in the 
India-Pakistan conflict, Beijing is also reluctant to be dragged into any conflicts 
between India and other South Asian states.
However, this change in China’s policy stance is not because of India’s greater 
investment with China, but is based on China’s own interests and needs. Adopting a 
more balanced South Asia is not a diplomatic gesture of good faith by the Chinese. 
Instead, it is a decision to ensure that China’s own development would not be derailed 
by the India-Pakistan disputes. That is, China did not intentionally change its South 
Asian policy to please New Delhi. As a result, although Beijing has sought to 
minimise the adverse effect that confrontation might have on Sino-Indian relations, it 
is unlikely that it would limit Sino-Pakistani cooperation to meet India’s demands.
144 John W. Garver, “China-India Rivalry in Nepal: The Clash over Chinese Arms Sales,” Asian Survey, 
vol.XXXI, no. 10, October 1991, p.957.
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Nevertheless, there is an impression that Beijing has tended to take advantage of 
India’s difficulties with its smaller neighbours in the subcontinent. Although China’s 
relations with smaller neighbours have not resulted in any formal military alliance 
against India, India has been wary of a two-flank attack by China and Pakistan along 
its northern border. Indian scholars still believe that China’s indulgence with India’s 
smaller neighbours “does have a major influence on the South Asian threat perception 
that mainly moulds the South Asian security profile.”145
F of India, one goal of its security and foreign policy is to find an effective way to 
successfully counter the threat from China. The threat perception about China partly 
explains India’s focus on building military relations with ASEAN after it launched the 
Look East Policy. One of the attractions of close relations with India from the 
standpoint of ASEAN states is the belief that those relations will help mitigate the 
effects of Chinese pressure in the region. Thus, both India and ASEAN countries find 
common interests in building stronger ties. Although the Look East Policy was not 
originally designed as a grand strategic plan to counter China’s influence in the region, 
India is now treating its engagements with states in the region, especially in the area 
of military cooperation, as a counterbalance to China’s rising influence.
The competitive aspect of India-China relations is alive and well, and is marked by 
the different views of China-Pakistan military relations and India’s intention of 
engaging ASEAN states and Japan. However, at the moment, the Chinese do not 
worry too much as, according to their assessment, India lacks the ability to convert
145 Swaran Singh, “Sino-South Asian Ties: Problems & Prospects,” Strategic Analysis, vol. XXIV, no.l, 
April 2000, pp.31-49.
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South-East Asia into a “strategic backyard”.
While there is rivalry between India and China for influence in the region, there is 
also a cooperative dimension of Sino-Indian relations, built on the cause against terror, 
expanding sub-regional economic cooperation, and joining the other dominated 
regional groupings. The aspect of cooperation might provide an alternative to the two 
sides to go beyond the consideration of geopolitical encirclement.
Despite the potential strategic ploy to contain each other, both China and India sense 
the need to secure and extend their influence in the regions and forge closer relations 
with other neighbours on their journey to becoming a world power recognised by the 
international community. That is, their competition in the region is not always China- 
specific or India-specific. However, China and India are still aware of the pressure, as 
their strategic space is squeezed by the extension of each other’s influence. The 
Chinese saying, “Two tigers cannot live together on one mountain”, pithily 
summarises the situation.
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Chapter 6: China-India Relations in the Global Context
The future of China-India interactions is widely believed to a crucial factor in shaping 
the international order. China and India are big developing countries with populations 
of more than one billion as well as being rising players in the international system; 
their interactions not only affect the two countries, but also international society; the 
China-India relationship has gone beyond the bilateral context and acquired a global 
dimension. Just as China suggested, “a stable, normal and friendly relationship 
between China and India not only conforms with the fundamental interests of the two 
countries, but also helps promote peace, stability and development throughout Asia 
and even in the world as a whole.” 1 On the contrary, if  China and India work to 
counterbalance each other, it will serve the interests of the so-called “hegemonist”.
So far, several possibilities regarding how China-India interactions could shape the 
international order have been discussed. Of these, the most noticeable includes an 
Indo-American alliance against China, a China-India-Russia strategic triangle against 
the US, and tChindia’ as a dominant player in international society. These in fact are 
related to two different strategies of reducing threat perception: balancing and 
bandwagoning. The following sections will discuss the three scenarios which are 
helpful for understanding the future development of China-India relations.
6.1 Indo-American Alliance
1 “Foreign Ministry News Briefings,” Beijing Review, July 5, 1999, p.l 5.
2 Ye Zhengjia, “Zhong yin jianjiao 50 zhou nian -  jingyan, jiaoxun, ji qianjing”(“Sino-Indian relations
in the past 50 years: experiences, lessons and prospects”), Nanya yanjiu (Southeast Asian Studies), 
no.l, 1999, p. 10.
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Throughout the Cold War, India was viewed suspiciously by the US as being part of 
the Soviet camp. India’s nonalignment orientation was described as “immoral” by the 
then US Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles. On the other hand, American military 
cooperation with Pakistan and rapprochement with China undermined the possibility 
of building a close Indo-American relationship. US foreign policy towards South Asia 
was biased towards Pakistan. It was not surprising, then, that Indo-US collaboration 
had a low profile throughout most of the Cold War.
The Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, along with the collapse of the Soviet Union 
and the economic reforms launched by India since 1991 have given rise to the 
prospect of an enhanced level of interaction between India and the US. During the 
Gulf crisis, New Delhi gave American military craft permission to refuel at Mumbai,, 
but widespread domestic criticism forced the Indian government to recall the offer. 
During Chinese Premier Li Peng’s visit to India in 1991, there was a brief mention of 
a shared opposition to “international oligarchies”, but this was also quickly dropped 
and was not mentioned in the joint communique.4 The Indian Prime Minister, P. V. 
Narasimha Rao, broke with precedent to visit Washington in May 1994 before making 
a similar visit to Moscow. The move sent a strong signal that his government wanted 
to enhance Indo-American relations even at the risk of piquing India’s traditional ally. 
In fact, it is logical for India to turn its focus to the American capital, market and 
technology in the post-Soviet era, as the US is the sole remaining global superpower.
On the other hand, the US also adjusted its South Asia policy, and gradually put
3 Daniel Joseph Kuba and G. V. Vaidyanathan, “A Chronology of India-US Relations, 1941-2000,” in 
Kanti Bajpai and Amitabh Mattoo, Engaged Democracies: India-US relations in the 21st Century 
(New Delhi: Har-Anand Publications Pvt Ltd., 2000), p. 182.
4 Mira Sinha Bhattachaijea, “New Directions: Ending the past, opening up the future,” Frontline,
September 25-October 8, 1993, p.125.
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increasing emphasis on India’s potential as a rising economy and a strategic partner. 
At almost the same time, the US Commerce Department named India as one of the 
world’s big emerging markets. Indo-US economic relations have expanded 
remarkably over the past few years, as trade and investment is now one of 
cornerstones of the revitalised Indo-US relationship.
Evolving a Strategic Partnership
India-US relations have continued to witness intensive engagement regarding a 
qualitative transformation over the past few years. There is strong willingness on both 
sides to strengthen their ties further and to develop a strategic partnership. The two 
countries have been involved in institutional dialogues and interactions on issues of 
mutual concerns and interests, from the issues of defence, combating international 
terrorism to trade, and science and technology. The two countries have also increased 
the number of military exchanges and have conducted joint exercises on a regular 
basis.
However, the improvement in Indo-American relations was affected by India’s 
nuclear tests of 1998. In addition to postponing President Clinton’s visit to India, 
Washington also put economic sanctions on India to force it to join the non­
proliferation regime. However, India has since successfully repaired its relations with 
the US by conducting formal consultations and resuming high-level visits.
Indo-American relations after the 1998 tests first came to a climax when US President 
Clinton resumed his delayed visit to India and Pakistan in March 2000. He was the 
fourth American President to have visited India, and the first American president to
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have visited India in the 22 years since President Jimmy Carter’s tour in 1978. He 
spent five days in India, but only five hours in Pakistan. During his visit, India and the 
US signed a document entitled “India-US Relations: A Vision fo r  the 21st Century”, 
pledging to deepen the partnership through institutionalised dialogue and engagement 
in regular consultations. They also agreed that US President and Indian Prime 
Minister should meet regularly. India and the US were referred to as “partners in 
peace, with a common interest in and complementary responsibility for ensuring 
regional and international security.” 5 Although the two sides failed to reach an 
agreement on nuclear non-proliferation, an issue that President Clinton termed 
important to realise the full potential of the Indo-American relationship,6 there is no 
denying that Indo-American relations have improved significantly.
Although the war against terrorism made the US restore US-Pakistan strategic 
relations, the role of India has also been well-recognised by Washington. That is, the 
US does not treat India on par with Pakistan, but does accept that India has much 
more strategic importance in the region. In an important manifestation of the 
qualitative change in India-US relations, the US President, George W. Bush, and the 
Indian Prime Minister, Vajpayee, announced The Next Steps in the Strategic 
Partnership (NSSP) in January 2004, which covered cooperation in four areas -  
civilian space, civilian nuclear energy, dual-use items and missile defence. In March 
2005, the US revealed that it will “make India a major power in the 21st century”.7 
Unlike its concerns over China’s rise, the Bush administration considered the rise of 
India as adding value to its strategic plot.
5 For the text, see The Hindu, March 22, 2000.
6 Bill Clinton, “What I Hope to Accomplish on My Trip to South Asia,” International Herald Tribune, 
March 19,2000, p.8.
7 Press Trust o f  India, March 26 2005.
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US President Bush then termed India as America’s “natural partner” and visited India
o r
in May 2006 to advance the strategic partnership with India. Both countries 
announced their desire to establish a global partnership. Some analysts even thought 
that Bush’s visit could bear some similarities to Nixon’s opening to China in 1973.9 
That is, the US would like to bring India onto the world stage as a major player and 
make use of the Indo-American links to alter the strategic landscape.
As. attitudes are changing in both capitals, New Delhi acquired more strategic clout 
with Washington after Bush’s visit. The Indo-American defence ties have been 
warming up over the last few years after a hiatus in mid-1998. As one major element 
of the enhanced bilateral engagement, India and the US sustained the momentum in 
expanding defence cooperation. Such cooperation received a significant boost, as 
manifested by the large number of high level visits that took place on both sides. For 
example, the US Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff visited India in February 2002. 
The Indian Chief of Army Staff visited the US in April 2002, the Chief of Air Staff in 
June 2002, and the Chief of Naval Staff in September 2002. The US Army Chief also 
paid a visit to India in February 2003.
The adjustment of the US policy towards India is another issue that Beijing is 
carefully observing. The George W. Bush administration soon waived economic 
sanctions upon India and Pakistan after the events of September 11, 2001 (9/11) to 
seek the two countries’ support. More significantly, the military cooperation between
8 See President George W. Bush’s Address at Asia Society on February 22, 2006, the text is available at 
<http://www.asiasociety.org/policy-politics/president-addresses-asia-society-discusses-india-and- 
pakistan>.
9 Fareed Zakaria, “Nixon to China, Bush to India,” Newsweek (internet edition), February 27, 2006.
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India and the US also gained momentum after the September 11 terrorist attacks. In 
April 2002, India signed a $146 million deal with the US to purchase eight AN/TPQ- 
37 Firefinder weapon locating radars. This was the first major govemment-to- 
govemment weapons transaction in more than three decades between India and the 
US. A US Defence Department statement read, “This sale will contribute to the 
foreign policy and national security interests of the US by helping to improve the 
security of a country that has been and continues to be a force for political stability 
and economic progress in South Asia.”10
In May 2002, the US and India conducted the first ever large scale military exercises 
in Agra, India. Codenamed “Balance Iroquois”, the exercise was the first US-India 
joint exercise in seven years. In September 2002, India and the US resumed the 
Malabar series of joint naval exercise, which had been interrupted because of India’s 
nuclear tests in 1998. The two sides also conducted another joint exercise in Alaska, 
the first such exercise involving Indian troops and airmen on American soil. In 
October 2002, the US sent its fighter jets to India for the first ever India-US air 
exercise over Indian territory in almost 40 years, while the Indian Air Force was sent 
outside the subcontinent for the first time to hold an exercise with the US in Alaska in 
July 2004. The significant improvement in India-US military ties might not be 
directly aimed against China, but the development has cast a shadow on China’s 
security environment.
Counterbalancing China
The rise of China is one of the major factors that influence US policy towards India.
10 The Hindu, April 19,2002.
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After the demise of the USSR, China has been seen as a possible challenger to the US 
in the future, and the US has watched China’s rise in international society and its 
military modernisation with misgivings. It is thought that the US would like to 
contain China by establishing an anti-China alliance.
It is not news that defence papers issued by India and the US have always described 
China as a potential threat. The US is aware of India’s security concerns over China. 
For example, during a Congressional panel hearing, the US Assistant Secretary of 
State for South Asian Affairs, Karl Inderfurth, confirmed that “Pakistan is certainly a 
component in India’s security considerations but not the only one, indeed, not the 
major one.” After his “fact-finding” visit to India, US Senator Gary Ackerman 
concluded that there was a consensus in the mainstream Indian political leadership 
that China is its main adversary in the region, although Indian leaders shy away from 
publicly identifying China as India’s main military threat in order to maintain the 
charade of diplomatic politeness.11
Despite India attracting less foreign investment than China does, some commentators 
in India believe that there are opinions in the West in favour of India rather than of 
China. India’s democratic system and values, political culture, and greater 
transparency in military matters seem to be more favourable to the West, and place
17India above China in the eyes of many Westerners. The perception of China’s 
growing threat may make the US lean more towards India. As China’s military grows 
more formidable, there might be a greater coincidence of interests between India and
11 The Hindu (internet edition), March 5,1999.
12 Kaushik Sen, “India, China and the United States,” in Kanti Bajpai and Amitabh Mattoo eds., The 
Peacock and the Dragon: India-China Relations in the 21st Century (New Delhi: Har-Anand 
Publications Pvt Ltd., 2000), p.272.
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1 ^the Western powers in thinking about a more effective balance to manage Beijing.
In pursuit o f a shared objective of dissuading China from aggressive actions, India’s 
counterbalance against China is seen as a visible interest in broadening the ambit of 
US-India defence cooperation. The US would like to groom India as a counterbalance 
to China. Many analysts see the Indo-American joint manoeuvres as efforts by a 
democratic coalition to contain the rise of China. The India-US nuclear deal is viewed 
as a significant step in this direction. The Indo-American strategic nexus is likely to 
continue and to be reinforced further with the growing rift between China and the US 
or China and India.
Beijing is keenly observing the increasing closeness of Indo-American relations, 
especially on issues relating to military cooperation. Beijing seems to be increasingly 
worried about the formation of Indo-American strategic cooperation, which suggests a 
pattern of alliance-building activities that China cannot ignore. From the Chinese 
perspective, the coming together of the US and India could well serve Washington’s 
plans to contain China’s growing economic and military might in Asia.
The shared security concerns regarding China’s rise can be an incentive to boost Indo- 
American relations. New Delhi is, however, hesitant to become a pawn of the US 
coalition to contain China, though India would like to have America’s blessings and 
develop the facility to become a world power. Even the Chinese side does not believe 
that India will join the US in confronting China. At the moment, Beijing deems that 
“India will not blindly follow the lead of the US”14 The considerations within the
13 James Manor and Gerald Segal, “Taking India Seriously,” Survival, vol.40, no,2, Summer 1998, p.67.
14 See, for example, Zhang Lixia, Shen Lin, and Ren Yan, “Zhoubian guojia bu mangcong, Mei baowei
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Chinese leadership are whether it should maintain some relations with India or let 
India unite with the US on the international stage. Understanding the significance, 
Beijing will engage with New Delhi if  it senses that India would unite with the US at 
the international level. As some Indian analysts have pointed out, the difficulties in 
the relations between Beijing and Washington will then play an important role in 
encouraging the Chinese leadership to accelerate the process of normalising relations 
with India.15
It is clear that America’s global security interests take priority over India’s hope to 
become an independent power. That is, the US wants to help India to become a power 
to fulfil Washington’s own strategic goals, not in order to fulfil those of New Delhi. 
As. a result, the US has been opposing the Iran-India-Pakistan pipeline project, which 
is important for India’s energy security.
Pakistan-US relations and nuclear issues also remain as obstacles in developing a 
closer Indo-American friendship. Washington had no intention of developing Indo- 
American relations while ignoring Pakistan, no matter what kind of government was 
in power. The US Assistant Secretary of State for South Asian Affairs, Karl Inderfurth, 
did deny the concept of a tilt towards India, stressing that the US wants to maintain a 
good relationship with both India and Pakistan.16 During the visit of Alan Eastham, 
acting US Assistant Secretary of State, to South Asia in April 2001, he reiterated 
Islamabad’s importance in the region and said that the US has no intention of
Zhongguo de tumou jiang luokong huan qiu shi bao” (“Neighbouring countries do not follow blindly, 
the US plot to encircle China comes to no avail”), Huanqiu shibao (Global Times), March 23, 2005, 
p.7.
15 C. Raja Mohan, “Third parties in Sino-Indian ties,” The Hindu (internet edition), June 15, 1999.
16 Renmin Ribao, March 25,2000, p.4.
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abandoning Pakistan while forging a closer relationship with India.17 Although the US 
has accepted India’s de facto nuclear status, it still encourages India to accede to the 
existing nuclear non-proliferation regime.
As a result, in assessing India’s strategic alignment with the US, on one side are those 
who see the evolving Indo-American strategic partnership as a historic opportunity to 
secure a power status with the assistance of the world’s most powerful nation. On the 
other side are those who feel that this partnership would constrain India’s autonomy 
and erode its sovereign decision-making rights, because the US views India as its 
junior partner.
Traditionally, India, by and large, perceives the US as a nation given to hegemonic 
manoeuvres. It should be noted, for example, that in his speech at Peking University 
in 1993, Indian Prime Minister Narasimha Rao spoke out against affluent countries 
that were trying to “choke off the legitimate needs of developing countries” and asked
I o
how this “new suppressive process” could be resisted. Some commentators tend to 
identify the US as a fickle partner instead of a reliable ally, and worry that the change 
of its foreign policy may harm India’s interests.19
The Indian analyst C. Raja Mohan have argued that India has no interest in seeking a 
new Cold War confrontation between Washington and Beijing, because India’s long­
term objective is to emerge as an indispensable element in the Asian balance of
17 The Hindu (internet edition), April 18,2001.
18 “Beyond Borders: Sino-Indian ties after Narasimha Rao’s visit,” Frontline, September 25-October 8, 
1993, p. 123.
19 Mohan Malik, “High Hopes: India’s Response to US Security Policies,” Asian Affairs- An American 
Review, vol.30, no. 2, Summer 2003, pp.104-112.
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power. Indian External Affairs Minister Jaswant Singh also sought to dispel the 
misperception in China about an incipient alliance between New Delhi and
Washington. He insisted that India’s relations with the US would stand on their own
01merit and not be linked to American ties with a third party.
In the short term, however, New Delhi and Washington may also believe that the 
improvement of their bilateral relationship could generate greater foreign policy 
leverages for each other. The US may use India’s growing economic and military 
might ta  meet its strategic needs in Asia and to limit further Chinese influence in the
region. The US President George W Bush argued even more, saying the relationship
00has the power to transform the world. No matter how the Chinese side perceives 
India-US military relations, India will continue to maintain good relations with the US. 
Meanwhile, it is not in India’s interests to spoil relations with China. That is, India is 
not ready to behave like Japan, a reliable ally of the US in East Asia. As a result, 
sometimes India seems inclined to jump on the bandwagon with the US, and 
sometimes to act in pursuit of its own goals.
6.2 China-Russia-India Strategic Triangle
The idea of establishing a strategic triangle consisting of China, Russia and India was 
first mooted by the then Russian Prime Minister Yevgeny Primakov when he visited 
New Delhi in December 1998. In replying to questions at a press conference, 
Primakov said that it would be good to establish a China-India-Russia strategic
20 C. Raja Mohan, “India, China and the United States,” in Bajpai and Mattoo eds., Engaged 
Democracies: India-US relations in the 21st Century, p .31.
21 The Hindu (internet edition), April 19,2001.
22 Press Trust o f India, March 3, 2006.
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triangle.23 Since then, the idea of establishing a China-India-Russia strategic triangle 
and its implications surface occasionally, as people are concerned with the possibility 
that the three countries will transform the potential for an alliance into a formal 
alliance. Although Moscow soon clarified that the remark was not a formal proposal, 
ties between the three nations have since grown dramatically, as a series of bilateral 
pacts have been signed to define the direction of the relationship. Close attention is 
being paid to the question of whether China and India are also in favour of turning 
their bilateral relationship with Russia into a trilateral bloc.
In fact, China has conducted so-called “partnership diplomacy” with many countries 
and regions. As far as Sino-Indian relations and Sino-Russian relations are concerned, 
in 1994, China and Russia established a constructive partnership looking towards the 
21st century and then a “partnership of strategic coordination” in April 1996, while 
China and India set up a “constructive cooperative partnership oriented towards the 
21st century” in November 1996 and a “strategic and cooperative partnership for 
peace and prosperity” in April 2005. Besides, India and Russia have also extended the 
special relationship founded in the former Soviet Union era. An India-Russia strategic 
partnership was established in 1997, and the strategic partnership agreement was 
concluded in 2000. Therefore, in theory, it would be neither strange nor difficult for 
the three countries to transform their declared bilateral strategic partnership into a 
triangular format.
China, India and Russia are among the world’s seven declared nuclear nations, and 
the three nations combined have a third of the world’s population. China and Russia 
have already secured permanent membership of the UN Security Council while India
23 The Hindu (internet edition), December 22, 1998.
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is widely tipped to gain a new seat on an expanded UN Security Council. The 
combined strength of the three countries is forecast to increase.24 Such a group 
covering China, India, and Russia could act as a counterweight to the US on the 
international scene. A strategic triangle alliance may bring about a new world order 
where the US does not have such a preponderance of power. Even if the three 
countries do not build up a strategic partnership to counterbalance the US, they will 
find areas for cooperation. As cooperation among the three countries increases, so will 
their weight in international affairs. However, despite the intense discussions in the 
three countries involved and the international community, the concept has not yet 
become a reality due to various constraints.
From the Chinese perspective, the China-India-Russia cooperation has a rich and 
positive potential because the three countries all advocate a multi-polar world order 
and the establishment. of a just and fair new international order, and object to the
25hegemonism and the US-dominated international order in the post-Cold War era. 
For India and Russia, a multi-polar political order is also desirable, because they can 
share power with the other great powers in determining how the world should be 
governed. Not surprisingly, the similar viewpoints shared by China, Russia and India 
on major international issues are thus seen as the basis for further development of 
their trilateral relationship.26 As a result, it is likely that China, India, and Russia
24 See, for example, the US National Intelligence Council, Mapping the Global Future: Report o f  the 
National Intelligence Council's 2020 Project, Washington D.C., December 2004, available at 
<http://www.cia.gov/nic/NIC_globaltrend2020.html>.
25 For this point, see Yin Xinan, “Lengzhanhou Zhong Yin E sanbian hezuo chutan” (“Atrial discussion 
of the trilateral relationship among China, India and Russia after the Cold War”), Nanya yanjiu jikan  
(South Asian studies Quarterly), no.l, 2003, pp.52-53.
26 Yang Chengxu, “Fazhan Zhong E Yin san guo guan xi de kenengxing he qingjing” (“Possibilities and 
prospects o f developing relations among Russia, India and China”), Guoji yventi yanjiu (Journal o f 
International Studies), no.6, 2001, p .l; Liu Xuecheng, “Zhong E Yin san guo guanxi zhong de 
xietiao yu hezuo”(“Coordination and cooperation in China-Russia-India relations”), Dangdai yatai
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would work together in the international field in order to promote the establishment of 
an international order and a multi-polar world.
This thinking was shared by the Indian and Russian sides. For example, an editorial in 
The Hindu argued, “Among the ways of dissuading the US from arrogating to itself 
the role of a global policeman would be for Russia, India and China to get together in 
a strategic axis to pre-empt the aggressive and interventionist strides that the US is
97now taking across the world stage.” In addition, the Russian Foreign Ministry’s 
senior spokesman, Alexander Yakovenko, said, “Interaction between Russia, China 
and India could become a useful tool for the consolidation of international and 
regional stability, and the counteraction to threats and challenges of the modem era.”
US policy provided a good setting and opportunities for China, India and Russia to 
voice their joint concerns about the global order. It should be recalled that Russian 
Prime Minister Primakov’s suggestion about the strategic triangle came at a time 
when the US and Britain launched the bombardment of Iraq, bypassing the United 
Nations Security Council. Interestingly, Russia had shown its approval of the idea of 
trilateral interactions barely a year earlier when the then Indian External Affairs 
Minister I. K. Gujral had asked the then Russian Foreign Minister Primakov to 
arrange a trilateral meeting because the Indian External Affairs Minister and his 
Chinese counterpart were staying in Russia at the same time.29 The reason Russia 
moved from its previous stance was on account of its increasing distress over the
(Contemporary Asia-Pacific Studies), no. 12, 2001, pp.26-27.
27 Editorial, “Strategic triangle” (Primakov’s statement), The Hindu (internet edition), December 23, 
1998.
28 Itar-Tass, May 26, 2003.
29 K. K. Katyal, “Beijing-Moscow-New Delhi trialogue,” The Hindu (internet edition), September 22, 
2003.
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unilateral nature of the US operation. Meanwhile, Russia sensed the need to take 
countermeasures to check the US geopolitical “offensive” in Eurasia, such as NATO’s 
eastward expansion right up to its borders.
In sharp contrast to the concept of an Indo-American strategic partnership to counter 
China’s increasing power, the idea of China-India-Russia strategic triangle reflected 
the thinking about the need to check the growing dominance by the US. Given the 
three countries’ common concern about US power politics, it would seem reasonable 
if China were to show some enthusiasm, for the proposal, because if the three 
countries were to move closer, it would help to reduce the domination or attempts at 
domination by other great powers.
However, at the very beginning, Prime Minister Primakov’s remarks proposing the 
strategic triangle were met with little enthusiasm in Beijing. Compared to India and 
Russia, there was surprisingly little discussion or debate in China on the idea of a 
“strategic triangle”. Beijing cold-shouldered the concept on the grounds that it was 
pursuing an independent foreign policy and had no intention of changing the 
fundamental policy of not entering into any strategic alliances or military blocs. It was 
reported that Primakov had raised the issue with the then Chinese Premier Zhu Rongji 
when the latter visited Moscow in February 1999. However, Zhu Rongji ruled out 
Russia’s proposal to develop a triangular alliance. Chinese Foreign Minister Tang 
Jiaxuan also asserted that China was not willing to forge a strategic triangle with India 
and Russia on the grounds that Beijing was pursuing an independent foreign policy of 
peace characterised by non-alliance.
30 Press Trust o f India, March 8, 1999.
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China’s reluctance to embrace the idea implied that there were some constraints about 
developing a China-India-Russia triangle. Although the three countries had the 
potential based on a common identity and common interests, and sensed the need to 
deepen the triangular cooperation in order to deal with issues of common concern, it 
was a very controversial move to transform the triangular cooperative mechanism into 
a political-military alliance, namely, a strategic triangle.
China’s Reluctance
Despite the common rhetoric and expectations about a new international order and the 
multi-polar world, China is finding it difficult to endorse the strategic triangle without 
reservation. The first major reason for the hesitancy is that China’s relations with 
India and Russia are not as mature as India-Russia relations.
Roughly speaking, the China-India-Russia triangle consists of three bilateral 
interactions: Sino-Russian relations, Indo-Russian relations, and Sino-Indian relations. 
Indo-Russian relations are far better than Sino-Russian relations and Sino-Indian 
relations. In other words, the China-India-Russia triangle is a scalene one: Indo- 
Russian relations are the strongest side of the scalene triangle as they have always 
remained strong. Despite the momentous changes in the international environment 
after the end of the Cold War, India and Russia have maintained close ties. During the 
visit to India in 1993 by the then Russian President Boris Yeltsin both sides signed the 
Treaty o f Friendship and Cooperation to set up a new framework for the post-Soviet 
era. The two countries then claimed to establish a strategic partnership in 1997. In 
April 1998, the leaders of Russia and India reaffirmed their commitment to 
establishing a strategic partnership. In October 2000, when Russian President
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Vladimir Putin visited India, the two countries issued the declaration of establishing a 
strategic partnership for developing future relations. One media comment was that 
“There are few examples of a relationship between countries that has been as stable as
O 1
the one between India and Russia.”
Sino-Russian relations also developed smoothly in the post-Soviet era. In 1992, China 
and Russia asserted that they treated each other as friendly countries. The two sides 
then built a “partnership of strategic coordination” in 1996, and concluded a Treaty o f  
Good-Neighbourliness and Friendly Cooperation in 2000. China and Russia also 
completely resolved their boundary problem in 2004. More importantly, the Sino- 
Soviet rivalry ceased to be a factor in China’s foreign relations after the Cold War.
However, the trust between Beijing and Moscow is not as solid as the one between 
India and Russia. Among various fields, one noticeable area of the China-India-Russia 
relationship is the field of military technology, as both China and India are the 
Russian defence industry’s largest clients. However, Russia has taken a sceptical view 
of China’s rise, as it is especially vigilant in the transfer of technology to China. For 
example, Russia has granted India a license to manufacture Su-30 fighters, whereas 
China acquired only the license to produce SU-27 fighters. That is, Beijing did not 
win the full trust of Moscow. The Chinese are aware that some analysts in Russia also 
see China as a future threat. One Chinese analyst even suggested that the future Sino- 
Russian relationship may vary from alliance to conflict, but will not go much beyond 
the present status. Some Chinese scholars have cited the imbalance between Russian
31 Editorial, “Indo-Russian Ties-I: continued convergence of interests,” The Statesman (internet edition), 
December 20,2004.
32 Ding Xiaoxing, “Zhongguo, Yindu zai Eluosi waijiao zhong de dingwei—dangdai quanqiuhua 
jincheng zhong de E  Zhong Yin y e  ping (“China and India in Russia’s diplomacy: a review of Russia, 
China and India in the current globalisation process”), Xiandai guoji guanxi (Contemporary
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military transfers to India and China as evidence that some Russians are very 
suspicious of a rising China and believe in the so-called “China threat” theory.
Worse, Sino-Indian relations are neither close enough nor strong enough to form a 
base for a strategic alliance. Despite a significant improvement in bilateral relations 
over recent years, China and India are far from being friends. The improvement in 
China-India relations in recent times may pave the way for the establishment of 
trilateral cooperation between New Delhi, Beijing and Moscow, but has not been 
significant enough for the three countries to form a strategic alliance.
In fact, both Beijing and New Delhi treated Primakov’s “strategic triangle” proposal 
with caution when the idea was first mooted, because Sino-Indian relations had 
reached a  low ebb in the wake of India’s nuclear tests of 1998.34 The former Chinese 
ambassador to New Delhi, Cheng Ruisheng, frankly admitted that the relationship 
between China and India was “not mature enough” even for a “strategic 
partnership”.
In addition, the Chinese side has pointed out that economic exchange between the
O f
three countries does not meet their potential. In fact, it is argued that if the major
International Relations), no.6, 2002, p.63.
33 Yu Huachuan, “Zhong E Yin sanbian hezuoyu Zhongguo de xuanze” (“Sino-Russo-Indian trilateral 
cooperation and China's choice), Guoji luntan (International Forum), vol.6, no.2, March 2004, p.43.
34 Yin Xinan, “Lengzhanhou Zhong Yin E sanbian hezuo chutan” (“A trial discussion of trilateral 
relationship among China, India and Russia after Cold War”), Nanya yanjiu jikan  (South Asian 
Studies Quarterly), no.l, 2003, p.50.
35 Agence France Presse, June 16, 1999.
36 This point is widely shared among Chinese scholars, see Yu Huachuan, “Zhong E Yin sanbian 
hezuoyu Zhongguo de xuanze,” p.43; Yang Chengxu, “Fazhan Zhong E Yin san guo guan xi de 
kenengxing he qingjing,” p.3. Liu Xuecheng, “Zhong E Yin san guo guanxi zhong de xietiao yu 
hezuo,” p.27.
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powers had stronger economic links and interdependence, the possibility of forming 
an alliance against a hegemony would be relatively higher. In the present 
circumstances, the relationship among the three countries cannot guarantee the 
success of forming a strategic triangle. Also, there is a need to find ways to overcome 
the distrust between China and India and between China and Russia before a trilateral 
alliance can be forged.
The US Factor
Another factor affecting the development of a strategic triangle is the US. As 
mentioned earlier, Russia’s reason for proposing the strategic triangle was its 
discontent about the US-dominated international order; this implies a strong resistance 
to America’s unilateralism. In fact, the initiative of establishing a strategic triangle had 
already been seen as a serious escalation of Russia’s determination to undermine 
America’s strategic dominance. Needless to say, the formation of an alliance would 
inevitably cause more tension between the three countries and the US.
Despite the concerns and dissatisfaction over US power politics, China in fact has no 
intention of confronting the US directly. Aside from the diplomatic gestures, Beijing 
has avoided giving the impression that it is at loggerheads with the US. Some Chinese 
scholars have even argued that their advocacy of a multi-polar world does not equal 
an anti-US position. Instead, China is well aware of the importance of sustaining a
37 Paul A. Papayoanou, “Economic Interdependence and the Balance of Power,” International Studies 
Quarterly, vol.41, no.l, 1997, pp. 113-140.
38 See, for example, Martin Sieff, “Primakov puts Russia in a strategic spot,” The Washington Times, 
December 27, 1998, p.AlO.
39 Wang Yizhou, “Duojihua bu dengyu fan Mei” (“Multi-polarization does not equal an anti-US 
position”), Huanqiu shibao, Autumn 6, 1999, p. 14.
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benevolent relationship with the US, because its relations with the US involve a lot of 
economic and strategic stakes. Despite its military might, America is also the gateway 
to a huge pool of capital, technology and trade opportunities.
China’s priority is to build up its own strength to promote its influence during the 
globalisation process. If China cannot play a bigger role in the multi-polar world, 
world multi-polarisation is meaningless for China. That is, China will object to the US 
strongly only if it feels state sovereignty and territorial integrity are undermined, such 
as during the EP3 incident.40 It may be noted that Beijing’s official statements have 
recently avoided using the terms “hegemonism” and “power politics” in referring to 
US actions.
In 1992, the then Chinese President Jiang Zemin stated that the guidelines of China’s 
US policy were ‘increasing trust, reducing trouble, reinforcing cooperation and 
avoiding confrontation’ (Zengjia xinren, jianshao moca, jiangqiang hezuo, bimian 
duikao). To some extent, the 16-word dictum still remains at the core of China’s US 
policy. The Hu (Jintao)-Wen (Jiaobao) leadership in Beijing continues to make every 
possible effort to avoid a direct confrontation with the US41 Thus, since the concept of 
a China-India-Russia strategic triangle carries connotations of an anti-America 
posture, Beijing is unwilling to uphold the triangle proposal.
Besides its disinclination to undermine Sino-American relations, the Chinese side is
40 On 1 April 2001, a United States Navy EP-3 surveillance plane collided with a Chinese F-8 fighter 
jet about 70 miles (110 km) away from China’s Hainan. The mid-air collision caused the death of a 
Chinese pilot. The Chinese then detained 24 crewmembers o f the EP-3 until US Government issued 
a letter of apology for the incident.
41 Willy Lam, “Beijing’s Alarm Over New US Encirclement Conspiracy,” China Brief, vol. 5, no.8, 
April 12, 2005, p.3.
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not confident about the strength of the China-India-Russia strategic triangle. The 
Chinese side argues that, even if China, India and Russia were to come together to 
oppose the US, it is still an asymmetric struggle because the three countries’ national 
strengths combined are still less than the strength of the US. According to Chinese 
scholars, although the populations of China, India and Russia account for 40% of the 
world total, and their territorial areas for 22.5% of the world total, the total amount of 
GDP of the three countries accounts only for about 6% of the world total, while the 
combined GDP of the US, the EU and Japan accounts for 70%.42 Therefore, Chinese 
scholars warned, joining such a bloc does not serve China’s interest.43
Similarly, a Chinese survey about national strength confirmed the imbalance between 
the US. and the China-India-Russia triangle by pointing out that US strategic resources 
account for 22.785% of the world’s strategic resources, while the figures for China, 
India and Russia are only 7.782%, 4.365% and 1.712% respectively.44 In other words, 
China not only finds it difficult to resist the allure of the US, but also believes that the 
China-India-Russia strategic triangle is still too weak to balance the US in any 
significant measure.
Since the Chinese side does not believe a China-India-Russia alliance would be strong 
enough to confront the US directly, Chinese officials have kept a certain distance from 
the triangle overture so as not to risk ruffling America’s feathers. Beijing has stressed
42 Yang Chengxu, “Fazhan Zhong E Yin san guo guan xi de kenengxing he qingjing,” p .l.
43 Yan Xuetong, “Guoji huanjing ji waijiao sikao” (“International environment and China’s foreign 
relations”), Xiandai guoji guanxi (Contemporary International Relations), no.8, 1999, p. 11.
44 See Hu Angang and Men Honghua, “Zhong Mei Ri E Yin youxing zhanlue ziyuabijiao: jian lun zhi 
zai ‘fu min qiang guo’ de Zhongguo da zhanlue” (“Comparisons of the tangible strategic resources 
between China, the United States, Japan, Russia, and India: and an assessment on China’s grand 
strategy o f ‘making the people rich and the country strong’”), Zhanlue yu guanli (Strategy and 
Management), no.2,2002, pp.26-41.
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that it does not desire an alliance on the one hand, and, on the other, that the trilateral 
interactions among China, India and Russia are not against any third party. For 
example, the then Chinese Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan argued that China was 
pursuing an independent foreign policy of peace and wished to develop, on the basis 
of the five principles of peaceful coexistence, friendly relations and cooperation with 
all countries, India and Russia included.45 Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao stressed that 
the exchanges and cooperation among China, India and Russia are not an alliance, and
46are not against any country.
As a result, some may suggest, the possibility of the emergence of such a strategic 
triangle remains quite low, and the talk of anti-American strategic alliances need not 
be taken too seriously 47 For example, the Director of the Washington-based Centre 
for Strategic and International Studies’ South Asia programme, Teresita Schaffer 
argued, “It’s hard to think in any short-term time horizon that this will turn into a
A Q
meaningful and durable forum for real international cooperation.” Indeed, at the 
moment, both China and India still favour cordial relations with Washington, and as a 
result, will avoid a direct covert confrontation with Washington or the construction of 
a formal bloc or military security arrangements against the US. However, China’s 
anxiety to secure a bigger position in a new international order will not simply 
disappear all of a sudden: there exists a great possibility that China will cooperate 
with Russia and India within an informal and loose framework on certain issues in 
order to balance the US influence.
45 Press Trust o f  India, in April 9, 2000.
46 See Renmin Ribao, April 13,2005, p .l.
47 See, for example, Editorial, “The Russia-India-China axis,” The Boston Globe, October 3,1999, p.E6.
48 Peter Kammerer, “Right wing wary o f a new order,” South China Morning Post, December 26,2004,
p. 12.
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For example, although China has not openly supported the establishment of a China- 
India-Russia strategic triangle, senior Chinese Foreign Ministry officials are of the 
opinion that there is scope for enhancing the understanding of important global issues 
of mutual concern.49 That is why the US intelligence authority has not ruled out the 
possibility of China, India, and Russia forming a de facto  geo-strategic alliance in an 
attempt to counterbalance US and Western influence.50 As relations between China, 
India and Russia improve, the conservatives in Washington will have cause to worry 
about the implications for American dominance. Some analysts have even cautioned 
that a new Cold War might be in the offing and at its focus will be China, India and 
Russia.51
The US. will not sit idly by watching the China-India-Russia strategic triangle or the 
so-called BRICs economic bloc take a more forbidding shape.52 The US would take 
countermeasures to sow discord among China-India-Russia interactions, especially to 
bring India into US alliances. One Chinese scholar has argued that the US is trying to 
belittle the possibility of China-India-Russia trilateral cooperation, and is 
exaggerating the contradictions between the three countries. Another Chinese scholar 
has commented that US arms sales to India after the 9/11 attacks is part of the US plan 
to cripple the trilateral relationship. In their eyes, the US is cultivating an adversary of 
China, and undermining Russia’s dominant share in India’s ammunitions market by
49The Press Trust o f  India, October 2, 2000.
50 See the report of the US National Intelligence Council, Global Trends 2015: A Dialogue about the 
Future with Nongovernment Experts (Washington D.C.: December 2000), p.81.
51 Kammerer, “Right wing wary of a new order,” p. 12.
52 The research paper o f Goldman Sachs gave the term “BRICs” to signify Brazil, Russia, India and 
China and anticipated that the BRICs’ economies would become a much larger force over the next 
fifty years. For details see Dominic Wilson and Roopa Purushothaman, Dealing with BRICs: the 
Path to 2050, Global Economics Paper No.99, October 1, 2003.
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equipping India.53
Regularised Trilateral Meetings
Along with building bilateral ties with India and China, Russia is actively promoting 
the trilateral cooperation among them. Conversely, at the beginning, China and India 
demonstrated a relatively lukewarm attitude towards the strategic triangle. Currently, 
although obstacles remain in moving towards a trilateral strategic partnership, 
unilateral tendencies on the part of the US are encouraging the three countries to 
move closer to each other. Some nuanced changes were seen in China’s and India’s 
attitudes towards the triangle proposal after the military action in Kosovo in 1999. 
The Chinese side argued that, although the three countries did not hold a formal 
meeting, they made similar declarations about their concerns54; the Kosovo war 
reminded the three countries that they shared common interests in international affairs. 
As a result, the idea of establishing a strategic triangle was raised again and won more 
positive responses from India and China.
As was discussed earlier, the “strategic triangle” dilemma facing China and the other 
countries is that they need a trilateral relationship with strategic significance to 
counterbalance US unilateralism, but they do not want to provoke the US needlessly. 
It seems that China and the other two countries have already found a way to deal with 
this dilemma. This is seen in their changed phraseology for the concept: the term 
“trilateral coordination and cooperation” is now used to describe the efforts to 
promote the trilateral relationship, instead of the somewhat contentious “strategic
53 Yin Xinan, “Lengzhanhou Zhong Yin E sanbian hezuo chutan,” p.54.
54 For this point, see Yin Xinan, “Lengzhanhou Zhong Yin E sanbian hezuo chutan,”,pp.50-51.
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triangle” phraseology.
Under the catchphrase “trilateral coordination and cooperation”, the trilateral 
interaction between Russia, India and China has vigorously developed in recent years, 
and an intensive political dialogue has been established. The three countries have 
begun to conduct an informal consultative exercise to make sure that the three 
countries can create and maintain the necessary coordination in international affairs. 
Since 2002, the Foreign Ministers of the three countries have often held trilateral 
meetings on the sidelines of the United Nations General Assembly session .in New 
York. Indian Ambassador to Russia* Krishnan Raghunath, observed that “Moscow, 
Delhi and Beijing are moving from non-governmental contacts in a triangular format 
to discussing issues of common concern at a high official level.”55 Thus, irrespective 
of the terminology, a loose China-India-Russia format was clearly emerging.56
As a result, is not surprising that the trilateral meetings evolved into a gathering of 
heads of state. In July 2006, the first China-India-Russia summit was held in St. 
Petersburg, Russia, to formulate the common agenda, the possibilities of joint 
cooperative actions to deal with issues such as terrorism and other global threats, 
energy security, and health and related matters. The three countries then promptly 
held the second summit in New Delhi and issued a Joint Communique concerning 
their shared desire to work together on energy, terror, security and trade.
Furthermore, some concrete suggestions on sensitive fields to promote the trilateral 
cooperation have been made and have prompted great media interest. For example,
55 The Hindu, February 22, 2004.
56 Fang Tien-sze, “Zhong E Yin zhubu mai xiang zhanlue sanjiao” (“China, Russia and India move to 
strategic triangle gradually”), Pingguo ribao (Apple Daily), July 20, 2004, p.A.15.
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the Russian Ambassador to India, Alexander Kadakin, revealed in 2004 that Russia 
and India were considering inviting China to jointly develop a fifth generation, multi- 
role fighter aircraft. A similar proposal was made earlier in January 2004 when the 
Russian Defence Minister Sergei Ivanov called publicly for Russia, India and China 
to strengthen cooperation in the military-technical sphere and in the joint development 
of new advanced weapons.58 Although the Chinese side frankly admitted that, there 
was a difficulty for the three countries to launch a joint programme of developing 
weapons operating under prevailing conditions, this kind of news continues to cause a 
stir.
Another interesting development is that, although Beijing flatly refuses to describe its 
relationship with India and Russia as an alliance partnership, it has been keen to 
conduct joint manoeuvres. In October 1999, Beijing and Moscow held their first joint 
naval exercises in the East China Sea. Such an event had not been seen even during 
the 1950s when China adopted a “lean-to-one-side” policy of aligning with the Soviet 
Union. Thereafter, the Sino-Indian naval exercises took place in November 2003, for 
the first time in the history of relations between the two countries. It seems to be only 
a matter of time before the three countries hold a trilateral exercise.
6.3 The Chindia Concept
The term “Chindia”, which refers to the combination of China and India, was coined 
by the then Indian Minister of State for Commerce Jairam Ramesh in 2004, and has 
since been used by some analysts as they hail the economic performance of the two
57 Huanqiu shibao, July 2, 2004, p. 16.
58 The Hindu (internet edition), January 19, 2004.
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countries and its impact. The fact that China and India declared the year 2006 as the 
“Year of China-India Friendship” was hailed by some observers as a realisation of the 
Chindia idea and the resurrection of “Hindi Chini bhai bhaF.59 The expectation is that 
China and India will emerge as the fastest growing economies and the economic 
cooperation will act as the driving force and the focal point of bilateral ties.
However, “Chindia” is not limited to the economic aspect, but is also being applied to 
broader political issues. The Chindia discourse reflects the optimistic expectations 
about the coming together of China and India. For example, the well-known expert 
Tan Chung translated the English term literally “Zhong Yin da tong” (Sino-lndian 
Commonwealth), and saw Chindia as a prelude to the emergence of a World 
Commonwealth. Thus, despite their bitter experiences and differences over disputes, 
many still believe that China and India will stand together in international affairs as a 
powerful combination.
Indeed, there is a possibility that both countries can enhance cooperation in the 
establishment of a new international order. A certain convergence of views on the 
international order enables them to project a distinctive developing countries’ 
perspective on global affairs. On the other hand, their viewpoints on international 
issues are not always identical or compatible, which also restrains Beijing and New 
Delhi from expanding cooperation.
Basically, both China and India have similar international identities and thus have 
similar preferences. As rising powers, both China and India are seeking great-power
59 Yin Xinan, “Chindia/ ‘Zhong Yin Datong’ yundong jianxi” (“Chindia: Sino-lndian Great Harmony 
Movement in the New Century”), Nanyayanjiu, no.4, 2007, p.85.
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status, and have felt concerned over the dangers of the US strategy of pre-emption. 
Both China and India hold the view that developing countries are in an inferior 
position in an America-dominated international order, and so both are seeking a 
higher position in the international community. They also call for the role of the UN 
to be strengthened to prevent unilateralism and oppose neo-interventionism under the 
guise of human rights issues. As a result, it is likely that India and China could work 
together in the international field in order to advance the establishment of an 
international order and a multi-polar world, in which both countries secure a higher 
position.
As early as in the 1950s, both countries had proposed the Five Principles of 
Coexistence as their vision of the international order. The quest for a new 
international order remains, as it underpins Sino-lndian relations even after 1998. In a 
message to Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee for the 50th anniversary of the 
establishment of diplomatic relations between China and India, Chinese Premier Zhu 
Rongji stressed that India and China shoulder an important responsibility in building a 
new, fair and rational international political and economic order.60 Chinese President 
Hu Jintao also listed the development of “multilateral cooperation for creating a 
multi-polar world” as one of the five-pronged strategies India and China must follow 
in order to enhance their strategic partnership.61 Chinese Ambassador to India Zhang 
Yan also argued that China and India are bound to wield an important and positive 
influence on the transformation of the international order, which is moving in the 
direction of multi-polarity.
60 The Hindu (internet edition), April 1, 2000.
61 Editorial, “Not rivals but partners,” The Hindu (internet edition), November 23, 2006.
62 Zhang Yan, “A perspective on India & China-India ties,” The Hindu (internet edition), July 1, 2008.
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Both India and China are aware of their convergence on international affairs. 
Mechanisms for a security dialogue, strategic dialogue, foreign policy consultation 
and an anti-terrorism dialogue have been established to exchange and coordinate their 
viewpoints. Efforts are being made to help the two countries find common ground to 
speak with one voice at the negotiating table on issues of common interest. The 
potential for Sino-lndian collaboration is well-illustrated in a range of areas, such as 
human right issues, World Trade Organization (WTO) negotiation, climate change, 
energy security and so on.
On the WTO forum, India and China share many common interests in the negotiations, 
and support each other in the WTO for the interests of developing countries. India and 
China have agreed to coordinate their strategies in support of developing countries
/ '■ j
within the WTO. . Particularly, in the Doha Round, India and China have stood up to 
demands by the US and Europe on agricultural issues; they have worked together to 
ensure a development dimension. As a result, they have been most frequently targeted 
by developed countries. By such cooperation, India and China greatly strengthen each 
other and increase the possibility of their aims being fulfilled.
Similarly, on the issue of climate change, India and China objected to any 
arrangements that might slow down their economic growth. India and China have 
become increasingly close allies in the climate change debate. Since the two countries 
are big, populous countries, their cooperative involvement will be the key to the 
success of any international climate deal.
On energy security issues, India and China have seen a steady increase in their energy
63 The Hindu (internet edition), June 26,2003.
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consumption for many years and were previously locked in a battle to secure stakes in 
overseas oil fields. Both China and India recognised that rivalry between them only 
results in unduly large benefits to the seller of the assets. In 2006, the two countries 
decided to establish a framework under which their state-owned oil and gas 
companies could evolve and submit joint bids for the acquisition of assets in third
64countries.
Mutual support against Western resolutions on human rights in international forums 
has been another remarkable example of cooperation between India and China. In 
April 1999, when China won on a no-action motion, the vote was 22 for, 17 against, 
and 14 abstentions; India voted in favour of China’s position.65 It is worth noting that 
at that time Sino-lndian relations were at a low ebb due to India’s nuclear tests of May 
1998. In fact, India continued to vote in favour of China’s human rights record against 
an American resolution in the following years. The message is that New Delhi does 
not endorse Washington’s argument regarding the human rights issue. India itself have 
been often severely criticised by the US State Department’s annual human rights 
reports for a whole range of issues including religious abuses. Beijing and New Delhi 
therefore share an understanding of opposing the use of human rights as a pretext to 
interfere in internal affairs and they have a mutual desire to cooperate on the issue.
That is one of the reasons why not everybody is pessimistic about the prospect of 
China-India relations. Arguing that common interests far outweigh differences, those 
who see future China-Indian relations in a positive light tend to argue that India and 
China have close and similar view points regarding international affairs. To cite one
64 The Hindu (internet edition), January 13, 2006.
65 Renmin Ribao, April 24, 1999, p .l.
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example, the Chinese Foreign Minister, Tang Jiaxuan, said that China and India “have 
more common ground than differences”, and the two countries’ positions are indeed 
very similar and close to each other.66 A similar positive argument also could be found 
on the Indian side. Subramanian Swamy claimed that there are hardly any 
international issues on which India and China have irresolvable fundamental conflicts 
o f interest.
India’s Place in a Multi-polar World
The establishment of a just and reasonable new international order along with the 
quest for multi-polarization of the world has long been on the long-term agenda of the 
foreign policies of China and India. The Chinese side has viewed developing 
countries as the backbone in the process of building a new international order.68 Given 
that both China and India are big developing countries with military strength and 
economic potential, China should be able to convince India to unite to present a joint 
front for a multi-polar world.
Although their similar positions have sharpened the prospects for a new political 
convergence between Beijing and New Delhi, the differences between their roles in 
the new world order are also a stark reminder of the gap between the hype and the 
reality. China’s and India’s blueprints for the future multi-polar word are not the same. 
The two countries do not have a consensus on what a multi-polar world will be and 
what kind of place they currently have in the world.
66 Hindustan Times(internet edition), March 27, 2002.
67 Subramanian Swamy, India’s China Perspective (Delhi: Konark Publishers Pvt Ltd., 2001), p.24.
68 See, for example, Zhan Shiliang, “Fazhanzhong guojia yu guoji xin zhixu” (“Developing countries 
and the new international order”), Renmin Ribao (People’s Daily), December 25, 1999, p.3.
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India is recognised as the biggest power of South Asia and perhaps only Pakistan has 
stood out as the main obstacle to India’s desire to dominate South Asia. However, 
India has also pursued a bigger role in international affairs since independence. The 
first Indian Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, said, “India, constituted as she is, 
cannot play a secondary part in the world. She will either count for a great deal or not 
count at all. No middle position attracted me. Nor did I think any intermediate 
position feasible.”69 This statement is widely quoted by the Chinese side as evidence 
that India has. long been seeking status as a world power.
However, Beijing does not welcome India’s efforts to seek a higher position in the 
world order. Particularly, India’s ambition to be a world power has received harsh 
criticism from the. Chinese side. Some Chinese have argued that India has been “too
70poor to build the country but rich enough to buy arms”. The Chinese have also often
71questioned Indian leaders’ argument that the 21st century would be India’s century. 
This kind of viewpoint apparently does not meet New Delhi’s expectations, as India 
will not accept playing second fiddle to China. Therefore, it is very doubtful that New 
Delhi and Beijing will be able to work together to promote world multi-polarization if 
India is recognised only as a regional power.
There are differences of opinion in Chinese academic circles about India’s status and 
future role in the world. The first school of thought is that India has a very limited role 
at the global level because its strength is conditioned by domestic turmoil and the
69 Jawaharlal Nehru, The Discovery o f  India (London: Meridian Books Limited, 1956), pp.43~44.
70 Shao Zhiyong, “India’s Big Power Dream,” Beijing Review, April 12, 2001, pp.9-10.
71 Qian Feng, “21 shiji shuyu Yindu?”(21st century belong to India?), Huanqiu shibao, October 10, 
2002, p.3.
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peripheral environment. Since its influence is confined to Asia, especially South Asia, 
India is a regional power rather than a global power. By this reckoning, some Chinese 
scholars conclude that India is unlikely to be one “pole” of the multi-polar world in 
the 21st century.72
The second and very different view attaches greater importance to India’s place in the 
world. It argues that India’s strength is increasing and it should be viewed as a world 
power. This school of thought espouses the view that India would be abreast with 
China, Japan and ASEAN and become a pole in a  multi-polar world. In the near future, 
India would be a reputable power in Asia and the world as well. Some even claim that 
India has become a pole already after its comprehensive power was strengthened by 
the reform begun in the 1990s.74
The third school of thought, and perhaps the most popular one, is a compromise 
between the opposite opinions. It deems that India has the potential to rise as a world 
power, but there are numerous hurdles on the road to being a global power. Therefore, 
India’s strength will increase, but it has a long way to go before it becomes a world
75power.
72 Fu Xiaoqiang, “Nanya: zai jinzhang yu tingzhi zhong zou xiang xin shiji”(“South Asia: stepping into 
the new century and intensification and stagnation”), Xiandai guoji guanxi, nos. 1-2, 1999, p.63; 
Liang Jiejun, “kua shiji de Yindu guojia anquan zhanlue”(“India's trans-century national security 
Strategy”), Xiandai guoji guanxi, no.5, 1999, p.27; Deng Changchun, “Yaoyuan de daguo meng: 
Yindu jueqi de qianjing” (“A distant dream of great power: prospects of India s rise”), Nanya yanjiu 
jikan  (South Asian Studies Quarterly), no.2, 2003, pp. 16-19.
73 Wen Fude, “21 shiji Yindu jiang chengwei shijie daguo” (“India: the Approaching World’s Major 
Power in the 21st Century”), Nanya yanjiu (Southeast Asian Studies), no.3, 2005, pp.1-8; Wang 
Dehua, “Yindu hui chengwei weilai de chaoji daguo ma?” (“Will India become a future super 
power?”), Nanya yanjiu jikan  (South Asian Studies Quarterly), no.l, 1998, pp.23-25.
74 Zhang, Wenmu. “Yindu de diyuan zhanlue yu Zhongguo Xizang wenti” (“India’s geo-strategy and 
China’s Tibetan question”), Zhanlue yu guanli (strategy and management), no. 5, 1998, p. 107.
75 Sun Shihai, “Yindu de jueqi: qianli yu zhiyu yinsu” (“India’s rising: potential and constraint factors”), 
Dangdaiyatai (Contemporary Asia-Pacific Studies), no .8 ,1999, pp.3-14; Ma Jiali, “Yindu de jueqi
279
Beijing has acknowledged that India has a significant role to play in international 
affairs, but does not agree that India should occupy the same position as China. A 
former Chinese Ambassador in New Delhi, Cheng Ruisheng, has argued that in terms 
of historical background, geographical location, and overall national strength, China 
is in a higher position than India. Although China is willing to make concerted 
efforts with India for the establishment of a new international political and economic 
order, it has not viewed New Delhi as its peer in international affairs.
UN Security Council Membership
China’s and India’s disagreement about India’s place in a multi-polar world is 
reflected in India’s bid for a permanent UN Security Council seat. Since the early 
1990s, India has laid claims to this seat. New Delhi has been trying to gamer support 
for entering the UN Security Council although it was dealt a blow in 1996 when it lost 
the campaign to become a non-permanent member. From the Indian standpoint, India 
deserves a permanent seat in the UN Security Council in terms of its population, size 
and representational or ideological role in the Third World. The former Indian Prime 
Minister, I. K. Gujral, even argued, “We believe that we qualify for a permanent seat 
on the Security Council on the basis of any global, objective and non-discriminative
7 7criteria”. With its growing economy, India has acquired increasing confidence and is 
making its impact felt in regional and international affairs. India is seeking a greater
taishi” (“The Posture of India’s Rise”), Xiandai guoji guanxi (Contemporary International Relations), 
no.6,2006, pp. 51-55.
76 Cheng Ruisheng, “Zhong Yin guoji diwei de bijiao” (“A comparative study o f the international status 
of China and India”), Nanya yanjiu, no. 2 ,1998, pp.3-7.
77 Sudhanshu Ranade, “India’s place in world politics,” The Hindu (internet edition), April 29, 1998.
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7Rrole on the world stage, especially a seat at in the Security Council.
Beijing is not willing to make any promise regarding New Delhi’s presence in an 
expanded Security Council. During his visit to China in 2000, Indian President K. R. 
Narayanan officially sought China’s cooperation to bring about a democratic 
transformation of the United Nations to serve the interests and aspirations of
70humankind as a whole. Still, China did not make any commitment. During Chinese 
Premier Wen Jiabao’s visit to India, both sides issued a Joint Statement, in which “the 
Indian side reiterated its aspirations for permanent membership of the UN Security 
Council”, but the Chinese side mentioned only that “it understands and supports 
India’s aspirations to play an active role in the UN and international affairs.” A very 
small compromise was seen in A Shared Vision for the 21st Century o f  the People's 
Republic o f  China and the Republic o f  India, signed when Indian Prime Minister 
Manmohan Singh visited Beijing in January 2008, as the Chinese side said it 
understood and supported India’s aspirations to play a greater role in the United 
Nations, including in the Security Council. Apparently, the Chinese side is not willing 
to support India’s bid.
Although the Chinese government chooses to remain ambiguous on the issue, the 
expressions of opinions by Chinese scholars are clearer. A senior Chinese scholar, Ma 
Jiali, has argued that India might not be an appropriate member of the UN Security
o n
Council because it had broken up the process of nuclear non-proliferation. Some 
have even cited India’s failure in the campaign for a rotating non-permanent Security
78 Zhang Yan, “A perspective on India & China-India ties,” The Hindu (internet edition), July 1, 2008.
79 Renmin Ribao, May 30, 2000, p. 1.
80 See N. Ram, “The CTBT will make a real difference,” Frontline, September 12-25, 1998, p. 15.
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Council seat in 1996 as an example that India lacks influence in the world.
Indeed, India’s entry into the UN Security Council will be a valuable factor to 
advance the interest of the developing-country bloc and against the drive by the 
developed world to set its own agenda. Even as India pursues its own interests, it 
could, on the whole, prove a valuable ally in the establishment of a new international 
political and economic order. However, Beijing’s concern is not about maximising the 
legitimate rights of developing countries, but to preserve its own interest as the sole 
representative of developing countries and of Asian states. This position gives Beijing 
a bigger say in international affairs. In order to magnify its influence, China 
emphasises the need to resolutely defend the purposes and principles of the UN
O'}
Charter and the dominant role of the UN in world affairs. Although China is not a 
M l world power yet, its membership of the UN Security Council has become a useful 
leverage against America’s management of regional disputes. China also uses its 
position at the UN to support its allies, and punish uncooperative countries, 
particularly those who are building diplomatic relations with Taiwan.
Given the overlapping constituency, Beijing’s influence will soon be diluted if India 
secures a UN Security Council seat. Thus, it is natural that Beijing would not wish to 
see an emerging India with a standing in the Third World or Asia, which would 
impinge on its authority. As a result, Beijing and New Delhi have been unable to use 
the enlargement of the UN Security Council to affirm multi-polarity as a creed. Given
81 Shao Zhiyong and Xu Xiangjun, “Yindu junli pengzhang wei na ban—fan Guofan Daxue Hu Siyun 
jiao shou” (“The reason for India's build-up: interview with Professor Hu Siyuan o f National 
Defence University”), Guangming ribao (internet edition), November 15,2000.
82 See, for example, Jiang Zemin’s report to the 15th CPC National Congress, titled “Hold high the 
great banner of Deng Xiaoping Theory for an all-round advancement o f the cause o f building 
socialism with Chinese characteristics into the 21st Century”, September 12, 1997.
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that India repeatedly proposed receiving the Beijing regime as a member of the UN 
when communist China was rejected by the UN, China’s grudging support for India 
on the issue only makes New Delhi feel uncomfortable. In contrast, the Chinese side 
maintains that India has overvalued its role regarding helping China secure a position 
in international society in the 1950s.
Therefore, despite the common rhetoric and enthusiasm about the new international 
order and the multi-polar world, China and India find it difficult to structure a global 
condominium, as the two sides are rivals regarding their influence in the world or 
among developing countries. China’s friendly gesture to developing countries is only 
an attempt to increase its own status in the global order. National interests are put 
before the interests of other developing countries even in this globalisation era.
The Parallel Rise o f China and India
While optimists from China and India, such as Tan Chung or Jairam Ramesh, look 
forward with positive anticipation to the future and the role India and China are 
destined to play in the world, there is no denying that there is also increasing 
competition between China and India for influence. Although China is willing to 
make concerted efforts with India for the establishment of a new international 
political and economic order, this does not mean that Beijing has come to view New 
Delhi as its peer. Despite recognising India as a populous nation with an ancient 
civilisation, China merely treats India as a “younger brother” or junior, and is not 
willing to see India emerge as a major power.
83 Sui Xinmin, Zhong Yin guanxi yanjiu: shehui renzhi shijiao (Sino-lndian relations: a social cognition 
perspective) (Beijing: Shijie zhishi, 2007), p.231.
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India, aware of China’s unwillingness, introduced the “parallel rise” discourse to 
assure Beijing that both countries could simultaneously rise as global powers. That is, 
India’s emergence would not thwart China’s ambition to become a world power, and 
as a result, China would have no need to prevent India from rising on the global scene. 
At the banquet in honour of the visiting Chinese President, Hu Jintao, Indian 
President A. P. J. Abdul Kalam said, “The rise of India and China is a stabilising 
factor in today’s international economic order since both countries seek a peaceful
Q A
environment to focus on the paramount task of national development”.
Not surprisingly, the “parallel rise” idea has received wider appreciation in India than 
in China, as the Indian media lost time in claiming that the parallel rise of China and 
India is one of the most significant developments in international affairs.85 Indian 
Prime. Minister Manmohan Singh later developed the idea by arguing that “there is 
enough space for both India and China to grow and prosper while strengthening our 
cooperative engagement.”86 Further, Indian External Affairs Minister S. M. Krishna 
held the view that “India and China may be competitive in economic and trade areas,
on
but they are not rivals. There is enough space for both India and China to grow.”
In fact, the “parallel rise” or “co-emergence” of India and China has remained an 
attractive proposition for China. China’s Ambassador to India, Zhang Yan, also argued 
that China takes a positive view of India’s rise, believing that the “Dragon” and the
84 The Hindu (internet edition), November 23, 2006.
85 Editorial, “Not rivals but partners,” The Hindu (internet edition), November 23, 2006.
86 Manmohan Singh, “India and China in the 21st Century,” speech at the Chinese Academy of Social 
Sciences, Beijing, January 15, 2008.
87 Indo-Asian News Service, July 22, 2009.
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“Elephant” can “dance together” to cooperate and prosper together.88 China’s 
Consulate General in Kolkata, Mao Siwei, said “The joint rise of China and India” is 
referred to in the coinage of the term ‘Chindia’ as “the process of rising will be a joint
o n
one with joint efforts by our two peoples rather than two separate developments.” It 
was seen as a possible development to change the so-called unjust and unfair old 
international order dominated by the West.90
Although there is no denying that the rise of China and India would affect the 
international system, the kind of impact it would have is not clear. More importantly, 
how the two rising powers get along with each other is a question of great 
significance. One Chinese scholar emphasised that “parallel rise” does not mean that 
the two countries would reach the same level of development. The country in an 
inferior position may consider the other as an obstacle on its way to becoming a world 
power.91 It is. unlikely that they will always go beyond their differences to take 
concerted steps. In fact, it will be some time before China and India really can change 
the existing international order with their combined strength; the depth and strength of 
the Chindia relationship may be exaggerated as an optimistic prediction of China- 
India relations.
6.4 Conclusion
8* Zhang Yan, “A perspective on India & China-India ties,” The Hindu (internet edition), July 1, 2008.
89 The Hindu (internet edition), June 7,2008.
90 Wang Yiwei, “Zhong Yin gongtong jueqi de guoji zhengzhi yiyi-cong diyuan zhengzhi fanshi dao 
quanqiu ‘daiong’fa n sh r  (International Political Meaning of the Co-rising of China and India: From 
Geo-politics Paradigm to Global ‘Datong’ Paradigm), Guoji guancha (International Review), no.4, 
2007, pp. 10-18.
91 Zhao Gancheng, “Guoji tixi junheng yu zhongyin gongtong jueqi” (Equilibrium in International 
System and Co-emergence of India and China), Xiandai guoji guanxi, no.7,2006, p.8.
285
On the possible impact of China-India relations on the international order, this 
Chapter provides an assessment of the background and evolution of the Indo- 
American alliance, the China-India-Russia strategic triangle and the concept of 
Chindia.
Given the asymmetrical perception of threat between the two sides, the formation of 
an India-US alliance could help India counter its perceived “China threat”. In contrast, 
Beijing is keenly observing the warming of Indo-American relations, especially on 
issues relating to military cooperation. However, India is not willing to be a pawn in 
US strategy, because it will be more controversial if  it surrenders its strategic 
autonomy to the US
Beijing and New Delhi are in favour of the so-called “anti-hegemonism” struggle 
against power politics, and the China-India-Russia -strategic triangle or Chindia 
concept are seen as instruments to promote the new international order and the multi­
polar world. Those are also part of bandwagoning strategy to reduce threat perception. 
On the other hand, however, while neither the Chinese nor the Indians are very 
trustful of the Sino-lndian relationship, nor are they willing to put their relations at 
risk by joining an anti-America alliance. However, in order to balance their opposite 
needs, interests and considerations of risk, China and India will nevertheless continue 
to look for opportunities to strengthen cooperation on issues of common concerns. 
China, India and Russia are in the process of working out a trilateral dialogue to share 
their common concerns and protect their common interests. Aware of the 
overwhelming power of the US, the three countries may maintain a safe distance from 
the term “strategic triangle” and use a less-loaded phrase, such as “trilateral 
coordination and cooperation” to deepen the trilateral interactions. The existing
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strategic partnership of cooperation among China, India and Russia is playing and 
will continue to play a significant role in reshaping a new international order.
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Chapter 7: Concluding Remarks
This thesis tests the argument that the asymmetry in perceptions of threat between 
related states will encourage the state with a higher perception of threat to take 
initiatives to change the intensity of threat perception. This thesis has thus examined 
the major issues of China-India relations, including the nuclear issue, the boundary 
problem, the Tibet issue, regional competition and cooperation, and China-India 
relations in the global context, in order to identify asymmetrical perception of threat 
as the dynamics and the constraints in Sino-lndian relations with a focus on the post- 
1998 period.
The case of China-India relations suggests at least four significant theoretical 
conclusions. First, regarding the sources of the perceptions of threat, historical enmity 
will not naturally disappear easily with the passing of time, and will continue to 
amplify present perceptions of threat for the affected state. However, historical enmity 
could be treated as a fixed source of perceived threat, because the degree of enmity 
derived from the same historical event will almost remain the same over time. In the 
case of China-India relations, the 1962 border war has been the main source of India’s 
China perceived threat. Although the degree of enmity will not be easily diluted, 
neither will it be increased. Also, while historical enmity will increase the perceived 
threat, historical goodwill is not able to reduce the perception of threat. Worse till, the 
historical goodwill may create some overly optimistic expectations. The attempt to 
mention the history of “Hindi Chini bhai bha?’ has proved futile in improving Sino- 
lndian relations.
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Second, the factor of the state identity functions complexly in the process of reducing 
perceptions of threat. This thesis disproves the traditional axiom that constructing a 
shared identity between states will necessarily help reduce the perceptions of threat. 
On the contrary, interactions between China and India show that a sense of shared 
identity will seek to intensify the perceived threat sometimes. China and India have a 
shared identity as rising powers. As a result, China and India are looking for global 
power status and vie for influence in international and regional affairs. Particularly, 
the process of seeking shared identity is not welcomed by the state with a lower 
perception of threat. That is, China is the comparatively more reluctant of the two 
parties to recognise India’s status as a nuclear state.
Third, this, thesis finds that soft-balancing appears as a preferred option in the process 
of reducing the perceptions of threat. Although hard-balancing measures, such as 
developing nuclear weapons, might have a more immediate impact on the balance of 
threat, the state with a more intensified threat perception is very cautious in taking 
hard-balancing initiatives against its perceived threat as it tends to conclude that the 
cost of openly opposing the perceived threat exceeds the benefits. For example, in the 
case of China-India relations, India is reluctant to play the so-called “Tibet 
Independence” card against China, although it dislikes China’s takeover of Tibet. 
India is also cautious of forming an anti-China alliance.
Fourth, this study indicates that asymmetry in perception of threat between related 
states is a destabilising factor. The state with a more intensified perception of threat 
tends to challenge the status quo as it feels so insecure. Thus, the counterpart state 
should not feel satisfied with asymmetry and ignore the other country’s concerns. If it 
does, it may be “surprised” by the opposing state’s challenge.
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In addition to the above-mentioned findings, this thesis draws on evidence from 
interactions between India and China over the past few years to make an empirical 
case for the existence and impact of asymmetrical perceptions of threat between the 
two countries. The major issues of China-India relations, including the nuclear 
problem, the boundary problem, the Tibet issue, regional competition and cooperation, 
and China-India relations in the global context, have been examined.
Moreover, this thesis has highlighted the asymmetry of perceptions of threat between 
China and India and has explained the interactions of Sino-lndian politics. India tends 
to be deeply apprehensive of threats from China, while China appears comparatively 
unconcerned about threats from India, and finds it difficult to understand why India 
might perceive China as a threat.
In general, India remains caught in the web of the “China threat” perception, and has 
thus avoided annoying China while trying to redress the imbalance between the two 
sides. Thus, the Indian side tried to secure the nuclear deterrent against China. On the 
Tibet issue, it adopts an ambiguous position rather than seeking a definitive solution 
in order to keep the Tibet card in its hand. As regards the boundary problem, on the 
other hand, it is keen to find an early solution that can reduce its perceived security 
concerns. On regional issues, India is still disturbed by China-Pakistan relations, but 
is developing a Look East Policy to increase the pressure on China’s security 
environment. In the global arena, India is working to secure a global-power position. 
However, since the Indian side is cautious about the “China threat”, for most of the 
time New Delhi’s China policy has been a reactive one and allows Beijing to set the 
agenda and tone for talks.1
1 Editorial, “Chinese Checks,” The Times o f  India, June 10,2008, p. 18.
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The Chinese perception of India’s security environment is that itt is evolving 
favourably. In the circumstances, the Chinese find it difficult to understand how they 
pose a threat to India. Targeting China as a threat in order to rationalise Lndia’s nuclear 
tests programme is deeply resented by people in China, who do not share India’s 
concern about a “deteriorating security environment”. They stress that the post-Cold 
War Sino-Pakistani relationship is a normal one. China is not willing to use the 
relationship to challenge India, nor does China want to be involved in India-Pakistan 
disputes, but India’s recent military build-up has raised fears in Chiina of India’s 
“eastward progression” in its desire to contain China. Particularly, Beijing does not 
want to see India forge close relations with the ASEAN states and Japam. Since China 
has secured the upper hand against a challenge from India, there iis a sense of 
confidence in China that it will be able to deal with the relationship wrays that meet 
these objectives.
Despite India’s perception of China’s threat, however, Beijing does not w ant to see the 
two countries in a confrontational relationship. For China, the era of “teaching India a 
lesson” was a costly experience. So, China has no intention off adopting a 
confrontational attitude towards India. It is also not in Beijing’s interest to push India 
away from China or put it on the side of an anti-China alliance. Even if  it has a 
distrust of the Indian government, Beijing is working to engage Indra. It is unlikely 
that China will make it a policy to be hostile towards India. The issue by issue 
cooperation that has been established between the two sides and ithe building of 
common campaign platforms on matters such as climate change will conttinue.
The most important common interest for both countries is to havte a peaceful
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environment so that they can concentrate on economic and social development. The 
two sides have reached an agreement not to let disputed issues get in the way of 
developing the overall relationship. However, there is little evidence that China will 
treat India as a strategic partner. Although China and India are close geographically, 
the psychological distance between the two countries is relatively great. China lacks 
due understanding of Indian security concerns and should seriously face the fact that 
the Indian strategic community is still haunted by the very widespread perception that 
China is a security threat. For example, China’s behaviour is easily interpreted as part 
of a larger design to keep India off balance even as Beijing and New Delhi engaged in 
formal talks to resolve border disputes and generally improve relations.2 While the 
two countries have worked closely to avoid potential points of conflict, it is short­
sighted to ignore their differences. Being rising powers, China and India do not share 
the same understanding of security concerns and both sides are eager to expand their 
own influence. The prospect of forging closer political links hinges on the 
convergence of the security perceptions of both sides.
2 Editorial, “On the Hop,” The Times o f  India, June 23, 2008, p.20.
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